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ABSTRACT
Since the end of the Cold War era in the 1990s and the subsequent intensification of the 
globalization phenomenon, regionalism has become an important development strategy 
for both the developing and the developed countries. This thesis adopts a comparative 
approach to examine the role of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) in the promotion of socio-economic and political development in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. The thesis begins by providing a theoretical background to the concept 
of regionalism. It then traces the emergence of regionalism within the political economy 
of the international system, beginning from the era of mercantilism to the era of 
globalization. It then provides a critical overview of the European Union (the EU), the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Common Market o f the Southern 
Cone (MERCOSUR) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and 
analyses the achievements of these regional integration arrangements in so far as meeting 
the socio-economic and political development needs of their respective regions is 
concerned and builds the framework within which COMESA is compared vis-a-vis these 
regional integration arrangements. Based on the outcome of this comparative analysis and 
the broader literature on regionalism, the thesis identifies some of COMESA’s main 
challenges and makes some recommendations on how COMESA could overcome these 
challenges so as to improve its prospects for playing a more effective development role 
for the Southern and Eastern Africa region. Finally, the thesis concludes that although 
COMESA’s gains from regionalism so far remain minimal—  compared to those o f the 
other regional integration arrangements in this study— it remains a better vehicle for the 
development of Eastern and Southern Africa—more so, in this era of post-Cold War 
regionalism and globalization.
iii
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Background
Regionalism is increasingly becoming a major force in world politics1. Since the end of 
the Cold War, the major economic regions of the world—i.e. the mega-economies of 
North America and Europe and the emerging economies of East Asia—have given 
regionalism a prominent seat in their body-politic in order to accomplish two related 
objectives: first, so that they may be in a better position to mitigate the uncertainties of 
globalization and second, so that they may be in a better position to consolidate new 
socio-economic and political gains from an increasingly globalizing world2.
If these three mega-economic regions o f the world have adopted regionalism as 
one o f the main strategies through which to wither the vagaries o f globalization, the less- 
powerful economic regions o f the world— i.e. Latin America, the Caribbean, South East 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa—have similarly taken a keen interest in regionalism as a 
development strategy in this era of globalization. The renewed interest in regionalism in 
the developing world is clearly manifested by the formation of new regional integration 
arrangements or the rekindled commitment to already existing regional integration 
arrangements in these parts o f the world. Like the powerful economies of the North, the 
less powerful economies o f the South have opted for regionalism as a strategy through 
which they hope to, among other things: cope with the uncertainties o f globalization, stem 
their continued marginalization from the world economy and finally, develop a 
development strategy that will see them gainfully integrate into the emerging global 
economy3.
Existing, newly-formed or reinvigorated regional integration arrangements such as 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (henceforth, ASEAN), the European Union 
(henceforth, the EU), the Common Market o f the Southern Cone (henceforth, 
MERCOSUR), the North American Free Trade Agreement (henceforth, NAFTA), and the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (henceforth, COMESA) are some of 
the organizational vehicles through which states in different regions of the world are 
pursuing the strategy o f regionalism in the post Cold War era. Increasingly, regional 
integration arrangements are becoming a prominent feature in the post Cold War 
international political system. While the international political system has in the past
1
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undergone transformation due to such forces as imperialism, colonialism and the politics 
of the Cold War among others, globalization is currently the main transformative force in 
the international political arena4. Every time each of these global transformative forces 
came to dominate the international political system, they prompted different and unique 
strategic responses and reactions from the key political actors and or players in the 
international system. For example, imperialism and colonialism were marked by an 
expansionist strategy that led to the era o f empire building via overseas territorial 
acquisitions by the leading European imperial and colonial powers5. The resistance and 
the eventual attainment o f independence also marked this global transformative period by 
those who were under imperial or colonial domination6. As the main transformative force 
in international politics since the late 1940s to the early 1990s, super-power rivalry 
between the US and the USSR marked the Cold War era7. Some o f the political strategies 
adopted by the superpowers during the Cold War era period included: building spheres of 
influence in different regions o f the world via satellite states, building alliances with 
ideologically similar-minded political actors or seeking to win over political allies along 
ideological lines. Similarly, during this period, some of the less powerful political 
actors— especially the newly independent states in Africa, Latin America and Asia— 
chose to cope with the uncertainties o f the Cold War era by declaring themselves “non- 
aligned” to neither the Western Bloc nor the Eastern bloc8.
With the end of the Cold War era in the early 1990s, globalization rose in 
prominence and currently, it is the main transformative agent in the international political 
system. Globalization is rapidly altering the hitherto existing Cold War international 
socio-economic and political order. Due to the ubiquitous nature o f globalization and due 
to its unpredictable impact in global affairs, nation-states (the principal actors in the 
international political system since the peace o f Westphalia in 1648) are increasingly 
finding it imperative to come up with new ways of both maintaining political stability and 
ensuring the socio-econom ic development of their citizenry. Regionalism has become one 
of the main strategies through which different political actors, particularly nation-states, 
are responding to and or coping with the transformative forces o f globalization. Given its 
rising prominence in world politics, regionalism is now regarded as an important strategy 
in the socio-economic and political development efforts o f both the North and the South.
2
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What is more, an increasing number of scholars are now acknowledging that given the 
uncertainties o f the current era o f globalization, regionalism is an important factor in the 
development strategies o f both the developing and the developed countries9.
In fact, linking the concept o f regionalism to development has become so 
important in this era that scholars like John Sloan would prefer to aptly refer to 
regionalism as “developmental regionalism” 10 . Having taken cognizance of the 
multifaceted nature o f globalization and the broad range o f issues that it encompasses, 
these scholars have similarly broadened the mandate of regionalism. Hence, according to 
Sloan, unlike the past instances o f regionalism that mostly limited themselves to 
economic concerns, under globalization, the current revival o f regionalism is not only 
about economic growth (a position supported in this thesis) but rather a broader concept 
that encompasses the social and political dimensions o f development as well11. Sloan 
further contends that limiting regionalism to economic issues— as has been mainly the 
case in past studies on regionalism— is imprecise, static and irrelevant to the broader
• 19developmental spectrum within which regionalism currently operates .
However, it must be noted that while regionalism has been widely embraced as 
one of the most viable post Cold War development strategies, its success as a tool for 
development has been uneven. For example, while the developmental gains of 
regionalism have been impressive in Europe, fairly successful in North America and 
increasingly promising in both South East Asia and Latin America, the same cannot be 
said about the gains o f developmental regionalism in Africa where so far, such gains 
remain m inim al13. This thesis seeks both to identity some o f the main barriers to 
successful developmental regionalism in Africa and to make some recommendations on 
how these barriers could be overcome so as to make regionalism a more effective 
development strategy in Africa. Hence, despite the minimal gains that have so far accrued 
from regionalism in Africa, in this thesis, while paying special attention to the case of the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COM ESA), I argue that regional 
integration arrangements still offer one o f the most viable development strategies through 
which the African continent can improve its socio-economic and political conditions. It is 
my contention that successful developmental regionalism in Africa will propel the 
continent into a position where it will be able to generate the resources needed to
3
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effectively deal with its development challenges such as the elimination of absolute 
poverty, the combating and or treatment o f such preventable and treatable diseases like 
diarrhoea and malaria and the improvement o f basic survival skills through the provision 
of basic education to all14.
In defending regionalism as a viable development strategy for Africa, I am aware 
of the fact that a number of contentious issues arise in so far as the efficacy of 
regionalism as a paradigm for Africa’s development is concerned15. These issues are even 
more poignant, especially given the fact that the numerous regional integration 
arrangements that have existed in the continent since the 1960s have so far only made a 
miniscule contribution towards meeting Africa’s development needs16. However, it is my 
strong believe that African policy-makers and other scholars o f African development are 
now in a much better position than they were in the past both to analyse the limitations of 
past regional integration arrangements in Africa and to formulate new and more 
appropriate regional integration strategies that will be relevant to Africa’s development 
efforts17. In this thesis, I seek to make a contribution to this end. Additionally, it is fair to 
say that given the failure o f past development theories (I discuss some of these theories in 
detail below) and the adoption o f regionalism as a way o f promoting the socio-economic 
and political well-being of people in different regions o f the world (including the 
developed world), the African continent has fewer options to development that can match 
the immense potential o f regionalism as a development strategy for Africa18. What is 
more, for Africa—just like it is the case for the other regions o f the world— regionalism 
carries with it the dual advantage of both tempering the negative forces o f globalization 
on the continent while at the same time, acting as a medium through which Africa may 
pursue its development aspirations.
Regionalism offers better prospects o f bringing about political stability as well as 
setting in place the necessary socio-economic structures capable o f bringing about intra- 
regional and trans-regional development in A frica19. However, it must be noted that 
regionalism can only bring about socio-economic and political development to the 
African continent if  and only if the new (or the re-invigorated) regional integration 
arrangements seek to overcome the internal and the external obstacles to successful
4
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regionalism in Africa at the following four levels: the commitment level, the strategic 
level, the sustainability level and the geopolitical level.
First, at the commitment level, the main political actors ( in this case, the African 
political leaders) must be willing to make some concrete political commitment to the 
success of their respective regional integration arrangements, even if  this means ceding 
part of their juridical sovereignty in order to achieve this goal20. In the past, lack of 
political will has been one o f the major hindrances to successful regionalism in Africa21. 
However, I believe that this obstacle can be overcome if  African leaders learn to 
appreciate the fact that successful regionalism in other parts o f the world has only 
occurred partly because of the firm political commitment to regional integration 
arrangements by the leaders in these parts o f the world22.
Second, at the strategic level, regional integration arrangements in Africa must 
seek to develop the necessary infrastructure that will enable them gain the skills needed 
(both at the organizational and national levels) to face up to the present socio-economic 
and political development challenges in the continent . It must be noted that the inability 
to establish, fund or staff regional integration arrangements in Africa with high-calibre 
personnel (capable o f effectively and efficiently running the day to day affairs o f regional 
initiatives in Africa) has been one of the main obstacles to successful regionalism in the 
continent24. At the national level, it is instructive to point out that the individual countries 
within the different regional integration arrangements have not put in place sufficient 
socio-economic and political infrastructure for successful regionalism to take place25. 
These obstacles must be overcome first before successful, development-oriented 
regionalism can occur in Africa.
Third, African countries must realize that since they first got their independence in 
the 1960s and set-up regional integration arrangements as a means to harnessing their 
wealth and promoting development, their efforts have been, to say the least, less 
rewarding. One of the explanations for this is that for the most part, these regional 
integration arrangements were nothing more than non-sustainable initiatives, backed by 
high sounding political statements that had little or no chance of succeeding. A cursory 
look at the current regional integration arrangements in Africa reveals that most o f them 
are still heavy on grand rhetoric and less committed to a light, clear-focused agenda that
5
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will ensure both their sustainability and growth26. In this thesis it is my contention that if 
regionalism is to succeed in Africa, then it must start small, focus on a few socio­
economic and political sectors (such as the promotion of a culture o f good governance, 
investment in health and education, investment in transport and telecommunication 
services and the relaxation or reduction of barriers to intra-regional economic growth) 
that are crucial to the initial stages o f regionalism before expanding out. If this approach 
is not adopted, regional integration arrangements are likely to continue being photo-op 
sessions for African leaders with no real chance of promoting socio-economic and 
political development in Africa. What is more, African countries will continue becoming 
less and less competitive in the global economy and therefore incapable of seizing the 
new socio-economic opportunities that have emerged under globalization27.
Fourth and finally, the other powerful regional integration arrangements must seek 
to be altruistic and therefore willing to both help and allow fragile regional integration 
arrangements like COMESA take root. Regional integration arrangements in Africa, and 
indeed those in other parts o f the third world, must collectively lobby against such 
practises like the EU’s agricultural policies that make it difficult for them to effectively 
compete in those areas where they possess the so-called comparative advantage . What is 
more, African leaders must come to terms with the fact that with the end of the Cold War, 
their ability to play both the West and the East for political gain has been severely 
diminished. Therefore, they must seek to make regionalism work, since it is the only 
effective strategy through which the weak African states can still remain geopolitically
-)Q
relevant in the post Cold War era and therefore ensure their political survival .
From the foregoing, it can be clearly seen that before COMESA, and indeed the 
other regional integration arrangements in Africa, can start playing a meaningful 
development role in Eastern and Southern Africa, it must take a two-pronged approach. 
First, it must seek to overcome the internal and external obstacles to developmental 
regionalism identified at the above given levels. Then second, it must seek to promote 
the internal and external development opportunities made possible under globalization. 
But how can COMESA overcome these internal and external obstacles to successful 
developmental regionalism and in what ways can it promote the internal and external 
opportunities that developmental regionalism has to offer in a highly globalizing world?
6
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In this thesis, I seek to offer some insights into how COMESA could attain these two 
seemingly diametrically opposed goals.
Objectives and Methodology of this study 
Objectives
This study focuses on the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and COMESA 
and seeks both to establish the socio-economic and political trends and characteristics of 
successful regional integration arrangements and, based on these trends and 
characteristics, draw generalizations on the efficacy o f regionalism— in this case 
COMESA—as a strategy that is best suited to meeting Africa’s socio-economic and 
political development needs, especially in this era o f globalization. In order to realize 
these objectives, the study critically examines and analyses the following issues:
>  The Challenges o f development in Africa and some o f the theoretical and 
political explanations and solutions that have been offered to address the 
issue o f Africa’s socio-economic and political under-development, 
particularly since the 1950s to the present.
>  The reasons for the failure of some of the ‘theoretical and political 
development doses’ administered to Africa in the first phase ( 1950s to 
1980s) and the second phase ( 1980s to the 1990s) o f attempts at Africa’s 
development.
>  The role of regional integration arrangements as a paradigm for Africa’s 
development in this era o f globalization.
>  The internal and external context o f COMESA’s dual approach to 
development in Eastern and Southern Africa: First, the challenges that 
COMESA must overcome so as to evolve into an effective regional 
integration arrangement and second, the opportunities that it must seize so 
as to increase its prospects o f offering an effective strategy for Eastern 
and Southern Africa’s socio-economic and political development 
aspirations.
7
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Methodology
This is a qualitative study that is based on an in-depth analysis o f COMESA as 
well as a comparative analysis o f COMESA and other regional integration arrangements 
in Europe (the EU), in South East Asia (ASEAN), in North America (NAFTA) and in 
Latin America (MERCOSUR). Owing to resource and other logistical constrains, I could 
not travel to the field to conduct interviews, surveys and or make personal observations 
on the functioning o f regional integration arrangements in Africa and the other regions—  
Europe, Asia, Latin America and North America—that I have analyzed in the study. 
However, through a careful analysis o f the secondary data that included scholarly texts 
and other related materials like journals, published government statistics and institutional 
databases o f the regional initiatives in this study as well as the institutional databases of 
other reputable organizations, I was able to establish fairly predictable socio-economic 
and political trends and patterns o f countries that are likely to be successful at 
developmental regionalism. Based on these trends and patterns, I was able to analyse the 
efficacy o f regionalism in COMESA and therefore draw general conclusions on why, 
compared to other development strategies o f the past and in spite o f its currently limited 
gains, regionalism offers better prospects for Africa’s development.
For comparative purposes, and so as to develop a clear picture o f the status of 
COMESA vis-a-vis other regional integration arrangements, four regional 
organizations— each from a different geographic region o f the world— are incorporated 
into this study. These regional organizations are: the European Union (the EU) for the 
European region, the Common Market o f the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) for Latin 
America, the Association o f South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for Asia and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for North America. These regional 
organizations represent both the developed (the EU and NAFTA) and the developing 
(ASEAN and MERCOSUR) world and are therefore likely to offer a more balanced view 
on the general trends and patterns o f successful developmental regionalism. Since 
regional integration arrangements in Africa are still locked up in the battle o f confronting 
political, economic and institutional difficulties, I believe that a comparative analysis of 
regional integration arrangements in Europe, Asia, North America and Latin America will 
offer COMESA vital lessons on how to both confront and overcome or reduce the degree
8
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of some of the institutional, political and economic obstacles that have thus far hindered 
COMESA’s development efforts in Eastern and Southern Africa.
In this study, I used both the interpretive and the critical approaches to conduct a 
comparative analysis o f COMESA and the other regional integration arrangements
 ̂nidentified above . I adopted these approaches for two main reasons. First, since 
COMESA, and by extension all the other regional integration arrangements in this study, 
is in the constant process of becoming, the interpretive approach— with its clear emphasis 
on the fact that human beings are always in a process o f becoming and that this process of 
becoming entails being influenced by how they see themselves, by how others see them 
and by what they want to become— offers an apt portrayal o f some of the assumptions 
made in this study in so far as developmental regionalism in Africa is concerned31. One of 
these assumptions is that although the development gains from COMESA are currently 
minimal, over time and with the right set of policies choices and goals, COMESA will 
evolve into an effective tool for socio-economic and political development in Eastern and 
Southern Africa.
Second, since it places an obligatory role on social scientists that requires them to 
act as advocates o f change and social justice to all in society, the critical approach is 
important in this study, especially given the fact that the current socio-economic and 
political development status quo in Africa cannot be sustained32. The current status quo 
in Africa is one of intolerable socio-economic deprivation anchored on non-viable 
political systems and practices . Indeed, owing to this status quo, there is an urgent need 
for political scientists to candidly confront both the internal and the external causes of 
socio-economic and political under-development in Africa through illuminating research 
that highlights the crisis of development in Africa under the current status quo and how 
this crisis could be resolved34. This candour requires that political scientists be forthright 
in condemning certain values like corruption (manifested through economic 
mismanagement), political repression and violence or unfair trade practices— all o f which 
have made development in Africa almost impossible— while extolling others, such as 
democracy, the rule o f law and fair trade practices that are urgently needed to make 
development in Africa possible35.
9
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Based on the interpretive and the critical approaches, I make two key arguments in 
this thesis. First, at the interpretive approach level, I argue that although COMESA has 
not so far made substantial inroads into meeting the socio-economic and development 
needs of the Eastern and Southern Africa region, it would be improper to dismiss its 
potential in meeting these needs. This is because COMESA is still in the process of 
becoming and this process may as well be a long one. However, as long as COMESA is 
willing to take stock of its performance (something to which it seems to be currently 
resolutely committed to)36 and as long as it is willing to capitalize on its gains, learn from 
its failures and reasonably emulate the successes of other regional integration 
arrangements, then there can be no denying the fact that it stands a better chance of 
evolving into a formidable development avenue for Eastern and Southern Africa.
Second, at the critical approach level, I argue that poor political leadership in 
Africa, wrong resource allocation priorities at the national socio-economic level and 
unfair economic and political practices at the international level— particularly by the rich 
Northern countries— are some of the main reasons that explain the dismal performance of 
regional integration arrangements in Africa. Based on this argument, I contend that 
COMESA, and indeed other regional integration arrangements in Africa, can only 
become effective development models if and only if they abandon wrong values (e.g. a 
staunch commitment to juridical sovereignty, political repression and economic 
mismanagement) that have impeded regionalism in Africa since the 1960s and embrace 
correct values (like the willingness to cede some of their juridical sovereignty, the 
promotion of democratic governance and commitment to sound economic management)
i i
that are needed for successful developmental regionalism to take place . Similarly, I 
argue that COMESA will improve its socio-economic and political development record if 
and only if the other powerful international players abandon the pursuit o f anti­
regionalism values, like subsidies to their farmers and other unfair economic and political
practices, and instead embrace values that will assure their own advancement w hile at the
• 38same time giving other less powerful players like COMESA some room to thrive .
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-Chapter One—
(i) Introduction
An extensive amount o f literature has been written concerning development in the third 
world39. The bulk o f this literature generally dwells on two related issues: the crisis of 
third world development and the factors causing this crisis40. The literature is replete with 
both the explanations on the causes o f third world under-development and the possible 
diagnosis to this under-development41. While “development” and “third world country” 
remain contested concepts with no precise or concise definitions, there exists a general 
consensus on some o f the features and characteristics that distinguish the third world (also 
known as the developing world) from the first world (also known as the developed world). 
Here, I adopt Handelman’s categorization of these features and characteristics and seek to 
discuss the concept o f developmental regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa within the 
following three distinguishing categories o f under-development: Economic
Underdevelopment, Social Underdevelopment and Political Underdevelopment42 . 
Together, these features and characteristics make up what can be referred to as ‘the 
commonalities o f third world under-development’ and help in identifying some of the 
reasons why the gains from developmental regionalism remain low in Africa compared to 
other regions o f the world43.
A number o f development theories and strategies have been formulated to address 
the issue o f third-world under-development. However, these theories have so far failed to 
adequately address the question o f under-development in the third world. Given the 
failures o f these past theories, perhaps it is about time that a new strategy and approach to 
confronting third world under-development were adopted. This thesis focuses on under­
development in the African continent and seeks to examine the role o f regionalism in both 
overcoming the challenges o f and improving the prospects for development in Africa. In 
this thesis, I examine the case o f the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) and argue that, compared to the different theories o f development or the 
different structural reform approaches that have so far failed to effectively address 
Africa’s crisis of development, regional integration among the countries in this regional
11
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initiative offers a better strategic approach to development in Eastern and Southern 
Africa44.
Regionalism ( in this case, as envisaged in COMESA) is a better strategy for 
development in Eastern and Southern Africa in particular and to Africa in general because 
of its capacity to directly and locally intervene in the development process at both the 
political and the socio-economic level45. First, at the political level, unlike modernization 
theories which are generally seen as a form of external ideological imposition on the 
African continent, regional integration arrangements are generally seen as decidedly 
home-grown political initiatives among independent African states out to improve the 
socio-economic and political conditions of their people46. What is more, unlike 
modernization theories, regional integration arrangements do not normally carry the 
overtly condescending message of “us, the modern and developed west from whom you 
must learn versus you, the traditional and under-developed African continent who had
better leam from us or else ” that is a central plank of the modernization theory. On the
contrary, COMESA—just like the other regional initiatives in other regions o f the 
world— is a product o f political negotiation and compromise among a group o f willing 
and equal political actors— in this case those independent states in Eastern and Southern 
Africa— who have joined this regional initiative.
As a product o f negotiation and compromise, COMESA stands a better chance of 
nurturing a culture of political dialogue and confidence building in the Eastern and 
Southern region of Africa. A culture of political dialogue and confidence building is 
particularly crucial for Africa where political conflict continues to hamper the prospects 
of sustained development47. Therefore, regional integration arrangements are one of the 
possible avenues through which political stability could both be established and 
maintained on the African continent. It is not difficult to determine that the constant 
instances of political conflict that have dogged the African continent over the last four 
and a half decades have had a devastating impact on the prospects o f development in the 
continent48. For example, as a result of these conflicts, vital human and material resources 
have been wasted in wanton acts of destruction that have turned some countries in Africa 
into socio-economic and political wastelands, despite the fact that some of these countries 
are endowed with immense natural wealth49. The current political conflict in the great
12
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lakes region among the Democratic Republic o f Congo, Uganda and Rwanda and the 
accompanying socio-economic and political misery that this conflict has visited on the 
peoples of these countries is a prime example o f the negative impact o f political conflict 
on Africa’s development50.
Although the Democratic Republic o f Congo, Uganda and Rwanda are all 
members of COMESA, they have intermittently engaged in acts of political conflict since 
the horrors o f the genocide in Rwanda hit the great lakes region in 1994. However, the 
fact that these COMESA members are locked up in political conflict should not be 
construed as a failure o f regional integration in Africa. On the contrary, this should be 
construed as part o f the institutional limitations that COMESA must overcome before it 
can broaden its role in the development of Eastern and Southern Africa. What is more, 
the continuing conflict among some COMESA member-states in the great lakes region is 
a clear indication that regional integration arrangements in Africa have not yet developed 
the necessary socio-economic and political mechanisms to effectively deal with political 
conflict among their member states. The foregoing contention is supported by the 
existence of compelling evidence in the literature that in other regions— such as the EU in 
Europe and MERCOSUR in Latin America—where such mechanisms have been 
developed, regional integration arrangements have succeeded in securing the necessary 
political stability needed for sustainable development51. It is encouraging to note that
• • • • 52there are clear indications that COMESA is striving to establish these mechanisms . 
Therefore, it is not far-fetched to say that once these mechanisms have been established, 
COMESA will acquire the capability needed to secure the much needed political stability 
that is crucial for sustained development in this region of the world.
Second, at the socio-economic level, regional integration arrangements are an 
important tool for development since, unlike the dependency theories that advocate for 
the development of Sub-Saharan Africa outside the mainstream global economy, their 
development agenda is formulated within the context of improving their over socio­
economic development within the global economy53. Furthermore, unlike the arrogant, 
“one-size-fits-all” prescriptive development approach advocated for by structural- 
institutional reformists, regionalism— as already noted above— advocates for negotiation 
and compromise as opposed to prescription and order-taking as the basis upon which
13
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sustainable development is built. Therefore, since COMESA’s approach to the 
development o f Eastern and Southern Africa is based on negotiation and compromise, it 
is likely to promote a better understanding o f the socio-economic and political 
development challenges in this region through such cooperative efforts like the pooling of 
knowledge, experience and resources54. I will discuss the merits o f regionalism as a 
development strategy for Eastern and Southern Africa in detail in the subsequent chapters 
o f this thesis. In the meantime, let us examine some o f the leading development theories 
before embarking on a substantive analysis o f the role o f regionalism in Africa’s 
development within the framework o f these theories.
While most o f the development challenges currently confronting most African 
countries can be traced back to the eras o f imperialism and colonialism, the literature on 
both the causes o f Africa’s under-development and the suggestions o f the possible 
solutions to this under-development is relatively new (dating mainly from the 1950s) in 
the political economy of international development. Here, I divide this literature into the 
following three main chronological phases: the theoretical-developmentalism phase, 
marked by various theories o f development; the structural-institutional reform phase, 
marked by the structural adjustment programs; and the strategic-regionalism phase, 
marked by the rise o f regional integration arrangements. I examine these phases in turn.
(ii) The Theoretical-developmentalism Phase
The theoretical-developmentalism phase was prominent from the 1950s to the late 
1970s55. This phase was marked by a number o f competing theoretical explanations and 
suggestions on the causes o f and the possible solutions to third-world under­
development56. I do not intend to delve into a detailed analysis o f these theories here. 
However, since the application o f most o f these theories largely failed to bring about 
development in Africa, a brief synopsis stating what kind o f development strategy they 
stood for, how they failed to bring about the desired development and why there exists a 
need to critique them within a new strategy o f development (in this case regionalism), is 
in order. Different scholars have grouped the development theories into various 
conceptual categories57. Here, I discuss them within two broad categories: Modernization 
theories and the Dependency theories.
14
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
• Modernization theories
The concept o f a traditional society is central to this school of thought58. 
According to modernization theorists, the essence of a traditional society is that it is 
stagnant and unchanging59. It is this stagnant and unchanging nature o f the traditional 
society setting that is inimical to development. The following are some of the hallmarks 
of a traditional society: people lead fairly routine lives, they do not strive after profit in 
their daily work but for subsistence, they are not innovative and finally, people make no 
attempts to better their lot60. Since the modernization theorists explain socio-economic 
and political development in terms of the processes and institutional changes that society 
undergoes— in this case, from the traditional society to the modem society—they argue 
that no development can occur in the stagnant and unchanging world that is the traditional 
society61. The modernization theorists would characterise most of the Sub-Saharan 
African countries as being traditional. Therefore, according to modernization theorists, 
the biggest challenge that must be overcome before development can take place in Sub- 
Saharan Africa is the breaking up of the firmly entrenched traditional mind-set among the 
states and peoples o f this region.
In contrast to the traditional societies, the modem societies are associated with the 
following: organizational sophistication (manifested through specialization,
differentiation of roles and functions in organizations and government), technological 
improvement (manifested through an increase in the means o f producing goods and 
services) and attitudinal differences (manifested through “modem” attitudes that are 
characterized by increased knowledge, rationality, secular values and individualism)62. 
According to modernization theorists, the foregoing features are the key ingredients to 
development and only those societies that seek to acquire these features and therefore 
strive after modernity, have any reasonable chance for socio-economic and political 
development63. The modernization theorists would characterize Western states/countries 
as being modem64. The modernization school o f thought is based on the idea that Sub- 
Saharan African countries (and indeed all the developing countries o f the third world) 
will have to follow the same path that Western states did if they wish to modernize, nay, 
attain desirable levels o f socio-economic and political development65. But how do we
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establish the rationale (and therefore the legitimacy) for this Western-oriented path to 
development? I attempt to answer this question next.
Historians in the modernization school of thought point out to the fact that about 
five hundred years ago, most people in the world were poor, mostly living in traditional 
societies66. Although the literature is mixed on whether the standard o f living was the 
same in different regions of the world at this time, there can no denying the fact that most 
people everywhere in the world lived at very low standards compared to the norms in 
today’s wealthier countries67. Then, sparks o f scientific discovery occurred in widely 
scattered parts o f the world (i.e. in the Middle East, China, Africa, Europe and South 
America) . However, due to various historical reasons, scientific inquiry led to consistent 
technological innovation mainly in Western Europe and not the other parts o f the World69. 
Coupled with the entrepreneurial spirit o f capitalism, this technological innovation 
provided the push that led to Western Europe’s evolution from the traditional society to 
the modem society. Walt Rostow captured the process o f this evolution through a five- 
phase airplane take-off metaphor70.
According to Rostow’s development metaphor, Britain was the first airplane to 
take off from tradition to modernity in the late nineteenth century71. It was then followed 
over the next century by France, Germany and other European countries and by the
• 77United States, Canada and Australia . The twentieth century saw the take-off o f  Russia,
• 1"XJapan and several smaller Asian countries . Since then, the planes in different parts of the 
third world have made little progress or no attempt at flying at all74. Simply put, the fleet 
of the majority o f third world countries is still at the airport, their airplanes grounded. As 
a result, these countries are still stagnant and still traditional as they have been for 
centuries75. Therefore, the main development task for these countries is to make sure that 
their fleet is propelled into motion and that they are set on the runway, ready to start the 
takeoff journey that will launch them into the high skies of development. What is more, 
the modernization theorists argue that unlike the pioneer countries that had to plunge into 
the development runway without any role models to emulate, the countries o f Sub- 
Saharan Africa have numerous examples o f success stories (mainly from the West) that 
they can emulate in their journey to socio-economic and political development76. In fact, 
owing to this line of thinking, in the 1950s and the 1960s, most of the development
16
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programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa were inspired by the modernization theories and 
heavily supported by the West77.
However, the modernization theory o f development suffers a number of 
limitations. Here, I identify three. First, based on Rostow’s airplane metaphor, what 
happens if the planes on the ground choose not to snag onto the hooks offered them by 
the planes that are already in flight? This could happen for example if  they fail to (and 
many of them have failed to) develop the preconditions for takeoff, i.e. the right kind of 
education, the right kind of legal system, the right kind o f political systems ( right kind in 
this case being western-based) or the necessary levels of sectoral mobility needed for
70
development takeoff . Second, what happens if the planes that are already flying are 
slowed down, and therefore made to lose the power that they need in order to lift the 
grounded planes into flight79? If this were to happen (and it happened for example during 
the global recession o f the 1980s), one o f the fundamental tenets o f the modernization 
theory will not hold. According to this tenet, the already developed countries must 
continue to develop and grow if they are to assist the poor. Modernization theorists argue 
that without growth in the developed countries, there will be no new capital for 
investment in Africa and the rest o f the third world and markets in the developed world 
will not expand to stimulate export growth in Africa and the rest o f the third world80.
Finally, drawing a dichotomy between what is traditional and therefore under­
developed and what is modem and therefore developed is not a simple and straight­
forward task as the modernization theorists would want to have us believe. In fact, the 
reality is that the cultures o f the world are greatly varied. Hence, they are both traditional 
and dependent81. Accordingly, even at the heart o f the so-called modern societies of 
Western Europe, one can still find a lot that can still be regarded as traditional. For 
example, the religious forms of the rich countries— i.e. the many variant forms of 
Christianity and Judaism— have ancient origins and yet are still vital cultural heritages for 
many82. These traditional cultural beliefs show no signs o f  disappearing. On the contrary, 
some forms o f these practices, such as charismatic and fundamentalist Christianity, are 
growing stronger as people in the West turns to them to make sense out the constant
• 83changes and dislocations in their society .
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16th century93. As a result, capitalists from Europe began to seek profits from all over the 
globe94. Slowly, the pre-sixteenth century socio-economic and political order began to be 
transformed by these European capitalists. The search for profits through the production 
of agricultural goods for sale became the dominant force in the world economic system. 
Gradually, Europeans seeking profits came to control the rest o f the world. This control 
was exerted either formally and administratively through colonial empires or informally 
and commercially through European economic might and Europe’s capacity to strike 
unequal bargains with the other less powerful political entities in different parts o f the 
world95.
With the accumulation o f wealth and the expansion of their socio-economic and 
political power across the globe, the Europeans established a capitalist market system that 
has dominated the world since the sixteenth century to the present96. The dependency 
theorists argue that the problem with this capitalist process o f development is that while 
the process has, on one hand, led to the emergence of a core of rich, mainly Western 
capitalist countries, it has, on the other, led to the emergence o f a periphery o f poor, 
mainly third-world countries that have been drawn into the world economy in a manner 
that makes them dependent on the industrial countries o f the West97. For example, as a 
result of this dependency, the workers o f the poor third countries are often drawn into 
doing the socio-economic and political bidding o f the west. Hence, they produce raw 
material for export to the rich countries; they work for foreign companies and they are 
normally caught up in the geopolitical power struggles of the economically advanced 
countries; and finally, they are culturally and economically dominated since they are
98required to speak the language o f the ex-colonial powers and use their currencies . 
Therefore, according to dependency theorists, it is not that the poor countries are in some 
sort of primitive, unchanged state as the modernization theorists would want to have us 
believe99. On the contrary and for better or worse, these countries have been changed by 
centuries o f contact with the rich countries100.
Dependency theorists also see a host o f other problems with the capitalist 
economic system. Here, I list four. First, dependency theorists are critical of the role of 
western multinational firms in the socio-economic and political affairs o f most third 
world countries. According to them, some of these multinationals have dominated weak
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third world countries in ways that, for example, distort the structure o f the domestic 
economy of their host countries through policies that create vast income gaps or seek to 
pursue self-serving economic priorities that have rendered genuine development in the 
third world impossible. Second, the dependency theorists criticize the tariff policies in the 
rich countries by arguing that these policies dictate the sorts o f industrial patterns that the 
poor countries can choose while at the same time stifling the competitive capacity of 
these countries101. Third, dependency theorists argue that the major banks o f the rich 
countries are conduits for the siphoning-off of resources from the third world102. In the 
same vein, they fault international economic agencies such as the World Bank and the 
IMF for imposing policies that are favourable to the rich countries and detrimental to the 
poor ones . Fourth and finally, dependency theorists argue that the problems o f under­
development in the third world are caused by unequal exchange, which is manifested in 
the declining terms of trade for the third world104. Due to the declining terms o f trade, the 
relative prices o f third world country exports have been falling over time while the prices 
of their imports from the industrialized world have been rising105.
The dependency theorists argue that as a result o f the declining terms of trade, the 
third world countries have been caught up in a circular trap. This circular trap functions as 
follows:
Export prices are low because wages in the third world are low, and prices of 
industrial goods are rising because wages in the rich countries are high and rising. 
In turn, wages in the third world are low because the terms o f trade are moving 
against the third world, and wages in the industrial world are high because the rich 
countries have been able to exploit the poor. Exploitation creates poverty, which 
permits more exploitation, and the circle goes around106.
Therefore, while modernization theorists sees the capitalist system as offering the socio­
economic and political salvation for the poor countries, the dependency theorists see 
capitalism as the main culprit behind the socio-economic and political damnation o f the 
poor countries107. So what option(s) do dependency theorists offer for the third world’s 
socio-economic and political development? We shall now turn our attention to some of 
these options.
The dependency theorists offer a number of possible strategies for third world 
development. First, there are those in this school who argue that the best course o f  action
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for the third world in so far as development is concerned is to fight fire with fire108. 
According to this strand o f dependency theorists, the third world can consciously seek to 
transform capitalism from an enemy to a saviour109. In order to support their contention, 
these scholars point to the capitalist success stories of Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea 
and Malaysia, all o f which have adopted capitalism to unleash creative entrepreneurship 
in the manufacturing sector and acquired levels o f success that are challenging those of 
the rich Western countries110. However, this strategy has not been widely embraced by 
the dependency theorists. For example, some argue that while the capitalist strategy has 
brought about success in scattered parts o f the third world, it has also reproduced the 
tensions and inequities found in the economically advanced countries.
The second strategy for socio-economic and political development in the third 
world is offered by the liberal wing o f the dependency theorists111. According to liberal 
school of thought, capitalism should be the main philosophy guiding development in the
i i
third world . However, these theorists argue that capitalism should be subject to strong 
state guidance so as to ensure that it serves the real needs o f the people and not the 
external demand of foreign markets113. Proponents of this view support such protectionist 
economic policies like: import substitution industrialization, the erection of tariff barriers 
against foreign imports, the implementation of effective government economic plans and 
the establishment o f public financial institutions that favour some sectors (considered 
crucial to national development) over others114. As a result o f the views of this school, a 
number o f third world countries like Sri-Lanka and Kenya sought to develop their 
economies along import substitution industrialization policies but for these and other 
countries that adopted a similar strategy, the development record has not been 
impressive115.
However, most dependency theorists regard the first two strategies as half-hearted, 
if not outright naive116. The bulk of these theorists fall within the radical school of 
dependency theory and call for full socialist revolutions in the third world that includes 
the expropriation o f private enterprises (both foreign and domestic owned), so that the 
people as a whole, acting together through their governments, can combat the destructive 
forces of capitalism117. While this school of thought continues to inspire the socio­
economic and political development policies o f such countries like Cuba, it has greatly
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lost its appeal, especially since the demise o f the Soviet Union118. What is more, some of 
the third world countries that sought to pursue their development along strictly socialist 
lines (e.g. Tanzania under Ujamaa) failed to bring about the desired levels o f socio­
economic and political development to their citizens119. So what are some limitations of 
the dependency theory and why did the dependency approach fail to bring about the 
desired levels o f development in Sub-Saharan Africa and indeed in the majority of other 
third world countries? While numerous reasons have been advanced to explain the 
limitations of the dependency theory, for the purposes o f this thesis, the following three 
will suffice.
First, one o f the biggest limitations of the dependency theory is that its advocates 
tend to exclude the internal dynamics of the state from their analysis120. In fact, the 
dependency theorists often portray the third-world states/countries both as innocent and 
helpless victims o f vicious Western capitalist countries121. However, such a portrayal is 
far from the reality. While the Western capitalist countries have had a tremendous (and 
sometimes a negative one ) impact on the socio-economic and political aspirations o f the 
third world countries, it will be dishonest not to acknowledge the fact that some of the 
problems of third-world under-development are solely attributable to the internal 
dynamics in these countries. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, internal ethnic tensions 
have been largely responsible for such anti-development outcomes as the 1967 civil war 
in Nigeria and the horrors o f the 1994 genocide in Rwanda122. Additionally, continued 
practices o f poor political governance and economic mismanagement have seen such 
resource-rich countries like the Democratic Republic o f Congo and Angola reduced to
A'J'i
levels of abject poverty .
Second, the dependency theorists assume that the state o f dependency is an
unalterable fact o f third world existence124. These theorists homogenize the experience of
all third world countries into one preconceived pattern arising out o f colonialism
However, it is important to note that though most third world countries were under
colonial domination at one point o f time or another, it is difficult to say that all o f them
had similar colonial experiences. For example, while the countries of Asia and Latin
America received substantial levels o f investment during the colonial era, those in  Africa 
126barely received any . Even in Africa, the colonial experience was varied. Hence, while
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independence was preceded by violent clashes between the British and the Mau Mau in 
Kenya, the French and the Algerians in Algeria, and the Boers and the anti-apartheid 
forces in South Africa, independence was generally conflict-free in places like Ghana, 
Uganda and Tanzania127.
Third and finally, dependency theorists do not explain why states in the third 
world differ so greatly in their socio-economic and political development policy choices
1 O H  • •and outcomes . Some third world countries (especially the so-called Asian Tigers) have 
been able to make impressive development strides while others (especially those in Sub- 
Saharan Africa) have made negligible progress129. While the dependency theorists 
maintain, at least at the ideological level, that the only way for third world countries to 
attain development is by breaking free from the global capitalist system, they are hard put 
to explain the fact that the Asian Tigers have not attained their impressive development 
record by breaking with the global capitalist system but rather, by productively 
integrating their economies into this system. So, between the modernization and the 
dependency theories, which theory best captures the challenges o f development in Sub- 
Saharan Africa and which theory offers viable solutions to the crisis of development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa?
There is no simple and straightforward response to the foregoing question. For 
example, the explanations behind development are so numerous and varied that it is not 
possible to pin down one explanation as the source or basis of development in any given 
state or region o f the world. In fact, some scholars even go to the extent o f questioning 
whether the mainstream development (modernization and dependency) theories discussed 
above have any role at all in the development o f the third world. Take the case o f the 
Asian Tigers for example. While the modernization theorists would be quick to take 
credit for the impressive economic growth in these countries, the mainstream 
development theory sceptics would argue that these countries have made tremendous 
strides in the economic development front not so much as result of modernization theories 
but largely due to other development strategies (in this case, the developmental state 
strategy) that are hardly recommended by the modernization theorists130. Hence, although 
most African countries attempted to bring about development to their citizens based on 
these theories, it is important to point out that while most o f them did not succeed in
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doing so, the development successes in other regions o f the third world are not 
necessarily as result o f these development theories.
Another important point to note is that both the dependency and the modernization 
theories were normally shaped and defined within the realities o f the bi-polar (Western 
capitalism under the leadership o f the US and Eastern communism under the leadership 
of the USSR) world that dominated the international political order since the late 1940s to 
the early 1990s. The modernization theory clearly fell within the Western capitalist 
ideology while the dependency theory, even though its main theorists sought to 
distinguish it from the US-USSR rivalry, was mainly based on an Eastern-leaning 
communist ideology. Therefore, even when it became clear that these theories were ill 
suited in meeting the development needs of the third world, they continued to be pursued, 
mainly as a result o f other geopolitical reasons.
However, it is important to acknowledge the fact that these theories have made— 
and indeed continue to make— an important contribution to our understanding of the 
development challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is because, while the modernization 
and the dependency theories suffer from various conceptual limitations in their respective 
bid to define the concept “development” and how development can be realized, they 
nonetheless offer some explanations which, if  but partially, sharpen our general 
understanding development concept and what it is and how it can be attained131. Be that 
as it may, it is equally important to note that while these theories were meant provide a 
basis upon which “development” in Africa could be pursued and therefore realized, most 
of them failed to bring about the desired development to this continent132.
Hence, by the beginning of the 1980s, it was becoming increasingly clear that a 
new mode of thinking was necessary if African countries were to make any meaningful 
socio-economic and political development strides. So, where did this new mode of 
thinking, especially in so far as resolving the problems of Africa’s under-development, 
come from? Unlike the first phase o f development theory that had been mainly dominated 
by development theorists and scholars backed by respective super-power legitimacy, the 
second phase of dealing with Africa’s under-development (beginning in the 1980s) was 
not based on a concrete and rigorous theoretical foundation. Instead, structural- 
institutional reforms as carried out under the policy recommendations o f Western-leaning
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international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, in the context of waning 
Soviet influence, marked the main approach to development in this phase133. The IMF 
and the World Bank have been at the forefront o f pushing for Africa’s development under 
the Structural Adjustment Programs (S.A.Ps)134.
Since the 1980s, theoretical-developmentalism has increasingly given way to the 
structural-institutional reform phase of development strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa 
and the rest the third world135. As already noted above, this phase has not been so much 
driven by a concrete theoretical argument as it has been by an ideological— free market 
neo-liberalism— one. Under structural-institutional reform, the free-market neo-liberal 
ideology has provided the main approach to socio-economic and political development. 
So far, the so-called Washington Consensus has provided the intellectual legitimacy for 
free market neo-liberalism and given a stamp o f approval to the IMF, the World Bank 
and the G8 (excluding Russia) to pursue a neo-liberal, free-market development agenda in 
the third world136.
However, just like the theories under the first phase had failed to bring about 
development to Africa, the second phase theories (though still being championed to 
varying degrees by the IMF and the World Bank as the magic dose for Africa’s 
development malaise) have so far failed to bring about development in Africa137. In fact, 
the application of the structural-institutional reform strategies to Africa’s development 
has only exacerbated the crisis o f development, especially since this approach has led to 
the collapse of such vital development input sectors like education and health138. What 
then are the other options for African countries in their quest to attain meaningful levels 
of sustainable development, especially given their dismal failure to attain development in 
the first phase o f theoretical-developmentalism and the non-impressive development 
record of the second phase o f structural-institutional reform? Additionally, given the fact 
that most African countries continue to face the threat of a greater degree o f  socio­
economic and political marginalization, more so in this era of globalization, what 
development strategy can Africa adopt in order to stem this continued marginalization 
and to bolster its chances o f meaningfully integrating into the new global economy? In 
response to these questions, I argue that regional integration arrangements offer the most
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viable option both for overcoming the development challenges in Africa and for laying 
the foundation for sustained socio-economic and political development in the continent.
However, as I have already pointed above, before regional integration 
arrangements can become effective mechanisms o f development in Africa, the main 
challenges hindering their effectiveness must both be identified and addressed. In this 
thesis, I analyze the case of COMESA in a comparative context and examine both the 
challenges and prospects facing this regional integration arrangement in its bid to bring 
about sustained socio-economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa. 
I analyse COMESA’s challenges and prospects for development in Eastern and Southern 
Africa within a broad conceptual framework set out in the context o f the following four 
questions:
(i) What are the main theoretical contentions on regionalism and why have 
regional integration arrangements become a prominent factor in the 
international political system, especially since the beginning of the 1980s?
(ii) What are some of the socio-economic and political characteristics of 
successful regional integration arrangements and what role do these 
characteristics play in the promotion o f developmental regionalism in different 
regions o f the world?
(iii) Given the comparative study of COMESA vis-a-vis the EU, NAFTA, 
MERCOSUR and ASEAN, what lessons can COMESA learn from these 
regional bodies in so far as the establishment o f successful regionalism is 
concerned?
(iv) What challenges must COMESA overcome and what opportunities must it 
seize if it has to evolve into a vehicle through which sustained socio-economic 
and political development could be attained in Eastern and Southern Africa?
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. In this 
chapter, I discuss some of the leading development theories— modernization and 
dependency— and strategies (structural-institutional reform) and point out why these 
theories and strategies have failed to bring about socio-economic and political 
development in Africa and why they should be replaced by developmental regionalism.
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Chapter two is a theoretical discussion o f regionalism. Here, I provide an in-depth 
analysis o f the various theories on regionalism and attempt to discuss COMESA and the 
other regional integration arrangements identified in this study through various theoretical 
perspectives. In chapter three, I look at regional integration arrangements within the 
political economy of the international political system. Chapter four provides a general 
overview of the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA in terms of their 
objectives, institutional structures and operations and their contribution to the socio­
economic and political development o f their respective regions. Chapter five focuses on a 
comparative analysis o f COMESA versus the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN. 
In this chapter, I establish important trends and patterns for successful regionalism and 
then discuss the challenges that COMESA faces before making some recommendations 
on how COMESA can improve its role as a central institution for Eastern and Southern 
Africa’s development. I then look at COMESA’s prospects o f bringing about socio­
economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa before drawing a 
general conclusion that overall, COMESA has better prospects for promoting 
development in Eastern and Southern Africa compared the other theories and or strategies 
of development that have been previously promoted in the region.
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2 7
--Chapter Two—
(i) Regional Integration Arrangements: A Theoretical Perspective
In this study, a theoretical perspective on regional integration arrangements is imperative 
for a number o f reasons139. Here, I list four central reasons, which though formulated 
within the general context o f the importance o f theory in political science, are specifically 
relevant to role o f theory in regionalism. First, theory is central to the creation of 
definitions, concepts and categories around which the analysis o f regional integration 
arrangements is conducted. Second, theory exposes the assumptions that remain explicit 
and unquestioned in descriptive or historical regionalism. Third, a theoretical perspective 
o f regional integration arrangements sharpens our understanding of the main explanatory 
variables and causal mechanisms in the study o f regionalism. Fourth and finally, regional 
integration theory provides us with a coherent framework for systematically comparing 
regional integration arrangements in different parts o f the world140.
While the theoretical literature on regionalism is enormous, it is at the same time 
uneven and fragmented141. Most o f the theoretical work on regional integration has been 
formulated within the context o f European integration, specifically, the European Union 
integration142. In this section, I first begin by focusing on the theoretical work that has 
emerged out o f the European integration process and the debate this work has generated 
on whether European integration theories can offer replicable generalizations to the 
integration process o f other regional integration arrangements in different regions o f the 
world143. Then second, I proceed to examine integration theory within a broader extra-EU 
conceptual context. However, before embarking on an examination o f the European 
Union integration theories and their relevance to other regional integration arrangements, 
it is perhaps important to try and develop an understanding as to why Europe is such a 
strong focal point o f integration theory. I embark on this task next.
Two main sets o f events help explain why Europe is the dominant minefield of 
integration theory144. First, events taking place in Europe in the 1950s and the 1960s (a 
period which coincided with the formative years o f integration theory) helped propel 
Europe into the forefront o f integration theory. This was a period of profound
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Europe into the forefront of integration theory. This was a period o f profound 
transformation in Europe’s socio-economic and political landscape in which established 
patterns of political authority were being radically re-ordered. For example, Europe had 
just emerged out o f a devastating war — World War II— that had seen the hitherto 
existing balance o f power tilt in favour o f two ideologically-opposed camps. These camps 
pitted Western Europe against Eastern Europe and effectively divided Europe into an 
Eastern Bloc (under the USSR tutelage) and a Western Bloc (under the US tutelage)145. 
Second, apart form the new geopolitical alliances, the European nation-states had been 
politically diminished and economically destroyed by the war. As a result, Europe was 
engaged in a dual process o f both trying to find a way o f regaining its lost political 
authority while at the same time re-building its ruined economic base146.
For Western Europe, forging closer socio-economic and political co-operation 
among the states o f the region was one of the ways through which economic and political 
power could be regained147. What is more, the emerging Cold War rivalry between the 
USSR and the US saw the latter actively encourage regional integration among western 
European states in its bid to create a strong economic and political bulwark against
1 AQ
apparent Soviet expansionism . Hence, it can be argued that the onset o f a new geo­
political order (marked by the Cold War rivalry between the USSR and the US) played an 
important role in fostering the emergence of a new political order in Europe149. One of the 
manifestations of this new political order was a Western Europe that made attempts to re­
organise its socio-economic and political structures in a manner that necessarily followed 
an underlying logic that anticipated a new sort o f a politically and economically stronger 
state-form that was “above” the nation-state that had existed prior to the Cold W ar150. The 
other manifestation o f this order was an Eastern Europe that was under the tight grip and 
control of the USSR, with its keen ambition to expand its socio-economic and political 
frontiers151.
In Western Europe, the desire to forge a new political and economic entity that 
was “above the nation-state” laid the foundation o f European integration theory since it 
triggered theoretical discussions on what this new supranational entity was likely to look 
like or whether it was even likely to emerge at all from the ashes o f post World War II
1 ̂ 9and therefore replace the hitherto existing European nation-states . For example, neo-
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functionalist and inter-govemmentalist theories emerged around this period153. These
theories offer competing explanations for the emergence o f regional integration in
Europe154. According to neo-functionalism, the key actors in regional integration
arrangements are the supranational institutions— like the European Commission—who
make and implement important integration policy decisions155. Inter-govemmentalists
disagree. Unlike the neo-functionalists, inter-govemmentalists argue that the key actors in
regional integration arrangements are the national executives who determine the policy
directions and outcomes o f the integration process156. Hence, while neo-functionalism is a
theory of national change and transformation, inter-govemmentalism is a theory that
emphasises the supremacy o f the nation-state and therefore international political anarchy
as usual157. From the formative years of integration, the focus o f the theoreticians was
either the collective international and trans-national institutions and the emergence (for
neo-functionalists) or the non-emergence (for inter-govemmentalists) o f significant non-
1state actors in the world polity
The early theoretical tradition (mainly dominant in the 1950s and the 1960s) on 
European integration was deeply anchored in the vocabulary of the discipline of 
international relations159. For example, the alleged relationship between the nation-state 
system and war on one hand and the role of post-national forms o f organization and peace 
on the other that informed the debate on international politics during this period had an 
impact on the theoretical formulations of integration theory 160. However, before 
explaining how this debate influenced integration theory, a brief summary of the main 
theories that informed these earlier debates is in order.
The main political debates of the 1920s and the 1950s focused on war and peace 
as envisioned by either realism or liberalism. After World War I, Liberalism earned a lot 
of theoretical clout among the intellectuals and politicians of the first part o f the twentieth 
century161. According to these intellectuals and politicians, humanity needed to turn itself
• 1 f t " )  «to the avoidance o f war . The desire among the post World War I and inter-war era 
liberal intellectuals and politicians was to steer the world away from war towards 
peaceful international cooperation and co-existence163. However, while the liberals sought 
to create a world o f peaceful cooperation and co-existence, the realists argued that 
conflict among states, and not cooperation, was the modus operandi of international
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politics164. The realists’ position rose in prominence especially after the outbreak of 
World War II cast serious aspersions on the liberalists’ efforts at promoting international 
cooperation and peaceful co-existence among states165. It is this early realist and liberalist 
debates on the nature o f international politics that laid the foundation o f integration theory 
and because o f these debates, two diametrically opposed theoretical views on regional 
integration emerged
The first category o f theorists—those who believed in the role o f post-national 
forms of organization in the post World War II era (i.e. the neo-functionalists) — thought 
that they could lead creative policy-makers into designing rational institutions to secure 
better forms o f governance (and hence the avoidance o f war) in a modem, interdependent 
world166. The second category of theorists—those who believed in the supremacy of the 
nation-state in the post World War II era (i.e. the inter-govemmentalists)—argued that the 
emergence o f regional integration in Western Europe was not a reflection of a new post­
national global order but rather, a reflection o f the actions of national executives and the
• t  • 1 f \ lrespective international power-dynamics o f the time .
While these debates hold decidedly divergent views on Western European 
integration, it is important to note that the transformative events taking place in post- 
World War II Europe, especially those ignited by post-national activities like the Treaty 
of Paris (1951)— which brought together six European nations into some form o f trans­
national economic cooperation—  ignited a theoretical debate that firmly established
• 1 AS •
Western Europe as the centre of integration theory . This debate continues to form part 
of the broader contemporary literature on integration theory. And just like the original 
debates, the current debates on European integration have generated more points of 
contention that have led to or little no consensus in so far as integration theory is 
concerned169. I will now turn to a brief discussion o f some of the theoretical debates that 
are currently dominant in the European integration theory with particular reference to the 
European Union (the EU).
The EU integration theory can be examined within the following four theoretical 
domains:
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1. The EU as an International Organization
International Organizations (IOs) are inter-governmental bodies designed in the 
explicit context o f converging state preferences or common interests170. From this 
perception of international organizations, an examination of the EU quickly makes it is 
clear that the EU is more than a straightforward instance o f an international organization. 
Unlike most international organizations, the EU has peculiar institutions and a unique 
configuration o f internal forces that makes it difficult to analyze it in the same manner as
171other international organizations . Therefore, the EU cannot be seen as a mere 
International Organization and hence, this domain is not adequate in developing our 
understanding of the EU in particular and integration theory in general since it fails to 
offer a convincing explanatory theory for EU integration and by extension, other regional 
integration arrangements in other regions of the world.
2. The EU as an instance of regionalism in the global political economy
The aim o f this theoretical domain is to offer reflections and possible 
generalizations about the tendency of groups of territorially adjacent states to cluster
172together in blocs . In exploring this tendency, a number o f guiding questions can be 
posed. For example, is it possible to make meaningful comparisons between the EU and 
other regional groupings such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
the Association o f South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Common Market of the 
Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) among other comparisons? Or, do instances of regionalism arise in similar 
sorts of circumstances regardless o f time or place? Or, do global economic and political 
pressures force and or enable the creation o f regional integration arrangements? Or, how 
do variations in levels o f institutionalization in regional integration arrangements affect 
the interests and preferences o f actors? Or, does the emergence of regional integration 
arrangements have implications for the construction of new identities and the 
deconstruction of established ones, especially at both the elite and the popular mass levels? 
Or, do regional integration arrangements accelerate or retard free trade and 
multilateralism? Or, finally, do regional integration arrangements pose a uniform threat to 
the nation-state and the international system of states?
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The foregoing questions are important in helping us formulate a theoretical understanding 
of the EU as an instance of global regionalism. In fact, these questions are important in 
sparking off debate on such important theoretical issues as to whether the EU integration 
theories can be replicable in other regional integration arrangements. I discuss this issue 
further below. Here, it is only important to note that in order to formulate an EU 
integration theory within a global context, a broad array o f questions covering various 
socio-economic and political facets of integration must be asked and a rigorous 
theoretical paradigm established to answer them.
3. The EU as a useful site for the study of policy-making dynamics
Another theoretical domain contends that the EU is a complex policy-making 
system whose perspectives on policy-making procedures—developed in the context of 
national polities— can be put to the test and further developed as a model for other
1 7Tregional integration initiatives to emulate . In this theoretical domain, attention is 
turned to the interaction o f interested actors and the processes o f agenda setting, policy 
formulation, legislation, interest intermediation and policy implementation. The analysis 
of the actions of different players and their impact on different processes offers useful 
integration insights on such issues as the loci o f power within the EU and the relationship 
between formal and informal policy processes174. From this theoretical vantage-point, 
one can assess policy networks and the role o f institutions during such novel moments as 
when national (old) and supranational (new) politics overlap175. While a number of 
different regional integration arrangements have paid heed to this theoretical domain and 
attempted to replicate the EU experience within their respective integration initiatives, 
some theoreticians have argued that the EU is a unique entity that cannot be replicated 
elsewhere.
4. The EU as a unique entity unto itself
Some theoreticians, like William Wallace, have argued that the EU is a sui generis 
i.e. there is only one EU and hence EU integration cannot offer a theoretical testing site 
from whence broader regional integration generalizations can be drawn176. According to 
these theoreticians, rather than treat the EU as a theoretical paradigm for other regional
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integration arrangements, the EU should be treated as a historically rooted phenomenon 
arising in specific conditions and therefore without meaningful historical or contemporary
1 77parallel . Wallace has succinctly declared the uniqueness o f the EU in the following 
terms:
The experience o f deep integration within Western Europe does not provide a 
model for others to follow. Its historical development was rooted in the stage of 
economic development and a security framework that have now disappeared. The 
institutional structures that West European governments agreed to under those 
past circumstances have managed to respond to the very challenges posed by 
economic and industrial transformation in the 1970s and the 1980s. Political, 
economic and security motivations have been entangled in the evolution of West 
European regional integration from the 1940s to the 1990s178.
The view that the EU is a unique entity whose experience cannot be generalized to other 
regional integration arrangements has not only been confined to scholars o f European
1 70integration theory . In fact, some scholars o f the newer regional integration 
arrangements— especially in Asia-Pacific— support this position when they contend that 
the EU is a bad example, which should not be followed by other aspiring regional 
integration initiatives180.
Be that as it may, the theoretical approach that seeks to view the EU integration as 
a unique historical development that cannot be generalized to other regional integration 
arrangements has been strongly criticized for promoting crude empiricism181. According 
to critics of this theory, this approach tends to chronicle the EU without offering a  broader 
insight into the theoretical issues or the normative questions about the “real” problems
1 87facing Europe and its citizens . Additionally, these critics contend that viewing the EU 
as a unique integration experience whose dynamics cannot be generalized to other 
regional integration arrangements is a direct affront to the work of numerous integration 
theoreticians who have developed theories (with the European Union in mind) with the 
intention of having these theories generalized to other integration initiatives183. Hence, in 
their retaliatory response, those scholars who hold the view that the EU is a model of 
integration theory for emulation by other up-coming regional initiatives defend their 
position by arguing that two phenomena do not have to be exactly identical in order to be 
compared effectively184.
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This thesis relies on a comparative analysis of five different regional integration 
arrangements to make generalizations on the challenges and prospects of COMESA as a 
viable development strategy for Eastern and Southern Africa. Therefore, I support the 
view that it is possible to make effective comparisons between the EU and other regional 
integration arrangements, even when these— as is clearly the case with COMESA and the 
other regional integration arrangements in this thesis—are not identical to the EU. 
However, while the EU integration theory offers some invaluable and useful insights into 
the study of regionalism, it is important to note that other integration theoreticians have 
sought to develop a theoretical understanding of integration outside the ubiquitous grip of 
the EU integration theory. My thesis draws from these other non-EU focused integration 
theories as well. Hence, an analysis o f these non-EU focused theories is in order.
Most o f the contemporary debates on integration theory take as their starting point, 
the contentious issue of definition185. The theoreticians who pay attention to the issue of 
definition aver that a proper theoretical formulation o f regional integration theory cannot 
be attained unless a “clear definition of the term integration” or what integration entails is 
provided186. However, focusing on the definitional aspect of regionalism poses other 
significant problems. For example, what does a “clear” definition o f regional integration 
entail? Or put another way; is it really possible to come up with a firm and concise 
definition of such an amorphous and indeed dynamic concept as regional integration? 
The complexity o f defining regional integration is reflected in the fact that attempts to
1 R7define this concept have so far generated more questions and fewer answers . For 
example, is regional integration an economic phenomenon or a political one? Does 
economics influence regional integration or is regional integration influenced by politics? 
Or, how does the interaction between economics and politics (political economy) 
influence regional integration? Alternatively, is regional integration a process or an 
outcome? The list o f questions seems to be endless or can indeed be made endless. 
However, since the focus of my thesis is largely on how the process of regional 
integration could be used as a paradigm of development in Africa, I limit myself to 
examining regional integration within the definitional context of process and outcome.
Taken as a process, Ernest Haas offers two insightful definitions o f regional 
integration. First, Haas defines integration as the voluntary creation of larger political
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units involving the self-conscious eschewal o f force in relations between participating
• 1RRinstitutions . Second, in a fairly elaborate definition, Haas contends that integration is:
the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new 
centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing 
national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new 
political community superimposed over the pre-existing ones189.
From the definitions above, it can be seen that Haas views integration as both a process 
and an outcome of conscious political actions.
However, other theoreticians like William Wallace, while defining integration 
within the context of process and outcome, are keen to alert the students of integration to 
the relationship between economics and politics in integration theory. Wallace seeks to 
tease out this relationship by making a distinction between integration as a process and 
integration as an outcome190. He particularly distinguishes between formal and informal 
aspects of integration191. On one hand, formal integration consists of outcomes such as 
institutions, policies or legislative change that have been brought about as a consequence
i
of deliberate political sanction . On the other hand, informal integration involves 
processes that have effective economic consequences without formal authoritative
1 cnintervention . Richard Higgott offers a more or less similar definition of regionalism 
that favourably compares to that of Wallace, especially when he makes a distinction 
between de facto  structural regionalism and de jure  institutional economic cooperation194.
Another important aspect to note about Wallace and Higgott’s approach to 
integration is that both o f them predicate their definition o f regional integration within the 
context of political economy, especially since they attempt to draw connections between 
the political and economic forces that shape the emergence o f regional integration 
arrangements195. Defining regional integration arrangements within this context has dual­
pronged merits. On one hand, defining regional integration within the context o f political 
economy is beneficial because it offers ample room that allows for several theoretical 
permutations to be made196. First adopting a political economy approach to regionalism 
could, for example, lead to the following conclusion: changes in the informal economic 
domain, manifested through heightened capital mobility, increasing volumes o f  cross- 
border trade, alterations in the production process and shifting corporate strategies
36
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
decisively structure and constrain the agenda of authoritative political actors197. Second 
and as Rosamond contends, within the political economy context and faced with no 
options in the face o f the changes emanating from the informal processes in the regional 
economic domain, governments seek closer cooperation through the construction of 
regional political institutions designed to capture and control the emergent informal
1QReconomic processes . In this case, the political dimension o f regional integration is 
brought about as a consequence o f the intensity o f the agglomeration effects o f regional 
economic activity199. Third, under the political economy approach, it can be argued that 
formal political actions involving deliberate government sanction help the creation of 
regional integration arrangements. In this case, economic and political integration can 
only happen if  states enact policies that, for example, promote regional economic or 
political activity or both200.
Therefore, it can be seen that a political economy theoretical approach to regional 
integration draws our attention to the fact that the creation o f regional integration 
arrangements is determined by different economic and political dynamics. This may in 
turn mean that different periods o f integration may require different theoretical 
perspectives and different strategies for establishing regional integration arrangements201. 
Hence, for example, in regions where there are minimal chances o f creating regional 
integration arrangements through economic agglomeration effects (and this is clearly the 
case for COMESA and other regional integration arrangements in Africa), direct political 
involvement may be the most appropriate way of establishing a regional group. In other 
regions (especially those that already have high prior regional economic linkages like 
North America and Western Europe), political involvement may only be needed to co­
ordinate a well-developed regional network of social and economic activities.
So far, the theoretical views that I have examined above sought to develop our 
theoretical understanding of regional integration initiatives by attempting to define the 
concept of “regional integration” as both a process and an outcome within the context of 
political economy. While this approach is illuminating, it is not necessarily exhaustive. 
Therefore, instead of attempting to develop a regional integration theory by focusing on 
political economy, other theorists have sought to formulate their theories by developing a 
set of features and characteristics that broadly defines the concept “regionalism”202. The
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early theoreticians (the late 1960s and the early 1970s) who adopted this approach 
analysed the concept “regionalism” in terms o f the following four features and 
characteristics :
• Social cohesiveness: regionalism is defined in terms o f such factors o f social 
cohesion as ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, history, consciousness and 
a common heritage
• Economic cohesiveness: Economic factors such as trade patterns and economic 
complementarities are crucial in the definition of regional integration.
• Political cohesiveness: In defining regionalism under political cohesiveness,
factors like regime type and ideology are taken into consideration.
• Organizational cohesiveness: Finally, regionalism is defined in terms of the
existence (or non-existence) o f formal regional institutions.
Having examined the views of the early (both EU and non-EU focused) integration 
theories, let us now turn our attention to some contemporary (mainly spanning the period 
from the 1980s to the present) regional integration theories. These theories embrace either 
the political economy or the characteristics approach to regional integration or a 
combination o f both.
1. Regionalization:
Regionalization refers to the growth o f societal integration within a region and to 
the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction204. This process of 
regional integration formation is also referred to as informal integration or soft 
regionalism. At the socio-political level, regionalization involves the development of 
complex social networks manifested through increasing flows o f people, the expansion of 
shared political attitudes and the creation of a trans-national civil society205. At the 
economic level, regionalization involves the development of trans-border growth triangles, 
industrial corridors or increasingly dense networks linking industrial centres. An 
important point to note about the process o f regionalization is that it is not necessarily 
driven by conscious inter-regional state policy.
38
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2. Regional awareness and identity
Regional awareness and identity refers to the shared perception of belonging to a 
particular community. This perception can rest on a set o f internal factors such as a 
common culture, a common history or common religious traditions206. It can also be 
defined against the external “other”, in which case it may primarily be understood in 
terms of a real or perceived external socio-economic and or political threat207. Some 
common examples o f regional awareness and identity being defined in terms of an 
external ‘other’ include Westem-Europe’s self-image defined as against the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War or Latin American nationalism as defined against US hegemony or 
African nationalism as defined against European colonial and post-colonial domination.
3. Regional inter-state cooperation
Inter-state cooperation involves the construction o f interstate or intergovernmental 
agreements and regimes. The cooperation can either be formal or informal and does not 
necessarily depend on high levels of institutionalization. Regional inter-state cooperation 
serves two main functions. First, it can be a means of responding to external challenges 
and co-ordinating regional positions in international institutions or negotiating forums. 
Second, it can be developed to secure welfare gains, promote common values and solve 
common problems, especially those arising as a result of increased levels o f regional 
interdependence208. This process of regional integration is highly statist and seeks to 
make the state the focal point of any regional integration initiatives209.
4. State-promoted regional integration
This process of regional integration involves specific policy decisions by 
governments designed to reduce or remove barriers to mutual exchange o f goods, services, 
capital and people. This is the most popular form of regional integration and an extensive 
amount of literature has been written on this process210. Although economic issues are 
only one aspect o f regional integration arrangements, state-promoted regional integration 
is mainly concerned with economic integration. It is mainly evaluated on the basis of 
scope (the range o f issues involved), depth (the extent of policy harmonization),
3 9
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institutionalization (the extent of formal institutional building) and centralization (the 
degree to which effective authority is centralized)211.
5. Regional cohesion
Regional cohesion refers to the possibility o f the four processes identified above 
coalescing, at some point, into a cohesive and consolidated regional unit212. Regional 
cohesion can be understood in two senses. The first sense is when a region comes to play 
a defining role in the relations between the states o f the region and the rest of the world 
while the second is when the regional organization formed among states o f a region takes 
over a central role in regional policy formulation across a range of socio-economic and
ry 1 'S
political issues common to the integrating states .
It is important to note that there are various models upon which the move towards 
regional cohesion may be based. Here, I identify six possible models through which 
regional cohesion might be attained are214. One model may be the gradual creation of a 
supranational regional integration arrangement based on deepening economic integration. 
A second model may involve arriving at regional cohesion through the creation o f a series 
of overlapping and or strong inter-state arrangements or regimes. A third model may 
draw from a complex mix of traditional inter-govemmentalism and supra-nationalism, a
• “7  J Sfactor that may be prominent in the case o f the EU . A fourth model might involve 
attaining regional cohesion through the development o f consociational constitutional 
arrangements. A fifth model may have a ring o f the neo-medieval order where the 
principles o f territoriality and sovereignty are replaced by a pattern of over-lapping socio­
economic and political identities and authorities in a cohesive regional unit. Sixth and 
finally, regional cohesion might be modelled on a strong regional hegemon, which sets 
the socio-economic and political agenda within its regional sphere of influence and does 
so with or without strong regional institutions216.
6. Systemic theories and regional integration arrangements
Systemic theories emphasize the importance o f the broader political and economic 
structures within which regional integration arrangements operate and the impact of 
external pressures on a given regional integration arrangement217. These theories seek to
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understand the character of regionalism by looking at a regional integration arrangement 
from “the outside-in” and within this perspective, analysing its place in the broader 
international system . Integration theorists identify the following two sets of systemic 
theories:
(a). Neo-realism
Both classical realism and its more recent neo-realist variant stress the importance 
of external configurations o f power, the dynamics o f political power competition and the 
constraining role o f the international political system as the main determinants of 
understanding and defining the character of regional integration arrangements219. Hence, 
the neo-realists, for example, argue that the end o f the Cold War in the 1990s makes it 
easier for us to understand the extent to which Europe shifted from the 1940s and the 
early 1950s mindset o f the Cold War era ( an era that was based on intense ideological 
competition between Eastern and Western Europe) to the active promotion o f regional 
integration and cooperation across Europe, especially since the 1990s to the present .
Further, the Neo-realists argue that underlying these initiatives o f regional 
integration arrangement is not a concern for the socio-economic and political welfare of 
the participating states but rather, their desire to either become global economic and 
political powers or their need to escape from real or imagined economic and political 
domination by other external pow ers221 . Viewed from this perspective, regional 
integration arrangements are products of power-politics that are geared towards 
responding to fears o f a dominant hegemon among weak nations-states (who then chose 
to come together to leverage their power against the said hegemon) or in response to 
the demands o f a hegemon who wants to establish her sphere o f influence among a group
223 . . . .
of weak states . However, the neo-realists have been criticized by the structuralists for 
what the latter call “the neo-realists mischaracterization o f the international system224”.
(b). Structural interdependence
While agreeing with the neo-realist’s contention on the importance o f systemic 
factors in understanding the character of regional integration arrangements, structural 
interdependence theorists argue that focusing on systemic factors alone offers a  narrow 
and simplistic view of regionalism225. According to structuralists, a systemic approach is
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narrow and simplistic because it neglects the competitive dynamics o f changes (that are 
not always necessarily adversarial and state-centric) in the international system226. Hence, 
structuralists contend that structural interdependence among states— intensified by the 
current globalization trends towards ever deepening socio-economic and political 
interdependence— offer a better theoretical understanding of the character of regional 
integration arrangements than that offered by the neo-realists . As already noted above, 
neo-realism and structuralism are concerned with “outside-in” factors in formulating 
integration. Other theories, to which we next turn, focus on “the inside out” factors in 
their analysis o f regional integration theory.
7. Regionalism interdependence theories and regional integration 
arrangements
In contrast to the ‘outside-in’ analysis adopted by systemic theories in explaining 
the character o f regional integration arrangements, regionalism and interdependence 
theories see a close link between regional actors (as opposed to global) and regional 
interdependence as the basis of integration . The theoretical clusters in this school are: 
neo-functionalism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism. On one hand, neo­
functionalism and neo-liberal institutionalism view regionalism as functional responses 
by states to the problems created by regional interdependence . These two theories 
stress the critical role o f institutions in fostering and developing regional cohesion . On 
the other hand, constructivism lays greater emphasis on the relationship between material 
interdependence and understandings of identity and community within different regional 
integration arrangements231. The following is a brief discussion of these theories.
(a). Neo-functionalism
This theory is based on the prediction that regional integration arrangements will 
evolve to eventually become self-sustaining . Neo-functionalists argue that high and 
rising levels o f interdependence among integrating states will set in motion an ongoing 
process o f cooperation that will move a regional integration arrangement from economic 
integration among the integrating states to the political integration o f the integrating 
states . This theory gives supranational institutions a central role in advancing regional
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integration arrangements and argues that integration will take place through functional 
spill over and political spill over234. Under functional spill over, partial small steps down 
the integration road would create new problems that could then only be solved through 
further integration . Political spill over will occur when the supranational institutions in 
place set in motion a self-reinforcing process o f institution building236.
(b) Neo-liberal institutionalism
Neo-liberal institutionalism is based on three core conceptions. First, this theory 
contends that increasing levels o f inter-dependence generate increased demand for
'y in
international cooperation . Hence, the institutions in a regional integration arrangement 
are viewed as purposively generated solutions to different kinds o f collective action 
problems. Therefore, the norms, rules and institutions in a regional integration 
arrangement are generated because they help states deal with common problems and 
because they enhance their welfare .
Second, neo-liberal institutionalism is heavily statist. It lays more emphasis on the states 
as the vanguard between the national and the international239. In this regard, liberal 
institutionalism shares a striking similarity with neo-realism. However, unlike classical 
neo-realism, this theory does not view states as constant sites o f inter-state conflict. On 
the contrary, liberal institutionalism contends that mutual inter-state cooperation is 
possible240.
Third, neo-liberal institutionalism argues that in any regional integration 
arrangement, institutions matter241. Institutions are important because they have an 
impact on the benefits that individual integrating states get and the ways in which they 
define their interests242. What is more, the importance o f institutions in regional 
integration arrangements is reinforced by the fact that they provide vital information to 
the integrating states, reduce costs of operation, develop convergence o f expectations, 
facilitate the productive use of issue-linkage strategies, discourage cheating or defection 
and in a general sense, lengthen the shadow of the future243.
(c) Constructivism
Constructivists argue that regional integration arrangements are a result of both 
regional awareness and regional identity, forged on a shared sense o f belonging to a
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particular regional community244. Under this theory, the character o f regional integration 
arrangements is constructed through three main ways. First, the regional integration 
character is built on a sense of a “we-ness” that is fostered on mutual sympathy, loyalty 
and a shared identity. Second, regionalism is based on collectively held norms arising out 
of the compatibility o f the integrating states on major societal values such as capitalism or 
liberal democracy. Third, the character o f regional integration is based on processes of 
social communication that lead to an increase in the level o f transaction among the 
integrating states.
8. Domestic level -theories and regional integration arrangements
These theories focus on the role o f shared domestic attributes and characteristics 
to explain the emergence of regional integration arrangements245. A number of 
integration theorists have sought to explain the emergence o f regional integration 
arrangements by defining the character o f regional integration arrangements in terms of 
ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, history and consciousness of a common 
heritage246. Domestic-level theories offer the theoretical framework within which these 
theories are analyzed. Under these theories, the emergence o f regional integration 
arrangements can be understood through three main theoretical explanations. These are:
(a) Regionalism and state coherence
While a number o f regional integration theorists have argued that the role o f the 
state is becoming increasingly diminished under the current era o f globalization, theorists 
on regionalism and state coherence contend that the state is still a central component of 
regional integration arrangements247. According to the regionalism and state coherence 
theory, the apparent diminished role o f the state is largely due to lack of legitimacy within 
states, a situation that has been partly brought about by the end of the Cold War248. 
Hence, this theory holds that the possibility, and indeed the success, o f regional 
integration arrangements is likely to depend on the internal coherence and viability o f the 
state structures o f the integrating states249. In fact, the theorists in this school o f  thought 
argue that the absence o f viable states have made the process o f nation-building and 
regional integration in most parts o f Africa and South Asia difficult, if  not almost
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impossible250. On the contrary, the most successful regional integration arrangements (e.g.
the EU and NAFTA) have been possible in regions where state structures remain
relatively strong and where their legitimacy is not called into question by internal socio-
1
economic and political forces .
(b) Regime type and democratization
Democracy and the democratization process have a fundamental role in both 
shaping the character and prospects o f successful regional integration arrangements. 
Regime type and democratization theorists argue that the wave of democratic transitions 
that have swept the world since the 1980s can be plausibly implicated in the current 
phenomenal revival o f regionalism . For example, according to these theorists, regional 
integration arrangements in Latin America emerged against the background of a region- 
wide shift away from military regimes to more open democratic regimes253.
However, these theorists caution that while democracy and democratization are important 
ingredients in regional integration arrangements, they are not always a necessary 
condition. Hence, illiberal, and even violent, regimes in South East Asia, Latin America 
and Africa have formed regional integration arrangements even when democracy and 
democratization are not their forte 254 . Despite this fact, the regime type and 
democratization theorists emphasize the link between democracy and regionalism and 
argue that integrating states with a strong democratic culture are more likely do succeed 
at regional integration than those with a weak or no democratic culture255.
(c) Convergence theories
Convergence theorists argue that the convergence of domestic policy-preferences 
among the integrating states increases the chances for the formation o f successful regional 
integration arrangements . For Example, applied to the EU, convergence theory would 
argue that the EU is not a grand project o f individual nation-states moving towards a 
supranational entity but rather, the best means of sheltering/protecting particular domestic 
projects built around post World War II Keynesian economics, social welfare and 
cooperative arrangements . Furthermore, taken within the developing countries’ context, 
convergence theorists argue that regional integration arrangements are a means of
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pursuing policy-convergence issues anchored in neo-liberal market policies that stress 
trade liberalization and export expansion258. In fact, according to convergence theorists, 
regional integration arrangements are a conscious mechanism used by states to 
consolidate market-policies through so-called “lock-in effects259”.
The foregoing discussion provides a general overview on the theoretical 
perspective o f regionalism. The central truism that emerges from the theories outlined 
above is that while all of them provide an important analytical tool for understanding the 
study of regional integration arrangements, taken in isolation, none of them fully captures 
the dynamism and complexity o f regionalism. Therefore, these theories are important to 
the extent that they provide some insights into the emergence o f regional integration 
arrangements in the international political system. In this study, the success o f regional 
integration arrangements is analysed on the basis o f the integrating states’ capacity or 
ability to play leading roles in the socio-economic and political development of their 
respective states and regions based on different development indicators260. In conducting 
this analysis, I make the assumption that based on these indicators, a general deduction 
can be made on the role played by regional integration arrangements in promoting the 
process of socio-economic and political development in different regions of the world. 
This study lays special emphasis on the case of the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) to analyse the role of regionalism in Eastern and Southern 
Africa’s development.
In attempting to establish the role of COMESA in Africa’s development, I rely on 
a comparative analysis of COMESA, the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN. As 
will become clear at the end of my thesis, I am optimistic that though the gains made by 
COMESA and other regional integration arrangements in Africa may currently be 
negligible (as compared to the gains made by the other regional bodies in this study), 
regionalism offers better prospects for Africa’s development than other theories and 
paradigms of development that have been attempted in the past261. However, before 
embarking on this analysis, I first discuss the emergence o f regional integration 
arrangements within the context o f the political economy of the international system in 
the next chapter.
4 6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
--Chapter Three--
(i) Regionalism and the Political Economy of the International System
Montchretien de Watteville coined the term ‘political economy’ in 1615 when he used it 
to describe the science o f wealth acquisition common to the state as well as to the 
family262. While the concept o f political economy presaged economics, it reflected this 
discipline’s enduring pre-occupation with national territorial accumulation. Under 
classical political economy, national territorial accumulation entails a process o f wealth 
creation through the continuous self-expansion o f capital within the territorial bounds of 
the nation-state263. Since the establishment o f the nation-state under the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, the pursuit o f national territorial wealth accumulation—especially 
under the mercantilist era—remained a significant part o f the international political 
system. This chapter examines the evolution o f the international political system from the 
age o f state-led mercantilism to the era o f globalization where the supremacy o f the state 
in the international political economy system is increasingly being challenged by 
supranational entities, key among them being regional integration arrangements. The 
emergence o f regional integration arrangements as an important strategy for socio­
economic and political development, especially in this era o f globalization, is examined 
within this evolving international political system.
(ii) The Nation-State and the Era of Mercantilism.
Since its inception at the Treaty o f Westphalia in 1648, the nation-state has 
remained the prominent socio-economic and political entity in the international political 
system264. Conceived within the realist tradition, the nation state has been mainly 
preoccupied with creating wealth within its boundaries and wielding sufficient political 
power to ensure legitimacy within its boundaries and its survival within the broader 
international political system265. The drive for national wealth creation and the need for 
international political survival were the instrumental factors that led to the emergence of 
the mercantilist system266. Mercantilism is best described as the practice o f striving after 
political power through economic means 267 . As a result o f mercantilist policies, 
throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, European nation-states— all
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competing against each other— sought to foster economic growth and consolidate their 
political power both at home and abroad268.
The mercantilists thought of wealth creation in competitive terms. According to 
them, wealth was something that was taken by one nation from another and wealth 
creation was therefore an inherently a competitive game that was more or less fashioned 
along the ethos of say, winning a race. Hence, for the mercantilists, international trade 
was seen as a zero-sum game, with clear winners and losers269. Under mercantilist 
policies, the economy was intended to serve the power and glory of the state. 
Mercantilist policies shaped the international political economy of this era in the context 
of the weak versus the strong, with different regions o f the world being forcefully drawn 
into the mercantilist economy. It was because of mercantilism that Commodore Perry 
landed on the shores of Japan in 1854 to demand that Japan ‘opens itself up’ to outside 
(read American) trade270. It was because of mercantilism that the British waged the so- 
called opium wars on China in a bid to force the Chinese to open up their borders to 
British trade and thereby off-set the unfavourable balance o f payments that had been 
prevailing between China and Britain before the opium w ars271. It was because of 
mercantilism that the most pernicious form of wealth accumulation was developed: the 
use of millions o f African slave labour to develop and build the wealth of the new 
world272. It was mercantilism that gave birth to imperialism, which in turn led to the 
creation of colonial spheres o f influence by European states eager to stamp their 
economic and political might across the globe. Finally, mercantilist policies partly 
contributed to the violent confrontation between European powers in the first and second 
world wars and the desire for a new, less confrontational form of politics in the
273international political system .
At the end of the World War II, the nationalist approach that had given 
mercantilist policies the credibility as the basis o f the international socio-economic and 
political system came under increasing attack from liberal institutionalism274. According 
to liberal institutionalism, cooperation (not competition) among states should form the 
basis o f the international socio-economic and political system. The post war liberal- 
institutionalists attempted to build the basis of this international cooperation at tw o levels. 
At the economic level, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the
48
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) would form the basis of
• • 77̂international cooperation . At the political level, the different states o f the world were
• • • • • • • • • 77 f t
called upon to mitigate their political conflict via the United Nations . However, 
because o f a number o f different factors in the international political system, the vision 
set out by liberal institutionalists—that international cooperation was paramount in the 
international political system—did not fully materialize277. One o f these factors was the 
outbreak o f World War Two and the re-emergence o f nationalist and statist-led politics 
under the Eastern and the Western blocs, fought within the ideological context o f the 
Cold War.
However, although liberal-institutionalism had been discredited after the outbreak 
o f World War II, it did not necessarily bring an end to the concept o f cooperation in 
international political system. In fact, it is important to note that the onset o f the Cold War 
era and the rise o f a bi-polar international system provided an impetus to the emergence 
o f the concept o f regional cooperation among states, especially in Western Europe278. 
Similarly, with the end o f World War II came a steady decline o f European colonial 
powers. The fall o f European colonial powers saw the newly independent post-colonial 
states move to establish regional integration arrangements as one o f the ways through
77Qwhich they could consolidate their socio-economic and political independence . Let us 
now briefly examine these two factors—the rise o f the cold war era and the fall of 
European colonialism— and how they contributed to the emergence o f regional 
integration arrangements in the post World War II era.
(iii) Regional Integration Arrangements: the Cold War Era and the end of 
European Colonialism
Although regionalism became a dominant aspect o f the international political 
system immediately after the end o f World War II and the beginning o f the Cold War era, 
it is important to note that as a political concept, regionalism pre-dates the two. Hence, 
despite being portrayed in the literature as a novel phenomenon in the international 
political system, it is worth noting that regionalism has long historical roots which can be 
traced back to the 19th century280. One o f the earliest manifestations o f regionalism 
bearing the essential features o f contemporary regional integration arrangements was the
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bearing the essential features of contemporary regional integration arrangements was the
9 0 1
German Zollverein . A Customs Union formed in 1834 among eighteen small states, the 
Zollverein functioned as an important catalyst for a united Germany later in the century282. 
However, while empirical examples on regionalism abound throughout history, 
contemporary literature on regionalism mainly focuses on the regional integration 
arrangements formed in the post World War II era. The main reason for focusing on this 
era is that the regional integration arrangements formed during this period have a much
9 89closer connection with the current landscape of the international political system .
The concept o f regionalism as currently discussed in the literature began in the 
1950s when the European Community (now the European Union), with the approval of
984the United States, emerged onto the international political landscape . The main purpose 
of the European Economic Community—as expressed in the Schuman Declaration— was 
to prevent another war in Europe by binding European states through economic ties285. 
The United States o f America’s efforts to rehabilitate war-torn Europe by means of 
measures such as the Marshall Plan, which was itself conditioned by concerns about the 
growing influence of the Soviet Union, provided a firm foundation for the establishment
• 98ftof the European Community .
Since the formation of the European Community in the 1950s, regionalism has 
evolved within two distinct periods generally termed as “the First Regionalism” and “the
• * 287 * • •Second Regionalism” . The first regionalism phase picked up pace in the 1960s. 
During this period, a number o f regional trading arrangements flourished across different 
regions of the world. Some of these were the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA— 
not to be confused with “NAFTA”—the North American Free Trade Agreement), The 
Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and 
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)288.
During the first phase o f regionalism, regional integration among the different 
integrating countries was mainly driven by politically-motivated strategic concerns289. 
Hence, as mentioned above, it was politically-motivated strategic concerns that compelled 
the US to play a major role in overseeing both the emergence and formation o f the 
European Community. The US supported the emergency o f the European Economic
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Community (now the European Union) because it was America’s political strategic 
consideration that a stronger Europe would counter-balance the rising influence of the 
Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe290. Based on the same logic o f containing a 
powerful political adversary, most regional integration arrangements—the LAFTA, the 
LPA and the ASEAN among others—  in the post-colonial world were formed as a means 
of maintaining internal solidarity against the ex-colonial Western powers291. For the 
newly independent countries, regional integration arrangements provided one of the 
strategic moves that they could pursue in their bid to break free from the political and
• ■)Q‘)
economic domination of their ex-colonial masters .
However, after being in operation for three decades and despite having set out 
amidst much gusto and fanfare, most o f the regional integration initiatives under first 
regionalism were in dire need o f a new direction and vision by the beginning of the 
1980s . While most o f the post World War II regional integration arrangements had set
out to secure political security and advance socio-economic development in their 
respective regions, these objectives—perhaps with the exception of the European 
Economic Community—  had not been attained to any impressive degree by the end of the 
1970s. Hence, most regional integration arrangements came to the sobering conclusion 
that after three decades of existence, they had not achieved their desired objectives. 
Perhaps the question to ask at this juncture is this: Why did regional integration 
arrangements (and especially those in the post-colonial states) under the first wave of post 
World War II regionalism fail to achieve their desired objectives?
The literature suggests that the futility o f the first regionalism stems mainly from 
the format and rationale of these initiatives294. While regional integration initiatives under 
the first regionalism were heavily driven by politically motivated strategic issues such as 
containing Soviet expansionism or breaking loose from the grip of ex-colonial powers, 
most of them either neglected or out-rightly misunderstood the socio-economic aspects of 
their objectives295. As a result, their economic significance was greatly limited by their in­
ward looking orientation and the pursuit of protectionist policies such as import-
^0  f tsubstitution policies . The end result was that while most o f these regional integration
initiatives were driven by political considerations, they lacked the economic muscle to
7Q7
back their integration objectives .
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The failure o f the first wave o f regionalism paved the way for the rise o f the 
second wave o f regionalism, which emerged in the late eighties and early nineties, 
reaching its peak with the launch and completion o f the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations . This second wave of 
regionalism, which was unprecedented in its intensity, is represented by among other 
regional integration arrangements: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Common Market o f the Southern 
Cone (MERCOSUR), the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) trading arrangement and the 
African Economic Community (as envisaged in the Abuja Treaty o f 1991)2" .  It has been 
argued that globalization has played a significant role in propelling the phenomenal 
growth o f second regionalism, particularly in the post-Cold War era. In the next section, I 
examine how globalization has influenced the rise o f post-Cold War regional integration 
arrangements.
(iv) Regional Integration Arrangements and Globalization in the Post-Cold War
Era.
Globalization has become an important theme in the post Cold War analysis o f the 
international political system300. The central contention of the globalization metaphor is 
that there is increasing interconnection and interdependence between the states and the 
societies o f the international system301. The common images evoked by globalization are: 
a global flow of money, people, values and ideas. Due to this global flow, some scholars 
have stated that the international system is witnessing the emergence o f a ‘borderless 
world’ nay, the ‘end of geography’302.
According to the proponents o f globalization, there are a number o f indicators to 
support the view that we are living in an increasingly globalized world303. First, the 
international political system is witnessing a dramatic increase in the density and depth of 
economic interdependence. Second, both the information technology and the information 
revolution phenomena are playing an important role in globally diffusing knowledge, 
technology and ideas. Third, the integrating and homogenizing influence o f market forces 
continue to facilitate increased global flows o f values, knowledge, ideas and the ability o f 
like-minded groups to organize across national boundaries304. The ability to organize at
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cross-national levels has created a trans-national civil society that includes both trans­
national policy communities and trans-national social movements305. Fourth and finally, 
the foregoing global developments have led to an unprecedented and growing 
consciousness o f ‘global problems’ (such as global environmental change) and fostered a 
sense o f belonging to a single human community . So, how does the emergence of this 
seemingly ubiquitous post-Cold War globalized world relate to the unprecedented 
emergence o f regional integration arrangements in this era? It is to this question that I 
now turn.
Although the relationship between regional integration arrangements and 
globalization in the post Cold War era has generated a substantial amount o f literature , 
I limit my discussion to two central views that have emerged from the literature 
concerning this relationship. The first view contends that post Cold War globalization has 
worked against the emergence o f regional integration arrangements while the second 
view claims that globalization has provided an avenue for both the emergence and the 
entrenchment o f regional integration arrangements within the international political
■5 AO
system . I examine these two opposing views in turn, beginning with the view that post 
Cold War globalization militates against the emergence o f regional integration 
arrangements.
Two reasons have been advanced to explain how post Cold War globalization 
militates against the emergence o f regional integration arrangements309. First, it has been 
argued that increasing levels of economic interdependence, together with the rise of new 
global issues— such as environmental degradation, growing numbers o f refugees and 
complex humanitarian disasters among others— create a powerful demand for non- 
regionally based, issue specific international institutions designed to solve common 
problems and manage the numerous new sources o f friction arising out o f  global 
interdependence310. Second, post Cold War globalization has only served to create more 
room for the expansion and growth o f socio-economic and political interdependence and 
cooperation among the OECD countries to the exclusion of the other poorer regions o f the 
world311.
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Hence, instead o f providing an environment for the emergence o f regional 
integration arrangements in different regions o f the world, post Cold War globalization 
has helped foster powerful elements o f Western cohesion, which are clearly inimical to 
regional cohesion in other parts o f the world312. Reinforced by the Bretton Woods 
institutions, the Group of Seven (now Eight), transatlantic and transpacific security 
systems, the OECD-led regionalism has given regional integration a decisively Western 
outlook that has in turn constrained the emergence o f coherent regional integration 
arrangements in other regions o f the w orld313 . While the foregoing views cast 
globalization as being antithetical to regional integration arrangements, other views hold 
that globalization is the engine-head propelling the worldwide emergence o f regional 
integration arrangements. Let us now turn our attention the views that have been 
advanced in support o f globalization as a vehicle for regional integration.
There are a number o f ways in which globalization may act as a stimulus to 
regional integration arrangements314. Here, I analyse four. First, the ever-deepening 
integrative activities generated by globalization in the socio-economic and political realm 
create problems, which demand collective management, and regulation which goes 
beyond the limited confines o f both the domestic affairs and the sovereign prerogatives of 
the state315. This is a stimulus for regionalism since the demand for collective 
management and regulation that emerges out o f the globalization process can only be 
effectively mitigated by supranational institutions such as those created through regional 
integration arrangements.
Second, some scholars have argued that the ‘global’ character of many issues is 
often exaggerated316. According to this scholars, while some issues— such as climate 
change or loss o f biodiversity—may have a truly global character, their impact is likely to 
be felt most directly in particular regions than others. In this case, the balance o f interests 
and incentives is likely to reside in the region(s) that is/are most affected and hence,
• •  ̂17regional, as opposed to global policy responses may be more appropriate .
Third, regional integration arrangements offer the most viable level at which to 
reconcile the integrative market and technological pressures towards globalization on one 
hand and integration on the other hand318. The lacuna created by the reduction in the
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domestic regulatory role o f the state due to globalization has opened vital socio-economic 
and political space that enables regional integration arrangements to act as the medium 
through which the balance o f wealth and power among social groups within and across 
regions can be reconstituted319. Viewed from this perspective, regional integration
• • • l i barrangements are essentially about issues o f inequality and redistribution .
Fourth, globalization may have acted as a powerful stimulus to regionalism 
(especially economic regionalism) by altering and intensifying patterns o f economic 
cooperation321. Changes in technology, in communications and in the operations o f the 
global markets (all associated with globalization) have had a profound impact on how 
governments define their economic development and political autonomy in this era of 
globalization . For example, globalization has put pressure on states and compelled 
them to harmonize their economic policies in a bid to attract both foreign investment and 
the much needed new technology.
Additionally, the nature o f competition under globalization has forced states and 
corporate actors to form larger units, both for economic efficiency and for the 
augmentation o f the necessary political power needed to bargain effectively over the rules 
and institutions that govern the world economy 323 . Hence, regional integration 
arrangements have become a necessary part o f the effort of states to cope with a pervasive 
globalization dragon that threatens to curtail their economic and political well-being. If 
regional integration arrangements are the medium through which corporate and state 
actors have sought to constrain the vagaries o f globalization, the multi-lateral trading 
system is the medium through which the operations o f regional integration arrangements 
are constrained. I examine regional integration arrangements and the multilateral trading 
system next.
(v) Regional Integration Arrangements and the Multilateral Trading System
As a result o f the impressive gains made under the second regionalism, a new 
debate has emerged in the development literature; which o f the two global trading 
systems—Regionalism vs. Multilateralism—is a better system in the promotion o f socio­
economic and political global prosperity? Traditionally, the desirability o f regional 
integration has been discussed against the backdrop o f multilateralism. Within this
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integration has been discussed against the backdrop of multilateralism. Within this 
paradigm, a simple welfare analysis that weighs the “trade creation” and the “trade 
diversion” effects o f regional integration has been used to measure the desirability o f 
regionalism with respect to the multilateral trading system324.
However, some new-generation political economists have criticized the “trade 
creation” vs. “trade diversion” approach as being too narrowly focussed on the static 
aspects o f economic welfare . As such, these political economists argue that the trade- 
creation versus trade-diversion approach is incapable o f capturing other socio-economic 
and political concerns that are necessary if the diffusion of the global benefits o f regional 
integration is to occur . Consequently, debate as to the desirability o f regional 
integration has now been broadened to include other aspects beyond trade creation and 
trade diversion. The broadened debate seeks to find out, for example, whether regional 
integration arrangements are building blocks or stumbling blocks to broader global 
community welfare goals such as raising the standards o f living o f the poor and 
promoting sustainable development .
Therefore, while regional integration arrangements have, for example, led to 
tremendous increases in global trade volumes, debate rages on as to how effective they 
are in dispersing the benefits o f global trade, and hence promoting global prosperity. Two 
diametrically views have emerged from this debate . On one hand, we have the view 
that regional integration arrangements are stumbling blocks to global prosperity due to 
their inability to allow global socio-economic and political benefits to percolate into their 
exclusive regional domains . On the other hand, we have the view that regional 
integration arrangements are building blocks for global socio-economic and political 
prosperity due to the fact that they provide a basis for global multilateralism330. We shall 
examine these views in turn.
(a) Regional Integration as a stumbling block to global prosperity:
The view that regional integration arrangements are a stumbling block to  global 
prosperity is examined within the following arguments:
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• External dynamics: regionalism as a stumbling block to global prosperity
The view that regionalism is a stumbling block to global prosperity is based on the 
claim that regional integration arrangements cause a reduction in the aggregate global 
welfare . But how does regionalism bring about the reduction in aggregate global 
welfare? It does so mainly through competition. For example, at the economic level, 
regional integration arrangements compete with both non-member states and other 
regional integration arrangements in their bid to shift terms of trade in their favour332. 
Raising tariffs against non-member states and other blocs is one of the common modes 
through which competition is manifested. As a result o f high tariffs, global welfare is 
diminished because trading products o f members within a given regional integration 
arrangement are protected irrespective o f whether they are o f the same quality or are 
produced under the same levels o f efficiency as those of non-member counterparts333.
Another distinguishing feature o f regional integration arrangements as stumbling 
blocks to global prosperity is their propensity to pursue mercantilist policies334. As 
already noted above, under the mercantilist mind-set, some regional integration 
arrangements seek to increase their trade surplus by importing less from non-member 
states while striving to export more to them335. Although this concept clearly violates the 
liberal idea o f free trade that is supposedly one o f the main trade principles o f 
regionalism336, it nonetheless survives among most regional integration arrangements, 
especially the more economically established ones like the EU, NAFTA and
0 - 3 7
MERCOSUR . Additionally, the mercantilist behaviour is exhibited in the form of 
policy options reflecting the political reality o f protectionism— such as the notorious
•3 - 3 0
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) within the European Union .
• Internal dynamics: regionalism as a stumbling block to global prosperity.
Another reason why regionalism is seen as a stumbling block to global prosperity 
stems from the fact that regional integration arrangements provide abundant opportunities 
for local interest groups to manipulate both their design and operation339. Under regional 
integration arrangements, producers o f trade sensitive products can, for example use the 
sensitivity o f their industry to serve their own economic interests to the detriment of the 
broader global economic interests340. What is more, once they are entrenched, it very 
difficult to break the interests of regional interest groups for the good of global welfare.
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Hence in NAFTA for instance, due to the deep-seated power o f interest groups, 
conventional trade barriers such as quotas in the agricultural sector have been phased out 
only through a tortuous and highly tedious process341.
Furthermore, even when these conventional trade barriers are finally broken down, 
a host of new non-trade barriers such as the complicated “rules o f origin” are invented in 
their stead. The rules of origin are designed to safeguard so-called “originating goods” 
with preferential treatment vis-a-vis “non-originating goods”, namely, goods imported 
from non-member countries342. As Sungjoo notes, the complex, almost labyrinthine, 
character o f such rules negatively affects the flow of international commerce by 
discriminating against non-members343. For example, under the NAFTA regime, arcane 
and idiosyncratic rules o f origin still abound for specific products such as automobiles 
and textiles344.
These rules have had a definite negative impact on the flow of automobiles and 
textile products from other non-NAFTA members, hence reducing the aggregate benefits 
that are supposed to accrue from global commerce345. Therefore, although preferential 
rules of origin may help in boosting intra-regional trade (hence resulting in trade creation), 
to a certain extent, they generally block global trade flows (hence resulting in trade 
diversion) from non-member countries. When this is the case the trade-creation vs. trade 
diversion dynamics are such that any advantages achieved through regionalism are offset 
by the corresponding disadvantages346.
• The “selfish hegemon” and the reduction of global prosperity role
Some scholars highlight the dominant role of hegemony in the formation and operation of 
regional trading arrangements and argue that the hegemonic powers normally usurp the 
benefits from intra-regional trade in a disproportionate manner347. Empirical confirmation 
of the “selfish hegemon” thesis exists in the trade talks on intellectual property rights
T4Rbetween the US and Mexico . Under NAFTA, the US coerced Mexico into accepting a 
“one-on-one” bargain on intellectual property protection. So satisfied was the US over 
this easy trade concession with Mexico that it recommended it as an example worth 
emulating by other regional trades349. What the US failed to take into account when 
making the recommendation is the fact that it could not have gotten such a concession
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from Canada, another NAFTA member who, though occupying the middle rung of 
NAFTA’s pecking order, is capable o f resisting such coercive trade negotiations350.
Another manifestation o f the selfish hegemon thesis can be found in the so-called 
“hub-and-spoke” forms of regionalism. Under this type o f regionalism, trade is 
characterized by bi-lateral trade arrangements between an economically superior central 
“hub” and economically inferior peripheral “spokes”. In this kind of regionalism, the hub 
country/region is likely to benefit disproportionately from the spoke(s) country or 
countries/region(s). This is so because while the hub country/countries has/have duty free 
access to a variety o f spoke countries/region markets resulting from bilateral 
arrangements, the spoke countries/region do not enjoy similar gains351. The only option 
left for the spoke countries/regions is that they are forced to sign bilateral trading 
arrangements among themselves, thus forming a marginal “rim” o f trade partners352.
However, even more telling is that while the spoke countries are struggling to 
remain afloat in global commerce by such desperate measures as forming a trading rim, 
the hub country tends to prevail both in its own market as well as in the markets of the 
spoke countries due the advantages o f the economies o f scale353. Already blessed with a 
secure and well-established industrial manufacturing base, the hub country proceeds to 
reap the full benefits of its expanded export markets in the spoke countries with the 
contentment of knowing that the latter lack the economic wherewithal to break into its 
domestic market354.
While this picture already looks grim, the reality is that problems associated with 
the “hub-and-spoke” regionalism are likely to more serious in future. This is considering 
the fact that the greatest increase in trade regionalism notified to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) so far is in the form o f bilateral trade arrangements, normally 
between the developed (the hub) and the developing (the spoke) countries355. Under this 
arrangement, powerful regional integration arrangements like NAFTA and the EU could 
potentially exploit smaller and weaker trading partners, particularly those in the 
developing countries. COMESA’s relationship with the EU has raised real concerns about 
the possibility o f the emergency of a “hub-spoke” relationship that will see the EU 
effectively dominate COMESA at both socio-economic and political levels owing to the
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examine the arguments in favour o f regional integration arrangements as building blocks 
to global prosperity.
(b) Regional integration arrangements as building blocks for global prosperity
Two main arguments have been advanced in favour o f regional integration 
arrangements as building blocks to global prosperity357. These are the “laboratory effect” 
argument and the “lock-in effect” argument.
• The “laboratory effect” argument for regional integration.
The laboratory effect argument provides one o f the most powerful arguments for 
regional integration arrangements. The laboratory effect holds that regional integration 
arrangements are popular due to the fact that the negotiation and process for membership
ICO
in a regional trading arrangement is much faster than that for membership in the WTO . 
Another advantage o f the regional integration arrangements is that once agreements are 
adopted and implemented, the experience gained and the lessons learnt through trial and 
error serve as a knowledge base for further improvement and or adjustment for a given 
regional integration arrangement359.
• The “lock-in effect” argument for regional integration
Some scholars argue that regional integration often leads to the “locking-in” of 
previous liberalization and reform efforts in a manner that prevents backsliding among 
the member countries o f a regional trading arrangement360. This lock-in effect can be 
particularly attractive to governments o f developing countries where reform efforts are 
normally stymied by deep-rooted anti-reform local powers361. The lock-in effect enables 
these governments to stave off opposition to regional integration since all they have to do 
to resist making local concessions is to argue that their hands are tied by broader regional 
commitments362. For example, in this context, it would be expected that individual 
member countries cannot reverse any socio-economic and political reforms made by 
COMESA at the regional level363.
Despite the fact that the debate on the effectiveness o f regional integration 
arrangements as a viable strategy for socio-economic and political development in the 
post-Cold War remains heated and contentious (as can be seen from the foregoing views 
and sentiments), there can be no denying the fact that generally speaking, the socio-
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Despite the fact that the debate on the effectiveness o f regional integration 
arrangements as a viable strategy for socio-economic and political development in the 
post-Cold War remains heated and contentious (as can be seen from the foregoing views 
and sentiments), there can be no denying the fact that generally speaking, the socio­
economic and political benefits o f the second regionalism have been very impressive364. 
As already noted above, it can be argued that the success o f second regionalism (in 
contrast to the failures o f first regionalism) is largely due to its commitment to both the 
political as well as to the socio-economic concerns o f the integrating countries365. What is 
more, the end o f the Cold War and the subsequent emergence of globalisation as a 
generally accepted trend in international development have laid a solid foundation for 
regional integration, especially given the fact that the world is no longer divided into two 
dangerously-opposed ideological camps. Since its emergence in the 1980s and its 
subsequent proliferation in the post-Cold War, second regionalism has become an 
important aspect o f socio-economic development and political cooperation in different 
regions of the world.
However, despite the apparent gains of second phase o f regionalism, the literature 
is mixed as to whether regional integration arrangements are the appropriate vehicles 
through which the expected socio-economic and political gains from globalization can be 
extensively dispersed to a majority o f the global population. So far, the gains o f  second 
phase of regionalism have been uneven— with some regions like Europe, North America 
and to a certain extent, Latin America and Asia reaping impressive gains while others like 
Sub-Saharan Africa, getting negligible, if  any, returns. While a number o f factors have 
been advanced to explain the reason behind these regional disparities, in the next chapter, 
I adopt a comparative analysis approach and discuss some of these factors within the 
socio-economic and political context o f the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and 
COMESA. The main task in this chapter will be to establish, based on a number of 
selected development indicators, general socio-economic and political patterns and trends 
in the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN before making a comparison between 
these regional integration arrangements and COMESA and before finally drawing general 
conclusions on COMESA’s role in the development of Eastern and Southern Africa.
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--Chapter Four—
(i) Regionalism and Development: An Overview of the EU, NAFTA,
MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA.
In this chapter, I discuss the role o f regionalism in development. I begin this section by 
presenting a general overview of the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA 
within three main contexts: First, I look at the founding objectives o f these regional 
integration arrangements, then second, I examine their institutional structures and 
operations and third and finally, I analyse their contribution to the socio-economic and 
political development o f their respective regions. The analysis highlights the development 
achievements and limitations and or challenges o f these regional bodies. As can be 
expected, all these regional integration arrangements have contributed differently to the 
development needs o f their respective regions and all o f them face unique challenges that 
reflect the complex dynamics o f development both within their respective regions and at 
the international level.
Additionally, it can be seen that the level and degree o f socio-economic and 
political development (as measured through such development indicators as intra-regional 
trade, regional infrastructure and the degree o f citizen involvement) greatly varies across 
these regional integration arrangements but generally, it can be concluded that all o f them 
have brought about some positive socio-economic and political development within their 
respective regions. It is against this backdrop that I make a comparative analysis between 
COMESA and the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN before examining both its 
challenges and prospects for Eastern and Southern Africa’s development in the next 
chapter o f this thesis. But before doing so, I first embark on the main focus o f this chapter 
as already laid out above.
(ii) a. The EU: Founding Objectives
On 9 May 1950, Robert Schuman took up an idea originally conceived by Jean Monnet 
and proposed the setting up o f a European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC)366. 
Following the establishment o f the ECSC, European countries that had once fought each
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other decided to pool the production of coal and steel under a shared authority—the 'High 
Authority' . Through the ECSC and in a practical and symbolic way, the raw materials 
o f war were being turned into instruments o f reconciliation and peace . The 
establishment o f the ECSC set in motion a series o f European integration activities that 
culminated into the EU as we know it today. Since the Schuman Declaration, and owing 
to a series o f integration initiatives thereafter, the EU’s objectives can be broadly 
identified as follows369:
■ The Establishment of Peace in Europe
The idea o f a united Europe was once just a dream in the minds o f philosophers and 
visionaries. Victor Hugo, for example, imagined a peaceful ‘United States o f Europe’
T 7 f l  •inspired by humanistic ideals . However, two terrible wars that ravaged the continent 
during the first half o f the 20th century seemed to have shattered the dream of building a 
peaceful ‘United States o f Europe’. But from the rubble of World Weir II, a new kind of 
hope emerged. People who had resisted totalitarianism during the war were determined to 
put an end to international hatred and rivalry in Europe and to build a lasting peace 
between former enemies371. As a result o f this new determination, between 1945 and 
1950, a handful o f European statesmen including Konrad Adenauer, Winston Churchill, 
Alcide de Gasperi and Robert Schuman set about persuading their peoples to enter a new
372era .
These leaders were determined to establish a new order in Western Europe based 
on the shared interests o f both the European peoples and their nations373. The new order 
would be founded upon treaties guaranteeing the rule o f law and equality between all 
countries in Europe374. The first manifestations o f this order came into play in 1950 with 
the Establishment o f the European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC). It was the 
start o f more than half a century of peaceful co-operation between the member states of 
the European Communities. Under the Maastricht Treaty o f 1992, the European 
Community institutions were strengthened and given broader responsibilities and the
T7SEuropean Union (the EU) as we know it today was bom
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European integration activities provided a forum for Western Europe to both 
secure peace for itself and assure itself o f peace, especially during the tumultuous Cold 
War era376. With the end o f the Cold War, the peace agenda remained dominant and the 
EU played an instrumental role in the unification o f Germany after the fall o f the Berlin 
wall in 1989. When the Soviet empire eventually fell apart in 1991, the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe that had for decades lived under the authoritarian yoke o f the 
Warsaw Pact decided to seek a new world order and peace within the family of 
democratic European nations under the EU377. So far, the EU has succeeded in forging a 
sense o f peaceful co-existence in Europe for over half a century.
■ Promotion of Safety and Security in Europe
Although the EU has so far done a good job in promoting peace in Europe, it 
remains alive to the fact that the new demands o f the 21st century still require Europe to 
deal with issues o f safety and security. Hence, ensuring the safety and security o f its 25 
member states is one o f the key objectives o f the EU. In order to achieve this objective, 
the EU works closely with the regions just next to its borders—  North Africa, the Balkans, 
the Caucasus and the Middle East— and those beyond378. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) has so far continued to provide the institutional structure within 
which Europe’s peace and security is assured379. Additionally, the EU is committed to 
developing some form of continental security arrangement through the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP)380.
■ Promotion of European Economic and Social Solidarity
The promotion o f European economic and social solidarity is another important 
objective o f the EU. The EU countries account for an ever smaller percentage o f the 
world's population381. This means that they must therefore continue pulling together if  
they are to ensure sustained econom ic growth for effective competition with the other 
major economies on the world stage382. In this era o f globalization, the EU recognizes that 
no individual EU country is strong enough to go it alone, especially on economic 
matters383. In order to achieve economies o f scale and in order to find new customers, 
European businesses need to operate in a bigger market than just their home country
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market384. To this end, the EU has opened up the single European market—removing the 
old obstacles to trade and cutting away the red tape—to boost intra-European trade and to 
strengthen the EU economic position in the international political system (see figures 1 
and 2 on page 75 below).
While the EU is committed to promoting economic success in Europe, it is equally 
committed to the idea of counterbalancing the negative consequences o f economic 
competition through a Europe-wide solidarity that is expressed in practical help for 
ordinary people385. For example, through the structural funds (managed by the European 
Commission), the EU encourages and backs up the efforts o f national and regional 
authorities aimed at closing the gap between different levels o f development in different 
parts o f the EU386. Also, both the EU budget and the money raised by the European 
Investment Bank are used to improve the member-states transport infrastructure (for 
example, by extending the network o f motorways and high-speed railways), thus
007
providing better access to outlying regions and boosting intra-EU trade .
However, the extent to which the EU satisfies the foregoing objectives, and 
therefore the socio-economic and political development needs o f this region, largely 
depends on how the EU is organized. So, how does the EU’s organizational structure look 
and how does this structure help in the promotion o f socio-economic and political 
development within the EU? The response to this question follows in the next section.
(ii) b. The EU: Institutional Structures and Operations 
■ The European Council 
The European Council is the EU's highest-level policymaking body. It brings together the 
presidents and prime ministers o f all the EU countries plus the President o f the European 
Commission388. The President o f the European Parliament also addresses every European 
Council meeting389. The European Council dates back to 1974, when the EU's political 
leaders (the "Heads o f State or Government"), began holding regular meetings390. The
-3Q1
Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 made this practice official . The growing 
importance o f the European Council is further reflected by the Treaty o f Maastricht 
(1992), which made the European Council the official initiator o f the Union's major 
policies392.
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Following the Maastricht Treaty, the European Council was given the 
responsibility to settle difficult issues on which ministers (meeting in the Council o f the 
European Union) fail to agree on393. The European Council now meets, in principle, four 
times a year394. The President or Prime Minister o f the country currently presiding over 
the Council o f the European Union chairs it395. Some Member States would like the 
European Council to become the “Government of Europe”, with one o f its members being 
the EU’s representative on the world stage396. But this is a contentious issue that raises a 
number o f questions. For Example, would the European Council choose this person or 
would it automatically be the President o f the European Commission397? Disagreement 
over this question continues. In the meantime, the EU’s representative on the world stage 
is the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (a post created 
by the Treaty o f Amsterdam), who is also Secretary-General o f the Council398.
■ The Council of the European Union
The Council o f the European Union is the EU's main decision-making 
institution399. It was formerly known as the 'Council o f Ministers', and for short it is 
simply called 'the Council'400. Each EU country in turn presides over the Council for a 
six-month period401. One minister attends every Council meeting from each of the 
member states. The ministerial attendance o f the Council meeting depends on which topic 
is on the agenda402. For example, if  the topic on the agenda is about agriculture, then the 
Ministers o f Agriculture from the respective EU member states would attend the said 
Council meeting403. If the agenda topic is on foreign policy, then it will be attended by 
the Foreign Affairs Minister from each country and so on. There are nine different 
Council "configurations", covering all the different policy areas404. The Council's work as 
a whole is planned and co-ordinated by the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council405.
The preparatory work for Council meetings is done by the Permanent 
Representatives Committee (Coreper), made up of the member states' ambassadors to the 
EU, assisted by officials from the national ministries while the Council's administrative 
work is handled by its General Secretariat, based in Brussels406. The Council and the
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European Parliament share legislative power as well as responsibility for the budget. The 
Council also concludes international agreements that have been negotiated by the 
European Commission407. According to the EU treaties, the Council has to take its 
decisions either unanimously or by a majority or "qualified majority" vote408. However, 
on important questions, such as amending the treaties, launching a new common policy or 
allowing a new country to join the Union, the Council has to agree unanimously409.
In most other cases, qualified majority voting is required. Qualified majority 
voting stipulates that a decision cannot be taken unless a specified minimum number of 
votes are cast in its favour410. The number o f votes each EU country can cast roughly 
reflects the size o f its population and is as follows411:
• Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom: 29 each
• Spain and Poland: 27 each
• Netherlands: 13
• Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Portugal: 12 each
• Austria and Sweden: 10 each
• Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Finland: 7 each
• Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia: 4 each
• Malta: 3
From the numbers above, the total vote is 321. Out o f these votes, a minimum of 232 
votes (i.e. 72.3%) is required to reach a qualified majority412. In addition, the following 
two conditions must be met. First, a majority o f member states (in some cases two thirds) 
must approve the decision, and second, any member state can ask for confirmation, in 
which case the votes cast in favour must represent at least 62% o f the EU's total 
population413.
■ The European Parliament
The European Parliament is the elected body that represents the EU's citizens and 
takes part in the EU’s legislative process414. Since 1979, Members o f the European 
Parliament (the MEPs) have been directly elected by universal suffrage every five years.
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732 MEPs were elected at the June 2004 elections to represent the 25 EU countries in the 
EU parliament. Parliament normally holds its plenary session in Strasbourg and any 
additional sessions in Brussels. It has 17 committees that do the preparatory work for its 
plenary sessions and a number o f political groups that mostly meet in Brussels.
Parliament and the Council share legislative powers, and they do so using three 
different procedures (in addition to simple consultation). First, there is the "cooperation 
procedure", introduced by the Single European Act o f 1986. Under this procedure, 
Parliament gives its opinion on draft directives and regulations proposed by the European 
Commission, which can amend its proposal to take account o f Parliament's opinion. 
Second, there is the "assent procedure", also introduced in 1986. Through this procedure, 
Parliament must give its assent to international agreements negotiated by the Commission, 
to any proposed enlargement o f the European Union and to a number o f other matters 
including any changes in election rules. Third, there is the "co-decision procedure", 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty o f 1992. This procedure puts the EU Parliament on 
an equal footing with the Council when legislating on a whole series o f important issues 
including the free movement o f people, the internal market, education, research, the 
environment, Trans-European Networks, health, culture and consumer protection. 
Parliament has the power to throw out proposed legislation in these fields if  an absolute 
majority o f MEPs vote against the Council's "common position”. However, the matter can 
be put before a conciliation committee.
The European Parliament and the Council o f the European Union also share equal 
responsibility for adopting the EU budget. The European Commission proposes a draft 
budget, which is then debated by Parliament and the Council. Parliament can reject the 
proposed budget, and it has already done so on several occasions. When this happens, the 
entire budget procedure has to be re-started. Parliament has made full use o f its budgetary 
powers to influence EU policymaking. However, most o f the EU's spending on 
agriculture is beyond Parliament's control.
Parliament is an important driving force in the EU politics. It is the EU's primary 
debating chamber, a place where the political and national viewpoints o f all the member
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states meet and mix with the intention of developing a common position. Since its 
establishment, the EU Parliament continues to play a role in shaping the outcome of the 
EU’s legislative processes. For example, Parliament played a key role in drawing up the 
EU Charter o f Fundamental Rights (proclaimed in December 2000) and in setting up the 
European Convention following the Laeken European Council in December 2001.
Lastly, the EU Parliament is the body that exercises democratic control over the 
Union. It has the power to dismiss (this requires a two thirds majority) the Commission 
by adopting a motion of censure. It checks that EU policies are being properly managed 
and implemented— for example by examining the reports it receives from the Court of 
Auditors and by putting oral and written questions to the Commission and Council. The 
sitting President o f the European Council also reports to Parliament on the decisions 
taken by the EU's political leaders.
■ The European Commission
The European Commission is one o f the EU's key institutions415. The Commission 
has 25 members— one per EU country. It is required to act with complete political 
independence and since its job is to uphold the interests o f the EU as a whole, it is 
required not to take instructions from any member state government. As "Guardian o f the 
Treaties", the Commission has to ensure that the regulations and directives adopted by the 
Council and Parliament are being put into effect. If  these regulations and directives are 
not being adopted as required, the Commission can take the offending party to the Court 
o f Justice to oblige it to comply with EU law.
The Commission is also the only institution that has the right to propose new EU 
legislation, and it can take action at any stage to help bring about an agreement both 
within the Council and between the Council and Parliament. In addition, as the EU's 
executive arm, the Commission carries out the decisions taken by the Council in relation 
to the Common Agricultural Policy, for example. The Commission is also largely 
responsible for managing the EU's common policies, such as research, development aid 
and regional policy among others. It also manages the budget for these policies.
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The Commission is answerable to Parliament and if Parliament passes a motion of 
censure against it, the entire Commission has to resign. It was when faced with just such a 
motion o f censure that President Jacques Santer tendered the collective resignation o f his 
Commission on 16 March 1999, allowing Romano Prodi to become President of the 
Commission for the period 1999-2004. The Commission is assisted by a civil service 
made up o f 36 "Directorates-General" (DGs) and services, based mainly in Brussels and 
Luxembourg. Unlike the secretariats o f traditional international organisations, the 
Commission has its own financial resources and can thus act independently on the 
implementation o f its policy options.
■ The Court of Justice
The Court o f Justice is located in Luxembourg and is made up of one Judge from 
each EU country, assisted by eight Advocates-General416. The Judges are appointed by 
joint agreement o f the governments o f the member states. Each is appointed for a term of 
six years, after which they may be reappointed for one or two further periods o f three 
years. The Judges make their decisions based on the principle o f impartiality and the 
Court's job is to ensure that EU law is complied with, and that the treaties are correctly 
interpreted and applied.
The Court o f Justice can find any EU member state guilty o f failing to fulfil its 
obligations under the treaties. Also, it can check whether EU laws have been properly 
enacted and it can find the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission guilty o f 
failing to act as required. What is more, the Court o f Justice is the only institution that can, 
at the request o f the national courts, give a ruling on the interpretation o f the treaties and 
on the validity and interpretation o f EU law. When questions concerning the 
interpretation o f the EU law are brought before the court in one o f the member states, that 
court may—and indeed sometimes must— ask the Court o f Justice for its ruling. This 
system ensures that EU law is interpreted and applied consistently throughout the 
European Union.
Finally, the EU Treaties explicitly allow the Court to check whether EU legislation 
respects the fundamental rights o f EU citizens. The Court can give rulings on questions of
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the EU citizens’ personal freedom and security. It is within this context, for example, that 
“the Court o f First Instance” (set up in 1989 and consisting o f one judge from each EU 
country) is responsible for giving rulings on certain kinds o f cases, particularly actions 
brought by firms or private individuals against EU institutions and disputes between the 
institutions and their employees.
■ The Court of Auditors
The Court o f Auditors was set up in 1977417. It has one member from each EU 
country and this member is appointed for a term o f six years by agreement between the 
member states and after consultation with the European Parliament. The Court of 
Auditors ensures that all the European Union's revenue has been received and all its 
expenditure incurred in a lawful and regular manner. It has the right to audit the accounts 
o f any organisation that is handling EU funds and, where appropriate, to refer matters to 
the Court o f Justice.
■ The Committee of the Regions
The Committee o f the regions (CoR), set up under the Treaty o f the European Union, 
consists o f representatives o f regional and local governments418. These representatives are 
proposed by the member states and appointed by the Council for a four-year term. Under 
the Treaty, the Council and Commission must consult the CoR on matters o f relevance to 
the regions, and the Committee may also adopt opinions on its own initiative.
■ The European Investment Bank
The European Investment Bank (EIB) is based in Luxembourg. It finances projects 
to help make the EU's less developed regions and small businesses more competitive419.
■ The European Central Bank
The European Central Bank (ECB) is based in Frankfurt. It is responsible for 
managing the euro and the EU's monetary policy420. The EU pursues its socio-economic 
and political development agenda within the foregoing institutional infrastructure. Our
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next question is: Given this extensive infrastructure, how has the EU so far performed in 
its quest to promote the socio-economic and political development o f its member states? 
Let us find out.
(ii) c. The EU and Europe’s Socio-Economic and Political Development
As can be clearly seen from the foregoing, the EU has an extensive institutional 
infrastructure within which it pursues Europe’s socio-economic and political development 
agenda. Within this infrastructure, the EU has adopted a broad-based approach to 
development that goes beyond the narrow confines o f economic growth concerns to 
encompass the social as well as the political well being o f the EU citizens. The scope of 
this thesis does not allow me to present an exhaustive account o f the EU’s extensive 
socio-economic and political development commitment. However, here, I limit myself to 
identifying four main areas in which the EU has made some progress in meeting the 
development needs o f the citizens o f this region.
First, at the socio-economic level, the EU has attempted to bring about a sense o f 
“being European and European belongingness” through educational and training 
programmes such as Erasmus (which promotes student mobility), Cornett (technological 
education and training) and Lingua, which encourages people to learn foreign 
languages421. Additionally, the EU has set for itself a target o f  having 10% o f its students 
spend one year in another European country taking a higher education course422. To this 
end, the EU has committed funds to such programmes as Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci and 
other youth programmes to encourage young Europeans to cast their nets wider when 
exploring educational opportunities in the EU.
Second, the EU has been able to bring about economic prosperity to the citizens of 
this region through the establishment o f a single European market423. Under the single 
market, businesses, professions and trade unions have all moved ahead swiftly, adapting 
their strategies to the new rules o f a much wider European market424. The benefits o f the 
single European market have spread within the EU as a wider range o f goods and services 
have become available through increased intra-EU trading activities (see figures 1 and 2 
below).
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Figure a: Growth in intra EU trade from 1990 to 2001
Imports
Figure b: Intra EU trade in 2001
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Source: The figures above have been adapted from Eurostat, the statistical division of the EU.
Third, through the Lisbon Strategy, the EU has adopted a comprehensive program 
aimed at achieving the following425: the promotion of a knowledge-based economy within 
the EU; the protection of Europe’s social safety-net programs, especially in terms of 
raising enough resources to take care o f the EU’s aging population while saving enough
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for future generations; raising the employment rate from an average o f 61% in 2000 to 
70% by 2010 and increasing the percentage o f women in the work force from 51% to 
60% over the same period o f time426. So far, the EU seems to be on the right track in so 
far as achieving some o f the Lisbon strategy goals is concerned427.
Fourth and finally, at the political level, the EU has been active in the promotion 
of the citizens’ rights within this region. To this end, the EU established the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights o f the European Union . This Charter was solemnly proclaimed in 
Nice in December 2000 and further underpinned by the Treaty o f Amsterdam429. This 
treaty introduces a procedure for suspending the EU membership rights o f  any country 
that violates EU citizens' fundamental rights430. Also, the Treaty extends the principle of 
non-discrimination so that it not only covers nationality but also gender, race, religion, 
age and sexual orientation431.
However, despite having made tremendous progress in promoting socio-economic 
and political development among the member states, the EU still has some obstacles and 
limitations that it must overcome. First, the recent rejection o f the EU Constitution by 
both France and Denmark is a clear indication that the idea o f a united, single-document 
governed Europe is still far from being achieved432. While the promoters o f a European 
Constitution make the case that such a document will be less complex (as opposed to the 
current treaty regime contained in some 80,000 pages) and therefore likely to promote an 
efficient form of governance in the EU, the resounding defeat o f the EU’s Constitutional 
referendum at hands of the Danes and the French is a clear indication that the issue o f a 
centrally-governed EU (under one constitutional document), is not yet popular with the 
nationals o f the EU member-states433.
Another area o f concern for the EU is that despite spending a lot o f resources to 
promote the idea o f a strong, united and popularly supported EU, available statistics 
indicate that the EU has not really succeeded (though the pre-2004 EU-candidate 
countries showed a higher EU affinity than the 15 EU member-states as figures 2 and 3 
below show) in forging a strong European identity. As a result, the EU has oftentimes 
been criticized by its critics for being an overblown bureaucratic, nay technocratic,
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institution that is far removed from the needs o f the European people. To the critics, the 
EU’s extensive institutions, especially the non-elected ones, serve no real purpose in the 
task o f building a strong and united Europe and are therefore a clear manifestation o f the 
democratic deficit within this regional integration arrangement434. What is more, the 
recent sharp divisions among the EU countries on whether to join or not to join, the US- 
led invasion o f Iraq is a clear indication that European cohesion, especially in matters that 
require the adoption o f a common foreign policy, is far from near cohesive.
Figure c: European Identity in the pre-2004 Candidate States
BG CY CZ I B  HU IV  t t  MT PL HO SK SI TR
Source: Adapted from the Euro barometer (Thumbs-Up means “proud to be European” and vice 
versa).
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Figure d: European Identity in the EU+15 member states
EU.1S B DK 0  EL K F ML I L NL A P FM S UK
Source: Adapted from the Euro barometer (Thumbs-Up means “proud to be European” and vice 
versa).
Finally, at the international level, the EU has often been accused o f trying to use 
its immense socio-economic and political power to protect its base through such unfair 
trade practices like the Common Agricultural Policy435. Additionally, the EU has been 
portrayed as an economic giant out to bully and manipulate other weaker nations and or 
regional integration arrangements to do its bidding, especially within the context of 
multilateral organizations such as the World Trade Organization436.
(iii) a. NAFTA: Founding Objectives
NAFTA is a comprehensive trade agreement between the US, Canada and Mexico. 
The agreement establishing NAFTA was signed on 17th December 1992 and came into 
force on 1st January 1994437. The 1994 NAFTA agreement broadened and superseded the 
1989 Free Trade Area agreement between the US and Canada 438. Prior to the 
establishment o f NAFTA, the US was strongly committed to the promotion o f a global 
GATT-driven multi-lateral trading system439. However, a number o f reasons have been 
advanced to explain why the US has increasingly abandoned its commitment to the post
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World War II multi-lateral trading system (a system in which it was the principal architect) 
especially since the mid 1980s. Here, I identify two.
First, it has been argued that the slow, long and time-consuming multilateral 1986 
Uruguay GATT round o f negotiations made the US increasingly impatient since its desire 
to revamp a sluggish economy via international trade was not being realized as fast as it 
would have wished440. Eager to recover from the global recession of the 1980s and 
impatient with the pace at which the rest o f the World, especially the major economies of 
the world, was opening up to market neo-liberalism, the US opted to start trade 
negotiations with its immediate neighbours (in this case, Canada and Mexico)441. These 
negotiations were seen as part o f the US’ bid to spur its sluggish economy through the use 
o f its hegemon status to increase international trade with its natural trading partners (in 
this case its regional neighbours)442. Hence, in pursuit of this goal, the US and Canada 
established a Free Trade Area in October 1987. Later, this trade area was transformed into 
the North America Free Trade Agreement in 1989 when Mexico joined the US and 
Canada to pursue a regional economic agenda443. Therefore, while the US had been 
committed to the multi-lateral trading system for the better part o f the Cold War era, by 
the beginning o f the 1980s, it became clear that this system was not responding 
favourably to its international trade expectations444.
A second view holds that the US abandoned its commitment to the multi-lateral 
trading system when it became clear that it could no longer hold its lead as the economic 
super-power in the World445. Given the increased levels of competition from Japan and 
the European Union in the mid 1980s and the rising economic threat from China and 
India, especially since the early 1990s, the US had no option but to adopt a regional 
strategy so as to stave off the threats posed by these emerging economies to its traditional 
global economic dominance446. Hence, according to some analysts, the establishment of 
NAFTA was a case o f the US ‘circling the wagons’ and retreating into a secure and less 
threatening regional sphere in order to consolidate whatever gains accrued from such an 
arrangement. Additionally, the formation of NAFTA was seen as a new strategy through 
which the US could re-invent, if  not re-energize, its waning global economic position447.
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Whichever o f the two positions outlined above one decides to adopt as the main 
impetus for the US’ new found affinity for regionalism, it is important to note that in this 
era o f globalization, the US, just like other nation-states in the world—both strong and 
weak—has opted to adopt regionalism as one o f the means through which to confront the 
many challenges that a globalizing world has thrown at the hitherto existing Cold War 
international political system. The US, Mexico and Canada have established NAFTA as 
the institution through which to respond to the challenges of globalization both within the 
North American region and at the global level. So what objectives has NAFTA set for 
itself in order to make North America a competitive regional integration arrangement 
capable o f securing the socio-economic and political needs o f  the peoples o f this region in 
the globalizing post Cold War era? The following are NAFTA’s objectives as spelt out in 
Article 204 o f the NAFTA Treaty448:
(a) Eliminate barriers to trade in and facilitate cross-border movement o f goods and 
services between the territories o f the parties.
(b) Promote Conditions o f fair competition in the Free Trade Area
(c) Increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories o f the parties
(d) Provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement o f intellectual property 
rights in each party’s territory
(e) Create effective procedures for the implementation and application o f the 
agreement for the joint administration and for the resolution o f disputes
(f) Establish a framework for further tri-lateral, regional and multi-lateral cooperation 
to expand and enhance the benefits o f the agreement
In order to accomplish the above objectives, NAFTA has established a number of 
institutional structures. Let us next examine these institutions.
(iii) b. NAFTA: Institutional Structures and Operations
■ The NAFTA Free Trade Commission (the FTC)
This is the body charged with fulfilling NAFTA’s objectives. The NAFTA Free 
Trade Commission is composed o f Cabinet-level representatives and is required to meet
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at least once a year in locations rotating among the three member states449. The FTC 
supervises the implementation o f the agreement and resolves any disputes that may arise 
on its interpretation and application.
■ The NAFTA Secretariat
The NAFTA Secretariat is composed of three national sections: the Canadian, the 
Mexican and the United States o f America section450. It has three main functions. First, it 
supports the FTC and any o f the working group(s) or committee(s) that the FTC may 
establish. Second, the Secretariat acts as the administrative assistant for NAFTA’s dispute 
settlement panels and other related committees. Third and finally, the Secretariat acts— in 
a limited capacity though— as a depository for any investment related disputes.
■ Dispute Settlement Panels
The dispute settlement panels provide a mechanism through which the disputes 
that have not been resolved by the NAFTA member states at the FTC level could be 
resolved451.
■ The Committee on Standard-Related Measures (the CSRM)
This is a committee o f the Free Trade Commission. The CSRM’s mandate is to 
monitor the implementation and administration o f NAFTA’s environmental objectives452. 
This committee reports annually to the FTC and operates under five sub-committees 
namely:
(i) The Land Transportation Standards Sub-committee ( the LTSS): The task of 
this committee is to standardize the member-states land transport related 
measures on bus, truck, rail operations and the transportation o f dangerous 
goods
(«) The Telecommunications standards sub-committee
(iii) The Labelling o f Textile and Apparel Goods sub-committee
(iv) The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS): This 
committee facilitates technical cooperation for the enhancement o f food safety 
and holds consultations on sanitary and phytosanitary measures among the 
NAFTA member states. Additionally, this committee deals with the following 
two issues: The promotion of harmonization o f standards and consistency in 
the application o f appropriate levels o f protection for human health and
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environmental standards among NAFTA states; and the issue o f trade irritants: 
the SPS attempts to mitigate on trade dispute issues before they reach the 
panel.
(v) The Commission for Environmental Cooperation (the CEC): The North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (the NAAEC, or simply 
the CEC) addresses environmental concerns among the NAFTA member 
states. The CEC is composed o f the following three-fold structure: A 
Ministerial-level Council, a Secretariat for technical, administrative and 
operational support and a 15-Member multi-stake holder Joint Public 
Advisory Committee (JPAC).
NAFTA has been in existence for a decade now. How has it performed in terms of 
achieving its objectives and what role has it played in meeting the socio-economic and 
political needs o f this region? The next section addresses this question.
(iii) c. NAFTA and North America’s Socio-Economic and Political Development
Unlike the EU which adopts a central, continent-wide institution-driven approach 
towards meeting the socio-economic and political development needs o f its member- 
states, NAFTA tends to focus more on the economic dimension of regional integration 
while leaving other social and political development concerns to individual member states. 
Therefore, while jointly computed NAFTA data on development indicators such as life 
expectancy, access to health and education may not be readily available, data computed 
on these indicators from the statistics o f individual member states held by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) indicates that the NAFTA member-states 
(with the exception o f Mexico) enjoy one o f the highest standards o f living in the world453.
However, these high standards o f living do not necessarily form the basis for 
drawing a simple causal relationship between NAFTA and social development in North 
America. This is mainly because NAFTA member states have pursued different and 
autonomous social development agendas and the gains made in, for example, raising the 
life expectancy, maintaining high levels o f access to education and health in this region 
are a reflection o f national policy options and not concerted regional efforts. Having made 
the foregoing claim however, it is equally important to note that ten years o f NAFTA’s
80
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
existence in North America have not led to a drastic decline in the social development 
standards o f this region. Therefore, while one cannot directly attribute North America’s 
high standards o f living to NAFTA, one cannot claim that the existence o f NAFTA has 
led a dramatic decline in North America’s standards of living. It is within this context that 
I make the following argument: since a significant portion o f the US, Canadian and 
Mexican economic activities are now conducted under NAFTA (see table 1 below), 
overall, it is logical to postulate that NAFTA has positively contributed to the socio­
economic (and by extension to the political) well-being o f this region454. I will shortly 
elaborate on this assertion.
As already mentioned above, economic integration remains NAFTA’s main point 
of focus. However, even within this economic dimension, unlike the EU that has opted 
for deep economic integration, NAFTA has opted for shallow economic integration 
among the member states, choosing to operate under a free trade area and showing no 
immediate plans to expand beyond the free trade area regime. In fact, Jordan Strasburger 
succinctly captures NAFTA’s economic dimension as follows:
...the objectives of the agreement as envisioned by its progenitors did not include 
creating a “Common Market”. A “Common Market” involves questions of 
political and economic national sovereignty by actually consolidating governing 
bodies, policies, and procedures under a single unified system. The countries party 
to NAFTA never intended to give up any portion of their independent sovereignty 
regarding trade policies and procedures. NAFTA was simply designed to (1) 
reduce or completely eliminate economic barriers and promote economic 
integration among the United States, Mexico and Canada; (2) promote the 
development o f key legal frameworks needed to improve security for investments 
and thereby enhance investment; and (3) facilitate the free flow of goods and 
services by increasing the importance o f trade and identifying trade opportunities 
for members o f the three countries455.
So, within this decidedly economically-oriented framework, how has NAFTA faired in so 
far as promoting development in North America is concerned? While the literature on 
NAFTA’s economic achievements is mixed, existing statistical evidence indicates that 
intra-NAFTA trade has intensified over the years456. Canada, the US and Mexico have 
become significant trading partners and as can be from table 1 below, intra-NAFTA 
export trade (at 56%) is higher than extra-NAFTA export trade with the EU ( at 14.6 %), 
Asia ( at 17.4 %) and the Rest o f the World ( at 12.0%). In terms o f imports (see table 1
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below), NAFTA member states have equally become more dependent on each other with 
intra-NAFTA imports being 38.1 % while extra-NAFTA import trade stands at 17.6% 
with the EU, 31.5% with Asia and 12.8% with the rest o f the world.
Table 1
NAFTA’s International Trade Outlook in 2001 (Shares of Exports and Imports in 
Percentage Form)
Destination Destination Destination Destination
Exporter NAFTA EU ASIA ROW
NAFTA 56.0 14.6 17.4 12.0
EU 10.9 61.0 7.2 20.9
ASIA 26.3 14.7 48.1 10.9
Importer NAFTA EU ASIA ROW
NAFTA 38.1 17.6 31.5 12.8
EU 8.1 58.9 12.0 21.0
ASIA 13.7 12.1 56.3 18.0
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, in NAFTA 2004 Report, p. 8.
Similarly, over the last ten years, trade among the NAFTA member states has 
grown tremendously. For example, since the implementation o f NAFTA in 1994, total 
merchandise trade between the US and Canada has grown by over 120% and close to 
140% in goods and services457. Currently, trade between the US and Canada stands at US 
$ 1.08 billion a day458. On the other hand, trade between the US and Mexico has grown at 
an annual rate o f 11% jumping from US $ 81.5 billion in 1993 to US $ 235.5 billion in 
2000459. Trade between the US and Mexico now stands at US $638 billion460.
At the political level, though NAFTA does not have established institutions to 
pursue its political agenda, it has none the less managed to make some political mileage 
within the synergies created under its economic integration framework461. Apart from 
capitalizing on the economic integration synergies to develop a common political agenda, 
the September 11 terrorist attack on the US provided another important reason for 
political cooperation among the NAFTA member states. The post September 11 
cooperation is forged within the context o f bilateral relations between the US and Canada 
and the US and Mexico and is based on the principle o f “Secure But Open Borders”462. 
As a result o f this cooperation, the US and Canada are currently working on the “Smart
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Borders Accord” while the US and Mexico are pursuing the “Border Partnership Action 
Plan”463.
NAFTA’s socio-economic and political development record in the North 
American region is however not without challenge. Since its inception in 1994, NAFTA 
has generated a lot o f debate in so far as its efficacy as the appropriate institution for 
North America socio-economic and political development is concerned. Some o f the 
main limitations that NAFTA suffers include:
(i) A Weak Institutional Architecture
Although the literature is mixed on the need for deepening NAFTA’s institutional 
architecture, some critics argue that NAFTA’s institutions are either under-developed or 
insufficient and therefore incapable o f effectively meeting the socio-economic and 
political demands of North America, especially in this era o f globalization464. For 
example, these critics point out that though the Secretariat is supposed to be NAFTA’s 
backbone, it is weak and ineffective due to the fact that each NAFTA member state runs 
an independent Secretariat. As a result, NAFTA has been characterized by the 
following465:
• Skewed terms o f trade in selected areas
• Differential subsidization, especially in agriculture, among member-states
• Lack o f sufficient country data, and therefore, lack o f detailed NAFTA data
analysis
• Lack of up to date market structure evolution
• Increasing incidents o f trade disputes
(ii) Business Sovereignty over People Sovereignty
One o f the biggest criticisms of NAFTA has been its overwhelming focus on 
economics and its apparent neglect o f other socio-political concerns in the region466. For 
example, critics argue that while the economic benefits o f NAFTA has been impressively 
huge, they have only benefited big-business to the detriment o f small-businesses and the 
North American labour market (especially the Canadian and American labour markets) 
has suffered inordinately as a result o f NAFTA. Critics further contend that NAFTA has
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led to the loss o f jobs from the high cost Canadian and US labour markets to the low cost 
Mexican labour market467. What is more, since NAFTA does not have a social safety net 
mechanism for those who are affected by the negative consequences arising out of its 
regional economic agenda, this burden has been shifted to individual member-states 
where it has not been adequately addressed468. Therefore, while NAFTA has made 
business sovereign, and in fact made it easier for businesses to relocate their capital 
within the region, it has taken away peoples’ sovereignty in this region in the sense that 
its limited institutional infrastructure has denied them a chance to actively shape its policy 
directions, especially those that have a direct impact on their socio-economic and political 
well-being.
(iii) NAFTA and the US: A Selfish Hegemon at Work
Given its huge economic and political might within NAFTA, the US has at times 
been portrayed as a selfish hegemon out to compel Canada and Mexico to do its socio­
economic and political bidding. For example, critics accuse the US o f giving concessions 
mostly on those trade issues that only advance its economic interests most and not those 
o f the other member-states469. Additionally, the US has tended to promote a hub versus 
spoke kind of regionalism in North America where, although it is under a tri-partite 
agreement with Canada and Mexico under NAFTA, it seems to prefer a bilateral, as 
opposed to a regional approach while dealing with the two member states470.
Therefore, while NAFTA has certainly made impressive gains on the economic 
front, the interpretation o f the benefits o f these gains is mixed, with some arguing that the 
gains have been good for North America in general while others contending that these 
gains have only benefited North America’s big business conglomerates, especially those 
in the US471. Hence, if  NAFTA intends to play a more proactive role in promoting socio­
economic and political development in North America, it must come up with mechanisms 
to limit its current shortcomings at both the socio-economic and political levels. Some of 
these mechanisms include establishing a central Secretariat and creating an institutional 
base that is capable of actively involving the citizens o f this region in NAFTA’s 
integration activities.
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(iv) a. MERCOSUR: Founding Objectives
The Latin American region was once ruled only under two metropoli located in 
the Iberian Peninsula472. Over time, and owing to a number o f internal and external 
political forces, Latin America was divided into the 19 states that currently make up the 
region473. However, although the fragmentation o f Latin America seems to have gone on 
unabated, it is important to note that the political leaders o f this region have always 
sought to stem the region’s fragmentation by taking measures aimed at restoring its 
original unity. Simon Bolivar made the first attempts at restoring Latin American unity 
when he called two Pan-American Congresses (the first one in 1819 and the second one 
in 1826) to discuss the issue o f the restoration o f Latin American unity474. These 
Congresses failed to reverse Latin American’s fragmentation.
However, the failures o f these two congresses to bring about unity in the early and 
mid nineteenth century did not extinguish the desire for unity in Latin America. On the 
contrary, this desire was rekindled again in the 1960s, but unlike the earlier attempts that 
had sought continent-wide unity, the 20th century Latin American unity initiatives opted 
for a regional integration approach as a means through which to attain continent-wide 
unity475. Some o f the key regional integration arrangements that were established 
towards attaining this goal include476: the Central American Common Market (the CACM) 
established in 1960; the Andean Pact and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) both 
established in 1969 and the Common Market o f the Southern Cone ( MERCOSUR—the 
focus o f this section) established in 1991477. The following are MERCOSUR’s member- 
states: Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. While the socio-economic and political 
gains o f the CACM, the Andean Pact and the CARICOM have generally been lacklustre, 
MERCOSUR stands out for having made the most impressive gains in this region.
However, as will be shown shortly, while MERCOSUR has set for itself concise 
and fairly attainable objectives and despite making some fairly impressive gains, it still 
has a number o f socio-economic and political obstacles that it must overcome in order to 
consolidate its gains and thus continue playing an important role as the vehicle for 
development in Latin America. But before making an assessment o f MERCOSUR’s gains 
and challenges, we need to start by looking at its objectives. The following are 
MERCOSUR’s objectives as set out in the 1991 Treaty o f Asuncion478:
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(a) Promote the free movement o f goods, services and factors o f production between 
the members states through, inter alia, the elimination o f customs duties and the 
non-tariff restrictions on the movement o f goods and any other equivalent 
measures.
(b) Establish a Common External Tariff (CET) and adopt a common trade policy in 
relation to third states or groups o f states and coordinate positions in regional and 
international economic and commercial forums.
(c) Coordinate macro-economic and sectoral policies between the member states in 
the areas o f foreign trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal and monetary matters, 
foreign exchange and capital, services, customs, transport and communications 
and any other areas that may be agreed upon in order to ensure proper competition 
between the member states.
(d) Secure the commitment from member states to harmonize their legislation in the 
relevant areas in order to strengthen the integration process
MERCOSUR has established an institutional infrastructure to achieve the above set 
objectives. The next section offers a brief discussion of MERCOSUR’s institutional 
structures and operations.
(iv) b. MERCOSUR: Institutional Structures and Operations
■ The Council of the Common Market (the CCM)
This is the highest policy-making organ o f MERCOSUR479. It is charged with the 
responsibility o f providing political leadership for the integration process and for making 
decisions to ensure the achievement o f the objectives defined in the 1991 Treaty of 
Asuncion. The CCM is made up of Ministers’ for Foreign Affairs and Ministers’ of the 
Economy o f member states or their equivalents.
The Presidency o f the CCM rotates among the member-states in alphabetical order for 
periods o f six months. The CCM meets whenever deemed appropriate but at least once 
every six months, and the meetings are normally graced with the participation o f the 
Presidents o f member states. The meetings are co-ordinated by Ministers for Foreign
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Affairs and other Ministers or Ministerial authorities may be invited. The rulings o f the 
CCM take the form of Decisions and are binding upon member states.
■ The Common Market Group (the CMG)
This is the executive organ o f MERCOSUR480. It consists o f four members and 
four alternates from each country appointed by their respective governments. The CMG 
must include representatives o f ministries for Foreign Affairs, ministries o f the Economy 
or their equivalents and the Central Banks o f the member-states. The CMG is co­
ordinated by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs. It may call representatives o f the member 
states governments or other MERCOSUR organs if  and where these are needed to help 
meet or further MERCOSUR’s objectives. The CMG holds extra-ordinary meetings as 
often as necessary and in accordance with its terms and rules o f procedure. Its rulings take 
the form of Resolutions, which are binding upon member-states.
■ The MERCOSUR Trade Commission (the MTC)
Together with the Common Market Group, the MTC monitors the application of 
the common trade policy instruments agreed upon by the MERCOSUR member states481. 
The MTC is made up o f four members and four alternates from the member-states and is 
co-ordinated by MERCOSUR’s respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs. It meets at least 
once a month or whenever it is requested to meet by the Common Market Group or any 
member-state.
The MTC is responsible for considering complaints referred to it by its National 
Sections and originated by member-states or individuals, whether natural or legal persons, 
relating to the situations provided for in Articles 1 to 25 of the Brasilia Protocol, if  and 
when they fall within its sphere o f competence
The decisions o f the MTC take the form of Directives or Proposals which are binding 
upon the member-states.
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■ The Joint Parliamentary Commission ( the JPC)
The JPC represents the parliaments o f MERCOSUR member states, in accordance 
with their internal procedures482. It consists o f equal members o f parliament representing 
the member states. The members o f the JPC are appointed by the respective national 
parliaments. The JPC’s duties include: speeding up the internal procedures in member 
states to ensure prompt entry into force o f decisions taken by MERCOSUR and working 
to harmonize legislation in order to advance the integration process. The JPC makes 
recommendations to the Council through the Common Market Group.
■ The Economic-Social Consultative Forum (the ESCF)
The ESCF represents economic and social sectors within MERCOSUR483. It 
consists o f equal numbers o f representatives from each member state. The ESCF plays a 
consultative role on social and economic matters in MERCOSUR. Its views are expressed 
in the form o f recommendations to the Common Market Group.
■ The MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat
The Administrative Secretariat is based in the City o f Montevideo484. It is 
responsible for providing services to the other MERCOSUR organs and among other 
things, does the following: serves as the official archive for MERCOSUR documentation; 
publishes and circulates decisions adopted within the framework o f MERCOSUR; 
organizes the logistical functions o f the meetings o f all the MERCOSUR organs; informs 
member-states about measures being taken by individual members states to incorporate 
MERCOSUR’s decisions into their legal systems and finally, draws up MERCOSUR 
budget and ensures its proper implementation. A Director who is a national o f one o f the 
member-states heads the Secretariat. The Director is chosen by the Common Market 
Group on a rotating basis and holds office for a term o f two years and may not be re­
elected at the end o f term.
(iv) c. MERCOSUR and Latin America’s Socio-Economic and Political Development
As already noted above, compared to other regional integration arrangements in 
Latin America and indeed those in Asia and Africa, MERCOSUR has made impressive
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gains, which have in turn meant higher socio-economic and political returns for its
A a r
member states . However, unlike the EU, MERCOSUR does not have an elaborate, 
region-wide institutional mechanism to distribute both the burdens and benefits of 
integration. Nonetheless, this regional integration arrangement has continued to see 
increased socio-economic and political benefits to its member-states486. At the socio­
economic level, intra-MERCOSUR trade has continued to improve as the member-states 
turn more and more to each for trade. For example, as can be seen from graph 1 below, in 
1990 and only one year before its formal establishment, intra-country trade among the 
states that would later make up MERCOSUR stood at only 9%. However, after eight 
years o f existence, intra-MERCOSUR trade rose from 9%  in 1990 to an impressive 25%
A Q H
in 1998 (see graph 2 below). Also, with the exception o f the automotive sector, the 
MERCOSUR member countries have eliminated quantitative trade barriers and are
400
currently in the process o f eliminating non-tariff barriers . Similarly, under 
MERCOSUR’s social dimension, this regional integration arrangement has broadened its 
internal agenda to cover such areas as education, labour, culture, environment, justice and 
consumer protection489. Recently, at a meeting held in Asuncion in June 18-19th2005, 
MERCOSUR approved an accord on defending human rights and launched a US $ 100 
million regional cooperation fund to help fight poverty490.










Source: Adapted from Echandi (2001): p 384.
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Source: Adapted from Echandi (2001): p 384.
At the political level, in 1998, MERCOSUR adopted a democratic clause as part 
o f the region’s treaty acquis491. Under MERCOSUR, nation-states that were once 
hallmarks o f repressive military dictatorships are slowly parting with this unenviable 
political culture and embracing a democratic culture, which without a doubt has created 
an environment within which sustainable development can occur492. MERCOSUR has 
been fairly successful in shunning a return to military dictatorships in Latin America. For 
example, in 1996, MERCOSUR’s commitment to a democratic political culture saw other 
member states engage in concerted diplomatic action that prevented Paraguay from 
slipping back into military authoritarianism493.
What is more, MERCOSUR has given the member-states the necessary political 
clout that has led to increased visibility in international multilateral institutions like the 
WTO as well as increased bargaining power among other well-established regional 
integration arrangements like the EU and NAFTA494. Generally speaking, MERCOSUR’s 
success at both the socio-economic and political levels can be attributed to the fact that 
this regional integration initiative has elected to focus on a concise and achievable 
regional agenda as opposed to pursuing grand and unattainable, but lofty objectives, a 
mistake that led to the downfall o f earlier regional integration arrangements in Latin 
America and as we shall find out in this thesis, one that still continues to impede 
successful regionalism in Africa. But despite its many socio-economic and political
9 0
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
achievements, MERCOSUR’s is still confronted by a number o f limitations in so far as 
pursuing its socio-economic and political mandate is concerned. Here, I identify and 
briefly examine three such limitations.
First, at the socio-economic level, although the 1991 Treaty o f Asuncion states 
that economic integration should include services and factors o f production, it makes no 
operational provisions on how this is supposed to be attained495. Hence, as Malamud 
notes, measures to promote the free circulation o f services, capital and workers have 
either been scarce or ineffective496. Also, although MERCOSUR claims that it has a 
social dimension to its integration agenda, so far, the Consultative Social and Economic 
Forum lacks real power and is barely accessible to the citizens497. What is more, in terms 
of striking regional economic deals, unions and businesses prefer to lobby top ranking 
officials at home on matters that are o f interest to them and not lower-ranking envoys in 
Montevideo498.
Second, even though MERCOSUR has seen tremendous increases in intra­
member trade, this has not been accompanied by preferential treatment o f the citizens of 
the member-states. As a result, the concept o f intra-regional citizen remains weak499. 
Therefore, although free movement o f people is part o f MERCOSUR’s objectives, so far, 
this objective remains but an idea. Consequently, the MERCOSUR flag remains a less 
meaningful insignia that is largely limited to the diplomatic arena o f the member states.
Third and finally, at the political level, since all decision-making, dispute- 
settlement and implementation capacities are in the hands o f member countries, 
MERCOSUR still remains heavy on diplomatic operations and light on juridical 
procedures. Therefore, even in those areas with agreed upon regional rules, there is a 
discordance o f implementation due to dissimilar national implementation capacities500. 
Additionally, MERCOSUR has not made much progress at the political level, especially 
when it comes to the issue o f enlargement. Hence, although a number o f Latin American 
countries have expressed their intention to join; this is not happening, particularly given 
the fact that MERCOSUR lacks clear application procedures501.
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Therefore, while MERCOSUR has so far made some good progress in 
contributing to the promotion o f socio-economic and political development among its 
member states, it must strive to overcome the above-mentioned limitations so as to 
enhance its capacity and so as to continue playing an important socio-economic and 
political development role for its members in particular and the Latin American region in 
general. For example, at the socio-economic level, the ESCF should be strengthened and 
given a more mainstream role in shaping MERCOSUR’s social policy agenda. At the 
political level, MERCOSUR must develop a strategy for its expansion, including putting 
in place a clear application procedure.
(v) a. ASEAN: Founding Objectives
Like most other post-World II and Cold War era regional integration 
arrangements, the Association o f Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 
the 1960s. On 8 August 1967, five South East Asian countries, namely, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand met in Bangkok and out o f this meeting, 
ASEAN was bom . Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 
1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999503.
Generally speaking, although ASEAN has been in operation for almost four 
decades now, the member states o f this regional integration arrangement and other South 
East Asian countries in general never really embraced regional integration as a strategy 
for their development, especially at the socio-economic economic level504. As is the case 
with most parts o f the third world, South East Asia’s 1960’s regionalism was more an 
affirmation of political autonomy (from the just vanquished colonial era) by South East 
Asian nations that was based on political-autonomy affirming rhetoric and not a means 
through which sustainable development in the region was to be attained505. Hence, despite 
the public declarations o f leaders in this region about their commitment to regionalism, 
none o f them gave regionalism serious attention as an avenue for development, especially 
in the formative years o f independence.
However, as Choi notes, the development and apparent success o f regional 
integration arrangements in other regions o f the world, especially in Europe (the EU) and 
North America (NAFTA) have forced many countries in East and South East Asia to
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consider establishing more institutionalized regional integration frameworks 506 . 
Additionally, the post Cold War era globalization forces and the Asian financial crisis of 
1997 have made the countries in this region more amenable to the idea o f regional 
integration arrangements as a strategy for stable and sustainable socio-economic and 
political development 507. It is within the context o f this renewed interest in regionalism in 
East and South East Asia that I examine ASEAN and its role and or contribution towards 
meeting South East Asia’s socio-economic and political development. I embark on this 
task by first giving the following outline o f ASEAN’s objectives508:
(a) To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in 
the region through the framework for elevating functional cooperation to a higher 
plane
(b) To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the 
rule o f law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the 
principles o f the United Nations Charter
(c) To promote political cooperation and regional security cooperation, through the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, based on the principles o f self-confidence, self-reliance, 
mutual respect, cooperation, and solidarity among the member states
(v) b. ASEAN: Institutional Structures and Operations
- the ASEAN SUMMIT
This is the highest-decision making body in ASEAN509. It is made up o f the 
Heads o f State and or Government o f the member states. The Summit holds its meetings 
annually, and whenever decided, the Summit is preceded by a Joint Ministerial Meeting 
o f the Foreign and Economic Ministers.
■ The ASEAN Standing Committee
This Committee is under the Chairmanship o f the Foreign Minister o f the country- 
in-chair and is mandated to coordinate the work o f the Association in between the annual 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (the AMM)510. The ASEAN Chair and Vice Chair are 
elected based on alphabetical rotation o f all ASEAN Member Countries.
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The ASEAN Secretariat
The ASEAN Secretariat is headed by the Secretary-General51 \  Its mandate is to 
initiate, advise, coordinate, and implement ASEAN activities. The operational budget of 
the ASEAN Secretariat is prepared annually and funded through equal contribution of all 
ASEAN Member Countries.
■ Committees in Third Countries
These Committees are composed o f Ambassadors o f all ASEAN Member 
Countries based in the capitals o f the ASEAN Dialogue Partners and other
• ^ 1 9  • •countries . ASEAN has 11 Dialogue Partners, namely Australia, Canada, China, 
European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic o f Korea, the Russian Federation, 
the United States and the United Nations Development Programme.
■ ASEAN’s Specialized Agencies
Apart from the above institutions, ASEAN is supported by several specialized 
Agencies based in different ASEAN capitals513. Some of these agencies are: ASEAN 
University Network, ASEAN-EC Management Centre, ASEAN Centre for Energy, 
ASEAN Agricultural Development Planning Centre, ASEAN Earthquake Information 
Centre, ASEAN Poultry Research and Training Centre, ASEAN Regional Centre for 
Biodiversity Conservation, ASEAN Rural Youth Development Centre, ASEAN 
Specialized Meteorological Center, ASEAN Tourism Information Centre, and ASEAN 
Timber Technology Centre.
From the foregoing, it can be seen that compared to NAFTA and MERCOSUR, 
ASEAN has a fairly extensive institutional structure. But has ASEAN effectively 
employed this extensive institutional infrastructure both to attain its objectives and to 
enhance socio-economic and political development in South East Asia? Let us find out.
(v) c. ASEAN and South East Asia’s Socio-Economic and Political Development
At the socio-economic development level, ASEAN’s focus has been in the 
following sectors514: trade, investment, industry, services, finance, agriculture, forestry,
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energy, transportation and communication, intellectual property, small and medium 
enterprises, and tourism. Within these sectors, ASEAN has made some commendable 
progress. For example, after establishing the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and 
within three year o f AFTA operation, exports among ASEAN countries grew from 
US$43.26 billion in 1993 to almost US$80 billion in 1996, an average yearly growth rate 
o f 28.3 percent515. In the process, the share o f intra-regional trade from ASEAN’s total 
trade rose from 20 percent to almost 25 percent over the same period516.
Additionally, as can be seen from figure 1 below and based on the 2004 
provisional estimates, ASEAN has substantially cut down intra-regional tariffs and 
therefore, virtually established a Free Trade Area in the region. Intra-regional tariff has 
gone down by more than 90 percent to fall within the 0-5 percent tariff range for the 
products in the Common External Preferential Trade Inclusion List (IL). In addition to 
trade and investment liberalization, ASEAN has sought to promote economic 
development through the development o f a regional transport, telecommunications and
c i  7
energy infrastructure .
Figure 1: Percentage of Tariff Lines at 0-5percent in the 
Tentative 2004 CEPT Package
ASEAIM-6 ___________ CLMV___________ Total ASEAN
■  Q-Spercent ■  >5percent □  Other
At the transportation services level, the Trans-ASEAN Transportation Network, 
consisting o f major inter-state highway and railway networks, principal ports and sea-
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lanes for maritime traffic, inland waterway transport, and major civil aviation links has 
been established518. Through this network, ASEAN seeks both to improve and expand the 
national and regional infrastructure. At the telecommunication services level, ASEAN is 
promoting both the interoperability and interconnectivity o f the national 
telecommunications equipment and services519. Finally at the energy services level, 
ASEAN is building Trans-national energy networks, which consist o f the ASEAN Power 
Grid and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Projects520.
ASEAN’s development focus goes beyond economic growth concerns to embrace
1
other social development sectors like health and education . For example, on health 
matters, ASEAN member states have opted for a regional approach, especially on such 
cross-border contagions like SARS and other regionally pandemic infections such as 
HIV/AIDS 522 . Hence, during the SARS health crisis, ASEAN leaders decided to 
undertake coordinated measures to contain the SARS outbreak that included : the 
exchanging o f information; the appointing o f a focal/contact point in every country; 
carrying out joint SARS research and training programmes and standardizing pre­
departure screening for international travelers.
On combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on 
Health Development (SOMHD) is in the forefront fighting to make anti-retroviral drugs 
accessible to HIV/AIDS patients in the region524. Based on the recommendations o f the 
SOMHD meetings, ASEAN member-states have agreed to compile baseline data on the 
extent o f unmet demands for Anti-Retroviral (ARV) drugs, patent laws, prices o f ARVs, 
local capacity for production and administrative requirements for importing generics so 
that joint action plan could be prepared on options to increase access through such 
strategies as joint negotiation and bulk purchasing . What is more, the SOMHD 
continues to exchange views on the WTO Doha Declaration on the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects o f Intellectual Property Right (TRIPS) and public health526. To this end, 
the SOMHD has endorsed the project proposal on: “Intellectual Property Law Review 
and Capacity Building on Intellectual Property Rights Related to Public Health in the 
ASEAN Region”, which aims to address the issue o f access to drugs .
On the education front, ASEAN has attempted to popularize itself among its 
member states through the ASEAN Committee on Education (ASCOE)528. ASCOE held
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its first meeting in September 2002 in Cambodia with a re-focused mission to promote 
ASEAN awareness in primary and secondary schools529. At the tertiary level of 
education, the ASEAN University Network (the AUN) continues to promote 
collaborative studies and research programs among its 17-member educational 
institutions 530. The AUN has, among other things, conducted activities such as 
developing an ASEAN Studies Programme; Student and Faculty Exchange Programme; 
Scholarships for Graduate Students at ASEAN Countries; Information Networking
ST 1among ASEAN Universities; and Collaborative Research .
Under the AUN, the University o f Malaya launched a Master’s Degree 
Programme in ASEAN Studies in June 2003 and now offers MA degrees in this field . 
Similarly, the AUN has facilitated faculty exchange through the ASEAN Distinguished 
Professors Program and continues to organize conferences, workshops and seminars for 
scholars within the ASEAN member states to both exchange views and to develop 
possible policy actions that will further help ASEAN achieve its objectives and meet its 
socio-economic and political development demands533.
In so far as political development is concerned, ASEAN has relied more on the 
diplomatic channels among the member states than a juridical regional structure to pursue 
both its regional and international political agenda534. Through diplomatic channels, 
ASEAN has made major strides in building cooperative ties with states in the Asia- 
Pacific region . What is more, ASEAN has intensified its cooperation with other East 
Asian countries, especially with its major FDI contributors (i.e. China, Japan, and the 
Republic o f South Korea) through holding annual dialogues with the leaders o f these 
countries536. ASEAN also continues to foster political cooperation with its other Dialogue 
Partners who include Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, New Zealand, the 
Russian Federation, the United States o f America, and the United Nations Development 
Programme537. Additionally, ASEAN has continued to maintain high visibility in the 
international political arena as most o f its member states participate actively in the 
activities o f the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM), and the East Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAF) and the WTO negotiations538.
Like the other regional integration arrangements discussed above, ASEAN suffers 
a number o f limitations that have impeded its full socio-economic and political
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development potential. I will examine these limitations within two main contexts. First, at 
the socio-economic level, despite having a seemingly ambitious agenda, ASEAN has not 
shown firm material commitment to the realization o f this agenda. Second, although 
ASEAN seems to have made tremendous progress in liberalizing the economy and 
attracting substantial levels o f FDI, it has not made similar strides in facilitating the free 
movement o f people within the region and from its current institutional layout, such plans
C I A
do not seem to be a priority issue . But why should the free movement o f people be a 
priority issue for ASEAN? The free movement o f people in ASEAN should be a priority 
because o f two main reasons. First, free movement o f people will make it easy for labour 
to freely circulate within the region and second, having established a Free Trade Area, 
such movement will make it possible for the gains and loses o f the FT A to be fairly 
distributed in the ASEAN region. This will lessen the short-term pangs o f integration in 
the areas most hit by regionalism, for example through job loss, as the affected people 
will move to those areas that have either gained or not adversely suffered from integration.
Finally, at the political level, ASEAN is still a predominantly top-heavy institution 
that accords little room for citizens democratic input into its day to day operations. What 
is more, owing to its firm commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs o f the 
member-states, ASEAN has not been very effective in promoting a democratic culture in 
South-East Asia. On the contrary, some o f the ASEAN member states, like Myanmar, 
carry the unenviable reputation o f being among some o f the most repressive political 
regimes in the world540.
So far, I have presented a general overview o f the role o f regional integration 
arrangements in the socio-economic and political development pursuits in North America, 
Europe, Latin America and South East Asia. In my discussion, I have focused on the EU, 
NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN and highlighted the roles that these regional bodies 
have played in securing the socio-economic and political development needs within their 
respective regions. While I take note o f the gains made by these regional integration 
arrangements in so far as the attainment o f their development objectives is concerned, I 
equally note their limitations and point out some o f the challenges they must seek to 
overcome in order to continue playing key roles in meeting development needs within
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their respective regions. In the remaining section o f this thesis, I turn my attention to the 
role o f regionalism in meeting Africa’s socio-economic and political development needs. 
I begin my discussion by first providing a general overview o f regionalism in Africa. 
Then second, I focus on COMESA and discuss its role in the socio-economic and 
political development o f Eastern and Southern Africa. Then in the final chapter o f this 
thesis, I examine COMESA within a comparative context and analyze both its present 
challenges and future prospects in promoting socio-economic and political development 
in Southern and Eastern Africa.
(vi) a. Regionalism and Africa’s Development: an Overview
As is the case with the other post-colonial regions o f world (mainly Latin America 
and South East Asia), the rise o f regional integration arrangements in Africa in the 1960s 
was mainly in keeping with the spirit o f the national liberation movements that had, to 
large extent, contributed to the demise o f the colonial era in the continent541. Hence, the 
main driving force behind the original idea o f regionalism in Africa was the desire by the 
newly independent African states to break away from the colonial era through creating 
geographic entities that were both economically independent and politically united542. To 
this end, three Pan-African Conferences (the first held in April 1957, the second held in 
June 1960 and the third held in May 1963) were unequivocal in their advocacy of freeing 
Africa in an all round sense— i.e. socially, economically and politically543.
Two views emerged out o f these Pan-African conferences. On one hand, was the 
view held by some African leaders, like Kwame Nkrumah, who argued that immediate 
continental unity through a Pan-African approach that would install a “United States of 
Africa” was the only way o f securing a strong united front against other dominant 
political actors in the international system544. On the other hand, other African leaders, 
like Julius Nyerere, called for a gradual unification o f Africa through a regional 
integration approach545. Eventually, the latter views prevailed. Therefore, at the launch of 
the Organization o f African Unity (the OAU) at Addis Ababa in May 1963, African states 
incorporated regionalism as the modus operandi for socio-economic and political 
development and the avenue through which eventual continental unity could be 
attained546.
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The experiment for the eventual, African-wide socio-economic and political unity 
and development via regionalism was designed to take place at sub regional levels in 
West Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, Central Africa and North Africa. Some o f the 
regional integration arrangements formed to fulfill this vision for African unity via 
regionalism include547: ECOWAS, ECCAS, PTA and SADCC and AMU. With these 
regional integration arrangements, the newly independent African states hoped to embark 
on the process o f regional socio-economic and political development that would 
eventually lead to a continent-wide approach to African development . However, like 
other regional integration arrangements in other parts o f the world, Africa’s regionalism 
had not brought about the expected socio-economic and political development gains by 
the 1980s. Why was this so?
A number o f factors have been advanced to explain why, after two decades of 
operation, regional integration arrangements in Africa had not made much progress in 
attaining their set development objectives549. Here, I identify three. First, like other 
regional integration arrangements in other regions o f the world, Africa’s pre-1980 
regional integration arrangements were caught up in pursuing a political agenda and 
insufficient attention was paid to the socio-economic dimension o f regionalism. Hence, 
although one o f the founding principles o f regionalism had been the desire to secure full 
political autonomy by breaking away from the grip o f the ex-colonial powers, the reality 
was different from the rhetoric, especially given the fact that most member states in 
Africa’s regional integration arrangements continued to exhibit patterns that reinforced 
their strong links to their ex-colonial powers550. This was particularly the case in the 
French speaking West and Central African states where France played a strong under­
writing role for a number o f regional integration arrangements, key among them being 
UDEAC and CEAO. The regional integration arrangements in French West Africa and 
French Central Africa were seen as necessary counterweights to regional integration 
initiatives like ECOWAS that were seen as being predominantly Anglophone oriented551. 
Hence, regionalism was emerging as a source o f regional disunity and therefore acting 
contrary to the anticipated eventual emergence of African unity .
Second, and still at the political level, divergent political ideologies among the 
member-states o f the different regional integration arrangements proved anti-thetical to
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successful regionalism in Africa. For example, it has been argued that the ideological 
difference between Kenya (under a capitalist ideology) and Tanzania (under a socialist 
ideology) partly contributed to the break-up of the East African Community in 197 7553. 
What is more, the politics o f the Cold War era and the protection accorded to client states 
(like Zaire—now the DRC— during the ruinous three-decade Mobutu regime and 
Ethiopia under Mengistu) by the super-powers led to the emergence o f some o f the most 
brutal dictatorships in Africa554. The leaders o f these super-power propped dictatorships 
cared less about the socio-economic and political well being o f their citizens. Expecting 
that such regimes would muster the necessary political will needed for successful 
regionalism when they did not even care about promoting the socio-economic and 
political well-being o f their individual states is, simply put, expecting too much.
Third, at the socio-economic level, most integrating member-states pursued 
import- substitution industrialization strategies that were inimical to the growth of 
complementarities since they promoted competition both for the acquisition o f similar 
capital input goods and for the export o f similar primary products to the same external 
market niche 555. Furthermore, owing to their narrow resource base, most newly 
independent African states heavily relied (and most still continue to rely on) on tariff 
revenues as one o f the main components o f government revenue and since implementing 
regional integration schemes required, among other things, tariff reduction, most states 
found this a difficult policy to implement556. What is more, owing to their highly 
repressive character, most member states excluded their citizens from active involvement 
in the respective regional integration arrangements and therefore limited both the spirit of 
individual initiative and enterprise that are important catalysts for the emergence o f strong 
regional economies557.
So, by the beginning o f the 1980s, there was a need to re-evaluate and if  possible, 
re-engineer regional integration arrangements in Africa. This need was captured in the 
Lagos Plan o f Action (the LPA) of 1980558. The LPA laid out a new vision for 
regionalism in Africa that was supposed to steer African regionalism from the pre-1980s 
failures559. However, a combination of poorly implemented internal development policies 
and the Cold War era politics continued to militate against post 1980 African regionalism. 
The end of the Cold War era in the 1990s and the subsequent demands for socio-
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economic and political reforms in most African states led to the re-birth o f regionalism 
under the Abuja Treaty o f 1991 that established a regional integration approach and 
vision for the emergence o f the African Economic Community by 2025560. Given the 
changed circumstances in the international political arena (key among them being the end 
o f the Cold War) and the internal socio-economic and political reforms taking place in 
Africa, it is my opinion that the Abuja Treaty stands a better chance o f making 
regionalism a more meaningful strategy for Africa’s development. I focus on a 
comparative analysis o f COMESA to examine the renewed possibilities for regionalism 
as a development strategy. However, before embarking on this comparative analysis, I 
first present a general overview o f COMESA (based on the same approach adopted for 
the other regional integration bodies above) in terms o f its founding objectives, its 
institutional structures and operations and its socio-economic and political development 
achievements and limitations within the identified institutional structures and operations.
(vi) b. COMESA: Founding Objectives
With 20 member-states, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) is one o f the largest regional integration arrangements in A frica561. 
COMESA covers the Eastern and the Southern half o f the African continent, stretching 
from Egypt to the north o f the continent to Zimbabwe to the South. COMESA was 
founded in 1993 as a successor to the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (PTA), which was established in 198 1 562. It formally succeeded the PTA on 8 
December 1994 upon ratification o f the COMESA Treaty by 11 signatory states563. The 
establishment o f COMESA was a fulfilment o f the requirements o f the PTA Treaty, 
which provided for the transformation o f the PTA into a common market ten years after 
the entry into force o f the PTA Treaty564. The following are some of the key objectives of 
COMESA as outlined in its founding treaty565:
(a) To attain sustainable growth o f the member states by promoting a 
more balanced and harmonious development o f its production and 
marketing structures;
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(b) To promote joint development in all fields o f economic activity and 
the joint adoption of macro-economic policies and programmes to 
raise the standard o f living of its peoples and to foster closer relations 
among its members states;
(c) To cooperate in the creation o f an enabling environment for foreign, 
cross-border and domestic investment and in the joint promotion of 
research and adaptation o f science and technology for development;
(d) To cooperate in the promotion of peace, security, and stability among 
the member states in order to enhance the economic development in 
the region;
(e) To cooperate in strengthening the relations between the common 
market and the rest o f the world and in the adoption o f common 
positions in international fora; and
(f) To contribute towards the establishment, progress, and the realisation 
o f the objectives o f the African Economic Community
COMESA has established an institutional structure within which it hopes to attain the 
above set objectives. I briefly discuss this institutional structure and its operations next.
(vi) c. COMESA: Institutional Structures and Operations 
■ The COMESA Authority (the Authority)
The Authority is the supreme policy organ o f COMESA, comprising o f Heads of 
State or Government o f member countries566. It is responsible for the general policy, 
direction and control o f the performance o f the executive functions o f the COMESA and 
the achievements o f its aims and objectives. The inaugural meeting o f the Authority took 
place in Lilongwe, Malawi in December 1994. The Authority’s decisions are reached 
through a general consensus, mostly during its annual summit meetings. The Head of 
State/Government o f the country that hosts the annual summit assumes the Chairmanship
t ho f Authority for the year. The most recent summit o f the Authority took place on 12-13
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June 2005 in Kigali, Rwanda. Therefore, the current Chairman o f the COMESA 
Authority is Mr. Paul Kagame, the President o f Rwanda.
■ The Council of Ministers (the Council)
Each member state appoints a minister to participate in the Council o f Ministers . 
The Council monitors COMESA’s activities, including the supervision o f the Secretariat. 
It makes COMESA’s policy recommendations and suggests the policy directions o f the 
organization. The Council meets once a year. It reports to the Authority.
■ The Secretariat and the Secretary-General
The COMESA Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General who is appointed by 
the Authority to serve for a term o f five years and is eligible for reappointment for a 
further term of five years568. He/She is the Chief Executive Officer o f COMESA and its 
representative in the exercise o f its legal personality. The Secretary-General is not 
expected to seek or receive instructions from any Member State or from any other 
authority external to COMESA in the performance of his/her duties. Additionally, the 
Secretary-General is required to refrain from any actions, which may adversely reflect on 
his or her position as an international official. On their part, Member States are required 
to respect the international character o f the responsibilities o f the Secretary-General and 
the other staff at the Secretariat and are therefore expected not to unduly seek to influence 
the Secretariat while it is discharging its responsibilities.
The duties o f the Secretary-General include, but are not limited to, the following: 
submitting reports (in consultation with the Intergovernmental Committee) on the 
activities o f COMESA to the Authority and Council; ensuring that the objectives set out 
in the COMESA Treaty are attained and to this end, either on his/her or own initiative or 
on the basis o f a complaint, investigate a presumed breach o f the provisions o f the 
COMESA Treaty and report to the Council in accordance with an investigative procedure 
to be determined by the Council; presenting the budget o f COMESA to the 
Intergovernmental Committee administering COMESA finances; and finally, promoting 
the adoption o f joint positions by the Member States in multilateral negotiations with 
third countries or international organisations.
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■ The Committee of Governors of Central Banks
This committee advises the Authority and the Council o f Ministers on monetary 
and financial matters569. It is responsible for the development o f programmes and action 
plans in the field o f finance and monetary co-operation and is made up of Governors 
General o f the Central Banks o f COMESA member states.
■ The Intergovernmental Committee
The committee consists o f Permanent or Principal Secretaries designated by each 
member state and is responsible for the development o f programmes and action plans in 
all fields o f co-operation except in the finance and monetary sector570.
■ Technical Committees
There are 12 technical committees, which are responsible for the preparation and 
monitoring o f comprehensive implementation programmes and, also, responsible for 
making recommendations to the Intergovernmental Committee 571 . These are: 
Administrative and Budgetary Matters; Agriculture; Comprehensive Information Systems; 
Energy; Finance and Monetary Affairs; Industry; Labour, Human Resources and Social 
Affairs; Legal Affairs; Natural Resources, Environment, Tourism and Wildlife; Trade and 
Customs and lastly, Transport and Communications.
Apart from the above noted institutions, COMESA has the following institutions, 
which are also referred to either as the COMESA independent institutions or the 
COMESA family o f institutions:
■ The COMESA Court of Justice
The court was established under the COMESA Treaty and became fully 
operational in September 1998572. It is currently located in Lusaka, Zambia and is 
composed o f seven judges, headed by a president o f the COMESA Court o f Justice. The 
principal functions o f the Court include: examining and arbitrating in disputes relating to 
arbitrary commercial practises that are contrary to the ratified protocols among COMESA
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member states; and interpreting the provisions o f the COMESA Treaty to ensure that 
member states implement and respect its decisions. A host agreement was signed in 
Khartoum on 26 January 2004 according to which the capital o f Sudan will be the 
permanent seat o f the COMESA Court. This agreement followed a decision on the need 
to have a permanent location for the Court at the 8th COMESA Summit held in Sudan on 
March 2003. Currently, the Court is in the process o f relocating to Khartoum.
■ The Eastern and Southern Africa Trade and Development Bank (PTA Bank)
The Bank has a capital base o f US$500 million and its principal function is to 
provide investment and trade financing to the business community in the COMESA 
region573. By September 2002, the Bank had approved a total o f ten projects amounting to 
US$29.5 million, including one equity investment in the Africa Trade Insurance Agency, 
bringing the total cumulative portfolio to US$225.4 million. This compares favourably 
with the Banks eight projects amounting to US$27.4 million for the same period in the 
year 2001. The Bank's operational activities are spread out over most o f the COMESA 
member States. Up to 30th September 2002, the Bank approved a total o f US$46.9 million 
in trade finance facilities bringing the total cumulative trade finance activities to US$830 
million, up from US$783 million as at 31st December 2001.
In order to further improve on its performance better, the Bank has designed and 
commenced the implementation o f a number o f other initiatives aimed at enhancing its 
operational capacity, the most important o f which are:
(i) The Third Corporate Plan (FYCORP-III), covering the period 
from 2003-2007. This plan seeks to promote large-scale 
corporate investment within COMESA. Additionally, through 
this plan, the Bank intends to transform itself into a world 
class financial institution delivering quality services and 
contributing significantly to the economic growth and 
prosperity of COMESA members.
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(ii) The Bank's decision to adopt the US dollar as its sole 
reporting currency in order to be easily understood 
internationally.
(iii) The Bank’s campaign to persuade those countries that are 
members o f COMESA but have not joined the Bank to do so 
expeditiously.
■ The PTA Reinsurance Company (the ZEP-RE)
The ZEP-RE was established in 1993574. Since then, it has been experiencing 
steady growth and its current share capital stands at US$27 million. In 2002, the company 
underwrote approximately US$14.5 million compared to US$11.75 million under-written 
in 2001. By the end o f the year 2002, the ZEP-RE was operating in thirty-eight countries 
both within and outside COMESA.
■ The Leather and Leather Products Institute (the LLPI)
The mission o f LLPI is to contribute to the strengthening o f the leather industry in 
the COMESA region while working as a centre o f excellence in leather and leather
c n c
products through the following two approaches : First, improving leather processing 
and manufacturing technology by developing human resources to meet this role; and 
second, addressing leather problems related to market capacity utilisation, input, 
technology, pollution, and standardisation. The leather market in Africa has a good 
potential to expand and develop, especially given the fact that Africa accounts for more 
than 19.5 % o f the global livestock population, o f which the COMESA region accounts 
for more than half. In 2002, the LLPI prepared eight projects for different countries and 
with the assistance o f the COMESA Secretariat, secured funds to finance them.
■ The COMESA Clearing House (the Clearing House)
The Clearing House is intended to address regional trade impediments, key among 
them being limited amounts o f convertible currency in the COMESA region576. Together 
with the Secretariat, the Clearing House has established a cross-border payment and
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settlement system called the Regional Payments and Settlement System (REPSS). Under 
this system, once the exporter has shipped goods, the funds transfer are made in the 
importer’s local currency and converted into the exporter’s currency, at an agreed rate (by 
the exporter’s central bank) for the credit o f the exporter’s commercial bank. This 
transaction is normally done at least on a same-day basis, which drastically reduces cross- 
border transaction costs and hence makes regional producers more competitive. 
Additionally, the Clearing House has set up a Trust Fund for ensuring timely completion 
o f daily settlements in the event o f an inability o f some participants to settle. What is 
more, since 2002, the REPSS has been using a multilateral netting system that converts 
all payments in local currencies to a “Settlement Currency” (US dollars or Euro) based on 
a fixed daily rate o f transfer between countries, with imbalances in the settlement 
currency being realigned or settled on a daily basis.
■ The COMESA Bankers' Association (the Bankers’ Association)
The COMESA Bankers' Association acts as a forum for the exchange o f 
information on banking practices in the region, and carries out activities meant to improve 
them577. In the year 2001-2002, the Bankers’ Association conducted a total o f seven 
seminars on issues such as bank fraud prevention, information technology, credit risk 
assessment, credit risk management, marketing and money laundering.
As can be seen from the foregoing, COMESA has a fairly extensive institutional 
structure and a brief glimpse o f its institutions reveals that most o f them seem to be 
making some progress in fulfilling their mandates. But to what extent have COMESA’s 
institutions and their operations translated into some tangible socio-economic and 
political development gains for the Eastern and Southern African region? This question 
informs the discussion in the next section.
(vi) d. COMESA and the Socio-Economic and Political Development of Eastern and 
Southern Africa.
On the economic front, the main approach being taken by COMESA in its bid to 
achieve the levels o f economic growth necessary to enhance economic development in
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Eastern and Southern Africa is market integration through the removal o f barriers to trade 
and investment. Under this approach, COMESA intends to consolidate its economic base 
and increase prospects for the member-states’ economic development through the 
following five stages578:
i. The first stage is the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), during which 
parties in the economic integration process offer each other 
preferences relating to market access for the goods produced in 
their territories.
ii. The second stage is the Free Trade Area (FTA), during which the 
integrating parties' trade is conducted on a duty-free and quota-free 
basis. Trade within a PTA or an FTA is dependent on agreed Rules 
o f Origin.
iii. The third stage of integration is the Customs Union (CU), during 
which two or more customs territories come together to form a 
single customs territory. Trade within the territory is conducted on 
a duty-free and quota-free basis for all products obtained or 
produced within the territory. The territory also imposes a 
Common External Tariff (CET) on products imported from outside 
its borders.
iv. The fourth stage is the Common Market, which can be summed up 
as a Customs Union plus the free movement o f the factors of 
production, namely labour and capital. At this stage, the cardinal 
issues include visas, work and residence permits, especially for 
skilled labour, businesspersons and investors. Normally, a 
Common Market simplifies these issues in that enhances the free 
movement o f the factors o f production. For example, in a properly 
functioning Common Market, the distinction between local 
(national) and foreign businesspersons or investors o f the 
constituent member states ceases to exist.
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v. The fifth and final stage is the Economic Union (EU), which 
incorporates all the features o f the Common Market plus common 
monetary and fiscal policies and the adoption o f a single currency 
issued by a common monetary authority. During this stage, 
economic policy in all areas is co-ordinated and any policy 
disarticulation arising from any of the member-states’ national 
policy/policies is not permitted. Also, during this stage, a common 
legislative body is established.
From the stages above, it is obvious that the “Common Market” component of the 
COMESA acronym is purely nominal and conceptually non-descriptive. Properly 
conceptualized and properly defined, COMESA is at the Preferential and the Free Trade 
Areas stage o f its five-stage economic development projection. Currently, and following 
the latest Authority meeting in Kigali, Rwanda on June 2005, COMESA has embarked on 
the process o f establishing a Customs Union579. So, the question here should be: What 
economic development gains has COMESA made as a PTA/FTA? Let us find out.
Since its establishment in 1993, COMESA has made some impressive strides in 
the promotion o f economic development in the region580. These gains can be analyzed 
within two broad categories: the trade category and the infrastructure category. First at the 
trade level, COMESA has continued to register increased trade volumes among its 
member states. For example, the total value o f intra-COMESA trade rose from US$ 
26,131 million in 1996 to US$ 4.5 billion in 2002581. What is more, COMESA FTA has 
adopted an outward-looking liberalisation strategy that has seen increased regional trade 
liberalisation measures taken among the member states. As a result, COMESA’s intra- 
FTA trade rose from US$ 2.1 billion in 2002 to US$ 2.6 billion in 2003, a growth rate of 
24%582. Over the same period, intra-COMESA trade rose from US$ 4.5 billion to US$ 
4.8 billion, an increase o f 7%583.
Second, at the infrastructure level, COMESA has taken concrete steps to reduce 
infrastructural impediments to regional economic growth. Some o f the steps taken 
include584: improving transport and communications in the COMESA region; establishing 
strong institutions to mobilise financial resources in order to provide investor confidence
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in the region and strengthening business links in the region through trade promotion and 
trade facilitation activities. In the transport and communications sector, COMESA has 
taken the following measures aimed at reducing regional impediments to economic 
development585:
(a) Surface Transport Facilitation
Transport facilitation is one area in which COMESA has made notable progress. 
In road transport, the measures taken to improve this sector include the COMESA 
Carriers Licence, the Harmonised Axle Load Limits and Road Transit Charges and the 
Third Party Vehicle Insurance Scheme (or the Yellow Card Scheme) 586 . When 
implemented together, these combined infrastructural changes have reduced transport 
costs in the COMESA region by an estimated 25 percent . In the case o f rail transport, 
COMESA is working closely with railways in the region to improve efficiency. In this 
regard COMESA has assisted the railways in the region adopt an information technology- 
based management system known as the Advance Cargo Information System (ACIS) that
c o o
facilitates the tracking o f cargo .
(b) Air Transport Facilitation
In accordance with COMESA's vision to attain higher levels o f economic 
development in the region, air transport liberalisation has become one o f its top 
priorities589. The main objective o f air transport liberalisation is to foster greater regional 
co-operation through the provision o f better quality and competitively priced air transport 
services. Already, COMESA countries implementing the air liberalisation programme 
have experienced increased frequencies in commercial flights between member countries, 
cheaper fares, entry o f new airlines and a wider choice o f routings with better 
connections590. In addition to intra-regional air liberalisation, COMESA, in collaboration 
with the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has developed competition 
regulations to ensure an orderly transition to open skies and the development o f a vibrant 
civil aviation industry within the region591.
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(c) Information and Communications Technology
Recognising that a reliable, efficient and cost-effective regional 
telecommunications network will greatly facilitate economic integration in the region, 
COMESA is currently promoting the establishment o f a regional telecommunications 
network that is viewed as part o f the solution the telecommunications problems in the 
region . This regional telecommunications network will be built and managed by the 
COMESA Telecommunications Company (COMTEL), which is a private limited 
company launched by COMESA 593. A strategic partner will hold 30 percent of 
COMTEL’s equity, participating National Telecommunications Operators will own 25% 
of the equity while private sector investors will own the remaining 45%594. The estimated 
total investment is US$300 million. The COMTEL project is on course and in March 
2004, three companies submitted their bid to the COMTEL Interim Board Meeting595. 
Work on the project is expected to resume soon596.
COMESA is also undertaking work in the e-readiness sub-sector aimed at 
assisting its member states to put in place the infrastructure needed to promote electronic 
commerce, and thus ensuring that they not only take advantage the e-commerce benefits, 
but also ensure that they are not further disadvantaged by being left behind as the new 
business technology moves forward elsewhere in the world597 . At the institutional 
infrastructure level, COMESA has established specialised institutions that are dedicated 
to supporting and facilitating regional economic development integration. Some o f these 
include598:
>  The Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTA Bank) 
with a capital base o f US$500 million. The Bank provides investment and trade 
financing to the private sector within COMESA and the East and Southern Africa 
region.
>  PTA Reinsurance Company (ZEP-RE), with a capital base o f US$27 million, and 
doing business in twenty African States. The main goal o f ZEP-RE is to foster 
economic growth and development in the region through trade in insurance and 
reinsurance business
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>  The African Trade Insurance Agency (ATI) with a capacity to underwrite business 
up to US$360 million. ATI is supported by the World Bank and the private sector, 
including Lloyds o f London and Gating Namur o f Germany and is a unique 
institution providing insurance cover for trade into and within the COMESA 
region.
>  Leather and Leather Products Institute (LLPI) is a technical institution that 
focuses on leather processing and manufacturing.
>  The Clearing House is developing a cross-border payment and settlement system 
which will meet the needs o f traders, industrialists and investors in the newly- 
liberalised environment.
Finally, COMESA has sought to promote economic development in Eastern and 
Southern Africa through both promoting and facilitating intra-regional trade and intra- 
regional business contacts. COMESA’s trade and business promotions have already 
created opportunities for cross-border investment, franchise and agency arrangements and 
joint venture operations599. For example, Egyptian business persons have sought to work 
with Malawian cotton growers and processors in a joint venture operation to access the 
US market for textiles under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)600; 
Mauritian manufacturers are operating in Madagascar in the textile sector and other 
sectors as w ell601; While Zimbabwean farmers and agro-processors are investing in 
Zambia in order to maximise their benefits under the COMESA FTA602. Such cross- 
border investment is, in turn, promoting the transfer o f technology and skills that 
contribute directly to the economic development o f the region603.
At the social level, COMESA is committed to developing a joint strategy against 
such regional health challenges, as the HIV/AID pandemic, that are a threat both to the 
economic gains so far attained and to the vast economic potential that is yet to be 
exploited in this region604. Hence, at the 2004 COMESA Authority meeting, the member- 
states resolved to jointly lobby against pharmaceutical companies invoking Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) regulations as a justification for denying the production o f the 
urgently needed Anti-Retro-Viral generic drugs for millions o f HIV/AIDS patients within
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the COMESA region605. Similarly, COMESA has spurred the growth and development 
of active regional civil society organizations such as SEATINI, MWENGO and CUTS- 
ARC, which are predominantly concerned with lobbying COMESA and other regional 
(e.g. SADC) and multilateral (e.g. WTO) bodies to incorporate a socially and politically 
inclusive dimension in their development agenda606.
Finally, at the political level, COMESA has acted on the synergies emanating 
from the regular interaction o f its leaders to develop a broad and fairly successful regional
• • « • (\(W  • . . .and international political agenda . COMESA is fully aware o f the fact that civil strife, 
political instabilities and cross-border disputes in the region have seriously affected the 
ability o f some of its member states to develop their individual economies as well as their 
capacity to participate and take full advantage o f regional integration arrangement under 
COMESA608. As a result, COMESA has taken a political approach to addressing the civil 
strife between and within some o f its member states because without peace, security and 
stability, satisfactory levels o f socio-economic and political development in the region 
cannot be attained609. To this end, a meeting o f the Intergovernmental Committee held in 
November 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia, explored ways to involve COMESA more directly in 
efforts to secure peace in the sub-region and rebuild war-torn economies610.
A follow-up meeting held in March 2000 at the same venue ended years o f 
COMESA’s ad hoc peace initiatives and laid the groundwork for a more institutionalized 
approach to realizing the peace and security objective enshrined in the COMESA Treaty. 
At this meeting, member states established a permanent, three-tier COMESA Peace and 
Security Programme structure to address the widespread and persistent armed conflicts 
between and within some member states611. This structure is composed of Heads of State 
and/or Government; Ministers o f Foreign Affairs; and a Committee on Peace and 
Security612.
What is more, unlike other past initiatives, the Peace and Security Programme is 
unique in that it includes the private sector and civil society organisations who have been 
given an advisory role613. The Ministers o f Foreign Affairs have so far held two meetings 
on Peace and Security614. At the first meeting held in Lusaka from 27-28 April 2001, the
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Ministers agreed to step up efforts to control the proliferation o f small and light weapons, 
step up the campaign against landmines and the stockpiling, use and or sale o f arms. At 
the second meeting held in Addis Ababa on 22 May 2002, the Ministers o f Foreign 
Affairs resolved to liaise with their respective governments to strengthen the role of the 
member-states Parliaments and Parliamentarians in the promotion o f a culture o f peace 
and security in the region615.
The COMESA Secretariat is responsible for the implementation o f the COMESA 
Peace and Security Programme, which falls under its Legal Affairs Department. As of 
March 2003, COMESA had carried or was in the process o f carrying out the following 
peace and security activities616:
>  Capacity building for regional parliamentarians and senators in conflict prevention 
and management skills: As at March 2003, COMESA had trained 70 
parliamentarians drawn from the parliaments o f each member-state. Ultimately, 
COMESA’s aim is to strengthen parliaments in the region as institutions of 
conflict management, armed with a pool o f trained conflict managers capable of 
addressing regional conflicts at the grassroots (read constituency) level;
>  Developing criteria and rules o f procedure for the role o f the private sector and 
civil society organisations in the programme on peace and security;
>  Seeking financial assistance from developed countries for the elimination of 
landmines and rehabilitation o f victims; and
> Adopting the Nairobi Declaration of March 15th 2000 on the control o f illicit 
proliferation o f small arms and light weapons as one o f the main means to control 
a key root cause o f conflicts in the region617.
In collaboration with other regional integration arrangements, COMESA has made 
some major breakthroughs in resolving political conflict in the Eastern and Southern 
Africa region618. For example, in Sudan, the Sudanese Government signed a peace 
agreement with the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army in 2004, bringing an end to a 
two-decade civil war that had pitted northern Sudan against southern Sudan619. In Uganda, 
the Ugandan Government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) are, for the first time in
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18 years, talking directly with one another620. This is a positive step that is likely to lead 
to a peaceful resolution between the Ugandan Government and the rebels and hence, 
promote the much-needed peace in Uganda. In Burundi, several rebel groups signed a 
peace agreement and are now working with the government to draw up a new constitution 
for the country . Finally, Somalia, that epitome o f Hobbesian politics, is slowly but 
surely rebuilding its statehood again after years o f being a stateless political jungle622.
Internationally, COMESA has continued to build its profile through both bilateral and 
multi-lateral cooperation initiatives with regional integration arrangements, multi-lateral 
organizations and individual countries both within and outside the African continent. 
The following are some o f the COMESA’s international cooperative activities623:
■ COMESA and the African Development Bank: The Secretariat actively 
participates in meetings convened by the African Development Bank to prepare 
action plans for medium and long-term projects to be funded by the Bank. 
Normally, the action plans cover the development o f physical infrastructure in 
aviation, roads, railways, ports, telecommunications and energy.
■ COMESA and the Economic Commission of Africa: COMESA has continued 
to receive technical support from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)624 
in, for example, identifying the investment opportunities for different COMESA 
member States.
■ COMESA and NEPAD: Within the framework o f NEPAD and the African 
Union, COMESA is developing closer and more cooperative links with other 
regional organisations in Africa. For example, COMESA has good working 
relationships with the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). 
Additionally, COMESA has signed co-operation agreements with IGAD and the 
Economic Community o f Western African States (ECOWAS) and will soon sign 
an agreement with the IOC. At a meeting o f the COMESA Council o f Ministers 
held in January 1997, it was agreed that COMESA and SADC should co-exist and 
cooperate. Consequently, COMESA and SADC are in the process o f establishing
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a framework that will lead to complementarity and co-operation in their 
activities625.
■ COMESA and the Commonwealth: COMESA receives technical and financial 
assistance from the Commonwealth Secretariat and, through this assistance, 
COMESA has undertaken a study on enhancing trade and production o f quality 
pharmaceutical products in the COMESA region.
■ COMESA and the EU: The EU is COMESA's major donor and COMESA 
continues to implement a number o f programmes with funding coming from the 
European Development Fund, mainly in trade policy and trade facilitation areas. 
Also, in 2003, the EU allocated Euro 223 million to COMESA and its sister 
regional organisations o f EAC, IOC and IGAD to implement a 5 year regional 
programme in three main focal sectors o f Economic Integration; Management of 
Natural Resources and Transport and Communication.
■ COMESA and USAID and other Agencies and Countries: COMESA 
continues to work closely with the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in a number o f areas, including in the implementation of 
the AGOA. In addition, COMESA maintains its associations with the Corporate 
Council on Africa, the African Capacity Building Foundation, and the French and 
British Governments.
Finally, one o f COMESA’s major challenges remains how to more effectively 
integrate into the global economy on equitable terms. COMESA is actively working to 
overcome this challenge by increasingly playing a strategic role in articulating its 
negotiating positions on WTO issues that range from agriculture to TRIPS. For example, 
COMESA member states, in collaboration with other developing countries and as part of 
the African group, played a significant role in ensuring that the Doha round of 
development issues was not trumped by the so-called Singapore issues at the 2003 
Cancun WTO Ministerial meeting626. COMESA is also co-ordinating negotiations for the 
Economic Partnership Agreements between the European Union, its largest co-operating 
partner, and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP States) at the regional level627. As
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can be seen from the foregoing, COMESA has made some gains in promoting socio­
economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa and overall, seems to 
be on the right trajectory in so far as making more socio-economic and political gains in 
the future is concerned. However, despite making these gains, COMESA’s performance 
at promoting development in Eastern and Southern Africa has been less than optimal due 
to a number o f socio-economic and political reasons. I shall now briefly examine some of 
these reasons.
At the socio-economic level, COMESA is confronted by a myriad o f problems. 
First, although intra-COMESA trade has grown since COMESA was established, 
COMESA member-states still predominantly rely on external parties as their most 
important trading partner(s) and not other COMESA member-states (see table 2 below). 
This extroverted nature o f the COMESA economy has been mainly attributed to lack of 
complementarities among COMESA member-states, most o f whom are producers and 
exporters o f similar primary products 628 . Second, COMESA has not acquired the 
necessary economic growth to effectively tackle the social dimension of development as, 
for example spelt out in the Millennium Development Goals (the MDG)629. In order to 
meet the Millennium Development Goals, COMESA needs an estimated growth rate o f at 
least 7% per annum so as to generate sufficient capital formation and the levels of 
employment needed to make the MDG a reality630. This growth rate translates to a 
minimum investment o f 25% o f the regions Gross Domestic Product (GDP)631.
However, the current domestic savings to GDP is about 11%, and the total 
regional investment to GDP ratio is 18%, with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
accounting for 7% of GDP . Therefore, COMESA needs to increase investment by at 
least 7% if  it must acquire the necessary economic wherewithal to implement the 
Millennium Development Goals. Third, although COMESA is committed to increasing 
the intra-regional flow of the factors o f production (capital and labour), so far, the 
achievements in this area remain lacklustre. In fact, on the issue o f free movement of 
people within the COMESA region, only three countries (out o f 20) have ratified the 
protocol on the free movement o f people within COMESA633.
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Table 2: the Structure of trade among COMESA Member States
COUNTRY Intra-COMESA Exports 
(As % of Total Exports)
Intra-COMESA Imports 
(As % of Total Imports)
1. Angola 0.04 1.78
2. Burundi 5.97 18.22
3. Djibouti 6.63 23.42
4. Egypt 1.11 0.89
5. Eritrea 11.77 1.32
6. Ethiopia 13.67 2.94
7. Kenya 43.77 1.78
8. Comoros 3.07 11.11
9. Madagascar 3.33 7.04
10. Maurituis 6.59 2.30
11. Malawi 10.38 15.35
12. Rwanda 79.16 19.23
13. Seychelles 0.63 3.46
14. Sudan 8.92 4.83
15. Swaziland 6.03 0.28
16. Uganda 11.30 21.85
17. Zambia 12.11 12.26
18. Zimbabwe 10.46 2.93
Source: COMESA Secretariat, 2002 Discussion Paper on “Economic Partnership Agreements”.
At the political level, COMESA has not done enough to ensure an active 
involvement o f the citizens o f this region in popular development as spelt out in its
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objectives634. What is more, although it has made some gains (as can be deduced from the 
role of some COMESA member states in Cancun) in bringing the economic issues o f the 
region to international attention, the COMESA member-states are still politically invisible 
internationally and or incapable o f effectively lobbying for COMESA’s agenda 
internationally635. So what chance does COMESA stand in its endeavour to promote 
development in Eastern and Southern Africa? While COMESA has made some gains and 
suffered some obvious limitations, a comparative analysis o f COMESA versus other 
regional integration arrangements in this thesis will help set out COMESA gains and 
limitations in sharp relief and also help in formulating recommendations that are likely to 
help make COMESA an effective tool for Eastern and Southern Africa’s development. 
This is the main task in next chapter o f this thesis.
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—Chapter Five—
(i) COMESA and Development in Eastern and Southern Africa: A Comparative
View
In this chapter, I discuss COMESA’s role in Eastern and Southern Africa’s development 
by conducting a comparative analysis o f COMESA within the EU, NAFTA, 
MERCOSUR and ASEAN contexts. While each o f these regional bodies is committed to 
the task o f promoting socio-economic and political development in their respective 
regions, all o f them have accomplished this task to varying degrees o f success. Here, I 
adopt a comparative analysis in order to accomplish two main tasks: First, to determine 
why some o f these regional integration arrangements have been more successful at the 
task o f promoting development within their regions than others and subsequently point 
out some o f the lessons that COMESA can learn, especially from the more successful 
regional integration arrangements; and second, based on this analysis and other general 
discussions in this thesis, to point out some internal and external challenges that 
COMESA must overcome so as to play a more effective socio-economic and political 
development role in Eastern and Southern Africa. But before embarking on these tasks, a 
brief discussion on how a comparative analysis o f these regional integration arrangements 
will contribute to accomplishment o f these two tasks is necessary.
A comparative analysis o f the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and 
COMESA is crucial in helping us establish a link between regionalism and development 
based on the following four reasons636: First, a comparative analysis o f these regional 
bodies is important since it helps in expanding the descriptive knowledge o f these 
organizations in a manner that makes it possible to develop detailed information about 
relatively unknown aspects o f their individual and systemic behaviour. From this 
information, it is possible to determine which individual and systemic behaviours are 
likely to promote regional developmentalism and which ones are not. Second, a 
comparative approach plays a leading role in helping both to identify and to explain the 
fundamental trends and patterns o f political behaviour across the regional bodies under 
comparison in this study. Useful theoretical generalizations, for example on such 
questions as what aspects o f political behaviour are important for successful regionalism,
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are drawn from these trends and patterns o f political behaviour. Third, a comparative 
study of the regional integration arrangements identified in this thesis is necessary in that 
it provides the background for making evaluative judgements on what is valid or good in 
one or more regional integration arrangements and therefore worth replicating in others. 
Fourth and finally, through accurate description, valid explanations and acceptable 
evaluations o f the data provided, the outcome o f this comparative analysis forms the 
foundation for making recommendations for successful regionalism in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. For example, the outcome o f this comparative study leads me to call for 
a reform to those aspects o f regional integrations arrangement— e.g. poor political 
leadership in the COMESA region—that are a clear hindrance to developmental 
regionalism in this region o f the world.
In this thesis, I conduct the comparative analysis o f the EU, NAFTA, 
MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA at three levels: the descriptive level, the analytical 
level and the conceptual level. First, at the descriptive level, though it is often difficult to 
achieve accurate comparisons o f descriptive data, I have attempted to minimize this 
problem by relying on data from credible and reliable sources such as the United Nations, 
Transparency International, Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation. Similarly, 
while I recognize that the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA are all 
unique organizations faced with different challenges and opportunities, an analytical and 
conceptual comparison o f these organizations (based on the information extracted from 
the foregoing sources), reveals some interesting trends and patterns in so far as their 
socio-economic and political configurations are concerned. As already noted above and 
as will shortly be shown below, these trends and patterns are important in helping to 
establish a link between regionalism and development and in providing the basis for 
offering some general suggestions on how COMESA could become a more effective 
vehicle for Eastern and Southern Africa’s development.
Second, at the analytical level, the comparison o f the regional integration 
arrangements in this study is based on the assumption that for a regional integration 
arrangement to be an effective paradigm o f development in its respective region, the 
integrating countries must be committed to addressing the overall development needs of
f \ X lthe people in their region at the social, economic and political levels . At the social level,
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successful, development-oriented regional integration arrangements continually seek to 
broaden the social networks in their regions by, among other things, increasing their 
capacity to address several development-enhancing factors such as promoting human 
rights and showing a firm commitment to the provision o f health and education to peoples 
in their region638. At the economic level, successful developmental regionalism normally 
seeks to expand the productive capacity o f the integrating countries by, for example: 
promoting good practices o f economic management through the elimination o f such vices 
as corruption, boosting their economies o f scale through expanded economic activities 
(key among them being increased volumes o f trade) and creating conducive environments 
for the emergence o f complementarities639. Finally, at the political level, successful 
regional integration arrangements are those that are committed to nurturing positive 
political ethos such as the rule o f law, the promotion of a democratic culture and the 
establishment o f a stable political dispensation both within and among the integration 
countries.
Third, at the conceptual level, I conduct the EU’s, NAFTA’s, MERCOSUR’s, 
ASEAN’s and COMESA’s comparison within the following benchmarks outlining some 
o f the characteristics o f successful regional integration arrangements640:
>  Proximity, successful regional integration arrangements often involve 
geographically contiguous countries or countries within the same broad 
geographic area.
>  Level o f  integration'. They often involve countries that exhibit high levels of cross- 
border trade and investment, including intra-corporate transfers and inter­
corporate alliances, before the negotiation o f the regional agreement. In effect, the 
regional agreement is more likely to be the result of, rather than the precursor to, 
closer economic relations.
>  Similarity. Successful agreements are more likely to be found among countries 
with similar levels o f economic development, legal structures, business cultures, 
political institutions and cultural values.
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>  Institutional maturity. Partners in such an agreement are likely to boast political 
and economic institutions that have developed over time and are capable of 
adjusting to the demands o f a regional agreement.
>  Stake: Partners in such an agreement are likely to have a high or similar stake in 
the success o f the agreement and would face problems in the absence o f an 
agreement.
>  Commitment: Successful agreements involve a significant commitment by the 
parties to open, rules-based relationships.
>  Power relationship: Disparities o f power—political and socio-economic— among 
parties to the agreement are such that it is possible to provide for full reciprocity 
and equality o f obligations, both de jure and de facto.
>  Economic impacts: On the whole, successful agreements are more likely to be 
trade creating than trade diverting. While there may be some trade diversion in the 
early stages, the mature agreement leads to net growth in economic activity and 
prosperity for the members rather than the redistribution o f trade and investment 
patterns.
>  Dynamism: Successful agreements grow and expand as the extent o f integration 
among the parties deepens.
It should be noted that the above characteristics are only a general, if  not ideal, guideline 
and that none of the regional integration arrangements identified in this study possesses 
all of these characteristics. However, having said this, it is important to note that those 
regional integration arrangements, which possess a greater degree of these characteristics, 
tend to be more successful than those, which do not.
The comparative analysis in this section is based on a few select and measurable 
development indicators data from the following categories: the socio-economic and 
political category (see table 3 below); the public spending category (see table 4 below) 
and the structure o f trade category (see table 5 below). Based on the content o f the data 
provided in tables 3 to 5, a comparative analysis o f NAFTA, the EU, MERCOSUR, 
ASEAN and COMESA reveals the following comparable attributes o f successful regional
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integration arrangements: similarity (this attribute must be qualified in terms o f positive 
versus negative similarity, and depending on the direction o f measurement, a positively 
higher—marked by a strong positive score— similarity level is the most desirable 
attribute); institutional maturity; level o f integration and commitment. I will examine 
these attributes in turn.
Table 3
Selected Socio-economic and Political Development Indicators in NAFTA, the EU MERCOSUR, 
ASEAN and COMESA
INDICATOR NAFTA The EU MERCOSUR ASEAN COMESA
GDP per 
Capita
US$ 24,733 US$ 22,823 US$ 7,773 US$ 7,389 US$ 3,143
School
Enrolment
87 percent 86.5 percent 85.6 percent 67.9 percent 53.2 percent
L.E.A.B 76.5 years 73.5 years 72 years 67.1 years 48.7 years
Health Exp. 
Per capita
US$ 2,741 US$ 1527.8 US$ 752 US$ 287.1 127.3
Public Educ. 
Expenditure
5.3 percent 4.9 percent 4 percent 3.4 percent 5.1 percent
Telephone 
lines/1000
476 465.4 192.3 131.1 46.2
Internet 
users/1000
342.3 353.9 82.6 111.0 20.2
Patents
granted/mill.
111.7 65.7 2 9.7 0.1
P. E.F 2.23 2.17 3.45 3.33 3.34
C.P.I 6.5 6.6 3.6 3.8 2.7
P.O.P.F 1.3 1.0 2.0 4.9 4.6
The data above was extracted from the following sources: The Human Development Index, 2003 
Report; The Heritage Foundation, 2005 Index of Economic Freedom Report; Transparency 
International, 2005 Global Corruption Report and Freedom House, 2005 Freedom in the World 
Report.
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Legend:
1. L.E.A.B: Life Expectancy At Birth
2. P.E.F: Perceptions of Economic Freedom
3. C.P.I: Corruption Perception Index
4. P.O.P.F: Perception of Political Freedom
Notes:
• GDP Per Capita: The figures used here are for 2002
• Public Health Expenditure: The figures here are in US$ PPP. They are a percentage of the 2001 
GDP.
• Public Expenditure on Education: Calculated as a percentage of the 1999-2001 GDP
• The figures for telephone main lines per thousand, Internet users per thousand are for the year 
2002 while the figures for patents granted to residents per million are for the year 2000.
The similarity attribute posits that successful regional integration arrangements 
are likely to be found among countries with similar levels o f economic development, 
business cultures, political institutions and cultural values. As can be seen from Table 3 
above, positive similarity is strongest in NAFTA and the EU, fairly strong in 
MERCOSUR and ASEAN and rather weak in COMESA in the following development 
indicators: GDP per Capita, School Enrolment and Life Expectancy at Birth. On health 
expenditure per capita, NAFTA and the EU have the highest positive similarity among 
the member states; MERCOSUR has a fairly positive similarity among the member states 
while ASEAN and COMESA have the lowest positive similarity among their member 
states. However, all the regional integration arrangements tend to be fairly similar in their 
public education expenditure, although the EU and NAFTA still have higher percentages 
in this area. The level o f similarity in telephone lines/1000 and internet users/1000 is 
positively high in the EU and NAFTA, fairly high in MERCOSUR and ASEAN and low 
in COMESA. In patents granted per million, NAFTA (mainly because o f the US factor 
and the small number o f member states) leads the pack while the EU, ASEAN, 
MERCOSUR and COMESA follow in that order. All the regional integration 
arrangements seem to be committed to a fairly similar business culture as is reflected in 
their levels o f economic freedom. The EU and NAFTA have the highest positive 
similarity in the political culture o f their member states as is reflected in the political 
freedoms enjoyed in their respective regions. In this regard, MERCOSUR has a fairly 
high level o f positive similarity in its political culture while ASEAN and the COMESA 
have rather low positive similarity levels in their political cultures. Finally, based on the
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data in table 3, it can be deduced that the corruption scores are highest and positive in the 
EU and NAFTA and low in MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA.
Table 4
Priorities in public spending in NAFTA, the EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA
PRIORITY
AREA
NAFTA The EU MERCOSUR ASEAN COMESA
EDUCATION 
(as % 1999- 
2001 GDP
5.3 4.9 4.0 3.4 5.1
HEALTH
(as % of 2001
GDP)
5.2 5.6 4.1 1.5 2.7
MILITARY 
(as % of 2002 
GDP)
1.7 1.7 1.4 3.0 4.5
DEBT SERV. 
(as % of 2002 
GDP)
*006̂ 13.3* 8.4 7.5 3.7
R & D
(as % of 2002 
GDP
1.7 1.5 0.4 0.9* 0.4*
Source: This data was computed from the Human Development Indicators 2003 Report 
Note: The asterisk (*) on NAFTA scores points to the fact that this score is high due to Mexico’s high-
debt servicing responsibilities while that on EU points to the fact that the score is higher due to the fact that 
most of the new EU entrants have high debt-serving obligations. Under R&D, the asterisk indicates limited 
data availability from ASEAN and COMESA respectively.
Table 4 above provides the social dimension commitment in terms of public spending in 
some selected priority areas. From the data in table 4, it can be deduced that NAFTA and 
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COMESA place the highest priority in spending on education; the EU and MERCOSUR 
place a high priority in the education expenditure while ASEAN’s expenditure in 
education is lower than that o f all the other regional integration arrangements. The EU 
and NAFTA have the highest expenditure in health, followed by MERCOSUR, 
COMESA and ASEAN in that order. COMESA and ASEAN have the highest military 
expenditure, followed by NAFTA, the EU and MERCOSUR. The EU spends the highest 
amount in debt serving. However, it should be noted that most o f this expenditure is 
incurred by the recent (2004) EU entrants. MERCOSUR spends the second highest 
amount in debt-servicing. It is then followed by NAFTA, where the debt servicing mainly 
falls within the Mexican jurisdiction. COMESA spends the lowest amount in debt 
servicing. However, the COMESA figures need to be qualified as they are not a reflection 
o f the least debt burden, but rather, the inability o f most COMESA member states to meet 
their debt repayment obligations641. Finally, in terms of expenditure in research and 
development, NAFTA and the EU have the highest expenditure, followed by ASEAN 
with COMESA and MERCOSUR tied.
Finally, Table 5 below provides the economic dimension o f the regional 
integration arrangements in this study. From this table, it can be seen that the EU and 
ASEAN are the leading exporters o f goods and services, followed by COMESA, NAFTA 
and MERCOSUR. COMESA and MERCOSUR are the leading exporters o f primary 
products followed by ASEAN, NAFTA and the EU in that order. The EU and NAFTA 
are the leading exporters o f manufactured products, followed by ASEAN, MERCOSUR 
and COMESA. Lastly, ASEAN is the leading exporter o f high-tech products, followed by 
NAFTA, the EU, MERCOSUR and COMESA in that order.
While I do not intend to draw simple causal relationships between the data above 
and developmental regionalism, it is nonetheless possible to establish general patterns and 
trends from these data. For example, the EU and NAFTA, which are generally regarded 
as successful regional integration arrangements, tend to consistently score high in the 
social, economic and political dimensions o f development as per the above selected 
categories. At the social level, the EU and NAFTA’s expenditures in health and research 
and development are higher than those o f the other regional bodies. As can be seen from 
the data, the dividends from these higher social expenditures include high levels o f life
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expectancy and high levels o f innovation, which in turn provides an important ingredient 
for successful regionalism. For example, as a result o f research and development, the EU 
and NAFTA produces high value, manufactured products, and this means higher 
economic returns for these regions.
Table 5




NAFTA the EU MERCOSUR ASEAN COMESA
Goods and 
Services
27 55.0 24.3 64. 29.3
Primary
Exports
20 19.5 64.3 21 71.8
Manufactured
Exports
76 78.5 34.3 47.3 24.7
High Tech. 
Exports
22.3 13.0 8.0 39 3.5
Source: Human Development Indicators 2003 Report.
At the economic level, the EU and NAFTA have higher levels o f GDP per capita 
compared to MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA. These higher levels o f GDP mean 
that the citizens o f these regional integration arrangements are fairly wealthy and 
therefore capable o f participating in the market mechanism both as producers and 
consumers o f good and services642. Owing to their higher incomes, the citizens of 
NAFTA and EU are more likely—compared those of MERCOSUR, ASEAN and 
COMESA—to have some disposable income, which they can in turn invest and therefore 
help to increase both the agglomeration effects and the economic complementarities of 
their respective regions643.
At the political level, the data indicate that the citizens in the EU and NAFTA 
enjoy a higher degree o f political freedom compared to those in MERCOSUR, ASEAN 
and COMESA. Political freedom is an essential component o f development since it 
ensures that the citizen’s input in the development policies that directly affect their
129
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
overall well-being is not ignored by political decrees or directives644. Additionally, 
political freedom ensures that the political leaders are held accountable and that their 
decisions, to the greatest extent possible, reflect the wishes o f the citizens645.
Therefore, from the foregoing, it can be said, and with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy that the EU and NAFTA are fairly successful regional integration arrangements 
because they possess a good number o f the features and characteristics that make for 
successful regional integration arrangements. And as can be seen from the data, the other 
regional integration arrangements have made varying degrees o f progress in developing 
these features and characteristics. For example, COMESA’s expenditure on education as 
a percentage o f the GDP is one o f the highest among all the other regional integration 
arrangements. Similarly, in terms of levels o f economic freedom, all the regional 
integration arrangements in this study have fairly similar levels o f economic freedom. 
MERCOSUR, another regional integration arrangement that is seen to be fairly successful, 
especially among third world regional integration arrangements, scores impressively in 
terms of GDP per capita, school enrolment and health expenditure. ASEAN has done well 
the exports o f goods and services, especially in the manufacturing and high-tech sector.
However, apart from the information derived from the data above, other factors 
can be attributed to the varying degrees o f regional integration success. These factors 
include a combination o f internal and external factors that have made some regional 
integration arrangements more successful than others. For example, the EU has grown 
into a formidable regional integration arrangement because at its formative stages, the US 
was fully committed to the idea o f a united Western Europe, mainly as a means to wade- 
off perceived Soviet expansionism646. Hence, in order to ensure the success o f the idea of 
a united Europe, capable o f resisting the lure and or coercion o f the USSR, the US 
substantially contributed to this idea through the Marshall Plan and through encouraging 
the emergence o f regionalism in Western Europe647.
Similarly, the lessening rivalry between France and West Germany, fostered 
through the creation o f strong economic ties, was instrumental in launching the idea o f 
regionalism in Western Europe onto a more hopeful path for growth648. Finally, the strong 
position held by the EU in such multi-lateral organizations as the WTO, the UN, the IMF
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and the World Bank and in its bilateral relations with a number o f developed and 
developing countries has given the EU the necessary leverage to bargain for favourable 
economic policies at the international level 649. These policies have significantly 
contributed to the EU’s success650.
As the de facto power in NAFTA and the biggest economy in the world, the US 
has continued to expand both NAFTA’s and its personal agenda regionally and 
internationally. Like the EU, NAFTA, particularly through the US, continues to strike 
favourable deals at the WTO level and at the level o f bilateral relations with other 
countries and or regional integration arrangements651. In MERCOSUR, Brazil and 
Argentina have taken the lead in championing the objectives o f their member states while 
increased levels o f FDI have meant improved prospects for the emergence o f a successful 
regional integration arrangement652. ASEAN has benefited greatly from Chinese and 
Japanese capital while promoting such vital sectors as the high-tech industry653. Finally, 
given its socio-economic and political climate, COMESA’s developmental regionalism 
gains are not as negligible as they are normally portrayed in the literature654. However, for 
COMESA to build on these gains and therefore transform itself into a more viable 
institution for Eastern and Southern Africa’s development, it must overcome a number of 
challenges and act on those areas where its prospects for success are highest. I will now 
examine COMESA’s challenges in so far as the development o f Eastern and Southern 
Africa is concerned before making some general recommendations on the way forward 
and drawing some conclusions on COMESA’s development prospects for the future.
(ii) COMESA and Development in Eastern and Southern Africa: Challenges,
Recommendations and Prospects.
(a) Challenges to COMESA’s Developmental Regionalism Efforts in Eastern 
and Southern Africa.
While COMESA faces a number o f challenges in its efforts to promote socio­
economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa, here I limit my 
discussion to the following: institutional constraints; structural constraints; infrastructural 
constraints and international constraints. COMESA’s institutional constraints are
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reflected in a number o f ways. First, at the executive level, the implementation o f the 
COMESA protocols is mainly left to the COMESA Authority and a few bureaucrats in 
the member states655. This renders the COMESA Secretariat an ineffective body and 
reduces its task to report writing and documentation. Second, because each member state 
is supposed to independently enforce the COMESA protocols, there is poor coordination 
in regional social, economic and political policy areas656. A third institutional constrain 
can be attributed to COMESA’s sheer size and the multiplicity o f regional integration 
arrangements within this regional body . The common cliche holds that bigger is better.
However, bigger is not always better, especially when (as is the case with 
COMESA) it is not backed up by sufficient capacity658. COMESA’s expansive size and 
its limited capacity to effectively promote developmental regionalism in this vast region 
o f the African continent is one o f the challenges that must be addressed before 
COMESA’s efficacy as a regional development initiative can be bolstered. Additionally, 
multiple memberships in different regional integration arrangements within and outside 
COMESA further reduce its capacity for effective developmental regionalism659. Finally, 
as can be seen from the data above, COMESA has not built effective political institutions 
and is confronted by such bad-govemance practices as high levels o f corruption660. The 
absence o f well-functioning political institutions among the COMESA member states is 
not conducive to developmental regionalism because: it reduces the political will needed 
to propel regional integration; increases the perception o f COMESA as a high risk region 
and therefore discourages both local and international investment; and finally, it denies 
regionalism the much needed input from the citizens of this region and hence leads 
politicians to pursue wrong priorities (e.g. massive military expenditures) at the expense 
the high priority development areas like health and education.
Low levels o f economic complementarities among the member states form one of 
the main structural constraints in COMESA’s efforts to promote development in Eastern 
and Southern Africa. As already noted above, COMESA member states are mainly 
producers and exporters of primary products. COMESA’s exports are normally destined 
for the same markets in Europe and North America and this has meant increased 
competition (not cooperation) among the COMESA member states661. What is more, the 
economic returns and profits from primary products have considerably declined over the
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years and as a result, the levels o f income in most COMESA countries are lower than that 
in other regions o f the world. A limited capital base means that a substantial number of 
the COMESA citizens are excluded from actively participating in COMESA’s market 
mechanism. As a result, there is a limited chance o f economic diversification and the 
continued reliance on a few primary products for the international market662.
At the infrastructural level, COMESA’s constrains are manifested through an 
under-developed regional transport and telecommunications network663. This constraint is 
exacerbated in COMESA’s landlocked states like Uganda, Rwanda, Zambia, Sudan and 
Malawi where entire regions are isolated from meaningful cross-border development. The 
development o f an extensive transport and telecommunications network is a major 
requirement for successful regional integration and COMESA must address this 
challenge664.
Finally, COMESA’s efforts at promoting developmental regionalism are 
constrained by the international environment, which seems to cater for large, well- 
established industrial and technology-driven regional integration arrangements like the 
EU and NAFTA while further marginalizing the weaker, primary-product driven 
integration arrangements like COMESA665. Additionally, owing to their socio-economic 
and political largesse, the more successful regional integration arrangements like the EU 
and NAFTA have erected unfavourable trade barriers in the agricultural sector666. This is 
one area where COMESA possesses the so-called comparative advantage and therefore, 
the impact and the effect o f these barriers has made COMESA even less competitive in 
the emerging post-cold War global economy667. So the question is: what are some o f the 
ways in which COMESA can overcome, nay, limit the foregoing challenges. I offer some 
recommendations next.
(b) Recommendations on Reducing COMESA’s Challenges to Successful
Regionalism in Eastern and Southern Africa:
The recommendations given here are in no way exhaustive. However, they 
provide a general outline on some o f the measures that COMESA can undertake so as to 
limit or overcome the negative impact o f the challenges identified and therefore bolster its 
role in the socio-economic and political development o f Eastern and Southern Africa. So
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as to overcome the above challenges and so as to bolster its development role, COMESA 
should:
>  Give the Secretariat more executive authority, especially in the implementation of 
those protocols that have already been ratified by the COMESA authority. This 
will bring about a more coordinated approach to policy implementation within 
COMESA.
> Rationalize and harmonize the process o f integration among the member states. 
The first approach here will entail COMESA persuading those member states who 
belong to other regional integration arrangements to quit their membership in 
these regional bodies and therefore concentrate their efforts and resources to 
building o f a stronger and more efficient regional integration arrangement based 
on regional integration co-ordination centres: an Eastern Africa Coordination 
Centre (to be based in Nairobi, Kenya); a Southern Africa Coordination Centre 
( to be based in Harare, Zimbabwe) and a Northern Africa Coordination Centre 
( to be based in Cairo, Egypt). These centres will act as the engine-heads of 
integration in COMESA and the focal points for COMESA-wide integration. The 
centres should be under the overall co-ordination of the COMESA Secretariat.
>  Promote a culture o f good political governance and uphold the rule o f law. As 
already noted above, incidents o f political instability and lack o f a strong, rules- 
based legal environment have had a negative impact on regionalism in this region 
o f the world.
>  Encourage the emergence o f complementarities in the region through promoting a 
broad auto-centric approach to development. While COMESA should continue 
seeking external markets, it should first start by unleashing the latent potential o f 
its under-utilized market by encouraging increased regional production for 
increased regional consumption. To this end, and as already suggested above, 
COMESA should focus on improving its regional infrastructure, especially its 
transport and communication network so as to further boost regional trade and 
improve its overall economic performance. Additionally, COMESA should invest 
more in health and education as a means of increasing its regional and 
international competitiveness.
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>  Finally, COMESA should continue liaising with other regional integration 
arrangements and countries, especially those from the developing world to endure 
that its socio-economic and political development agenda is not ignored at the 
multi-lateral level.
In light o f the challenges above and the recommendations given thereof, what prospects 
does COMESA have in so far as promoting socio-economic and political development in 
Eastern and Southern Africa is concerned? I offer a brief response to this question next.
(c) COMESA: Prospects for Eastern and Southern Africa’s Development
Despite the challenges identified above, COMESA’s prospects for promoting 
development in Eastern and Southern Africa look promising for a number o f reasons. 
First, although COMESA’s socio-economic and political development gains look 
minimal in comparison to the other regional integration arrangements, they are 
nonetheless important gains, especially given COMESA’s level o f integration668. Second, 
COMESA has laid out some important plans in terms of developing its transport and 
telecommunications sector. For example, in the transportation sector, COMESA has made 
impressive progress in liberalizing its skies and harmonizing its road and rail cross-border 
transportation procedures669. In the telecommunication sector, COMESA is in the 
process o f building and installing a regional telecommunication network dubbed 
COMTEL670. All these measures are likely to boost COMESA’s regional trading 
activities and therefore lead to increased economic growth.
Third, since the end of the Cold War, most COMESA states are breaking away 
from the shackles o f repressive political regimes and embracing more democratic forms 
o f governance. While this process is slow, and at times beset by retrogressive political 
developments (such as the current case in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe and Kabila’s DRC), 
overall, COMESA and Africa in general are moving away from the political horrors o f Idi 
Amin, Mobutu SeSe Seko, Jean Bokassa, Mariam Mengistu that haunted Africa from the 
1960s to the beginning o f the 1990s. New mechanisms o f moderating political conflict in 
Africa, such as a re-vitalized African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) are likely to ensure the non-emergence o f such despicable
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regimes671. Additionally, as already mentioned above, political stability and normalcy are 
returning to Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan. The emerging political climate in COMESA is 
generally tranquil and therefore likely to foster COMESA’s socio-economic and political 
development pursuits.
What is more, at the international level, the development concerns o f some of 
COMESA’s member states are being taken into consideration through, for example, the 
recent G8 debt cancellation for the least developed countries672. Overall, the African 
agenda is being taken into account through such initiatives as Tony Blair’s Commission 
for Africa and the United States o f America’s African Growth Opportunity Act and the 
EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) trade strategy674. Therefore, from the foregoing and as 
I have attempted to show throughout this thesis and while some challenges and 
limitations still exist, the contention that COMESA’s has good prospects for bringing 
about socio-economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa 
compared to other past development strategies is not far-fetched.
(iii) Summary and Conclusion
In this thesis, I have examined the political economy o f regionalism by looking at 
regionalism and its viability as a strategy for Africa’s socio-economic and political 
development. I started my discussion with a theoretical analysis o f regionalism. Then 
next, I examined different theories o f development and pointed out their inherent 
limitations before presenting some reasons why regionalism is a better development 
strategy for Africa than the other theoretical formulations on development. In exploring 
the viability o f regionalism as a development strategy for Africa, I conducted a 
comparative analysis o f the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
versus the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN. It has been my contention that while 
all these regional integration arrangements are confronted by unique challenges and 
operate under different circumstances in their respective regions, a comparative analysis 
o f these regional bodies exhibits certain trends and patterns that are closely related to their 
perceived degree o f success as avenues for socio-economic and political development.
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For example, from the comparative analysis o f the regional integration 
arrangements in this study, it was found that the regions committed to a more holistic 
approach to development are the one that are, overall more successful. Hence, those 
regions that have invested more in the socio-economic dimension o f development through 
committing more funds to health, education, research and development and in 
information telecommunications technology tend to have positive regional development 
input factors such as healthy citizens, innovative citizens and high-income earning 
citizens. The same trend is reflected in the political dimension o f development, with those 
regional bodies boasting o f higher levels o f political freedoms and low levels o f mal- 
govemance (i.e. low levels of corruption) also being perceived as more successful. Going 
by the select data used in the comparative analysis o f the regional integration 
arrangements in this study, COMESA’s scores are comparatively lower than those of the 
other regional integration arrangements in most development categories except for 
Education and economic freedom where the scores are more or less similar for all the 
regional bodies.
While the scores from this comparative analysis have been useful in helping to 
identify some o f the reasons for low regional integration success in COMESA, I have also 
identified other institutional, structural, infrastructural and international environment 
constrains to successful regionalism in this regional integration arrangement. Within this 
context, I made some recommendations and based on a number o f reasons, argued that 
COMESA’s has good prospects for bringing about socio-economic and political 
development in Eastern and Southern Africa.
Yes! It is true that compared to the other regional integration arrangements in this 
study, COMESA’s developmental regionalism gains look minimal. However, within its 
present socio-economic and political capacity, COMESA has done fairly well. What is 
more, COMESA has put in place mechanisms to improve its performance and if, 
perchance, it takes the above recommendations into consideration, it is likely to improve 
on its performance even more. However, the greatest hope for COMESA comes from the 
fact that for the first time, COMESA (and indeed all the other regional integration 
arrangements in Africa) has a real chance o f shaping its socio-economic and political
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outcome in an environment that encourages less adversarial regional and multi-lateral 
cooperation. Before the end o f the Cold War, such an environment was not really 
available and international politics, regional integration arrangements notwithstanding, 
was mainly shaped by the geopolitical interests o f the US and the USSR. The Cold War 
era is over. The people o f Africa and indeed the whole world are shaping their socio­
economic and political fortunes under a different era— globalization. For many people 
and for many states in the international system, regionalism has become one o f the main 
ways through which such fortunes are being determined. For the people o f Eastern and 
Southern Africa, COMESA provides an appropriate vehicle through which the journey of 
developmental regionalism in a globalizing world is being taken.
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